Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

u.s. engagement in somalia: frames, missed opportunities, and alternative options
US engagement in Somalia:
Frames, missed opportunities and
alternative options
Laura Weis
Executive summary
For many Americans, recent drone strikes against alleged terrorists or the memory
of humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s characterize the scope of US
engagement in Somalia. Perhaps less well remembered, but no less significant,
are US-Somali relations during the Cold War era. Examining US involvement in
Somalia over time sheds light on patterns of engagement that have in some cases
obstructed peacebuilding efforts or contributed to perpetuating cycles of violence.
It also reveals potential lessons to be learned from missed opportunities.
In the following, two related questions are explored, proposed by the Life &
Peace Institute (LPI):
• How has the “war on terror” framed US engagement in Somalia, and how was
it framed before 2001?
• What are the possibilities for peacebuilding that may have been obstructed due
to the “war on terror” or previous ideological frameworks, and what alternative
frames for US engagement may exist?
Exploring the first question provides historical context for the second, which
seeks to understand the consequences of that history, while also envisioning alternatives
that could facilitate positive changes in US policy toward Somalia. The
first section of this article presents a brief overview of US involvement in Somalia
from the Cold War to the present and suggests how particular frameworks may
have contributed to missed opportunities for a constructive US role in Somalia,
or obstructed Somali and NGO led peacebuilding efforts. The second section offers
modest recommendations informed by the discussion of missed opportunities
and posits an alternative framework for US engagement with Somalia.
Frames and missed opportunities
Cold War Frame: 1950s-1980s
After World War II, Cold War considerations framed US engagement in the Horn
of Africa. The US and the Soviet Union vied for influence in the region, shifting
support in response to ideological allegiance, changing governments, and geopolitical
interests. 1 The US provided approximately $1 billion in military aid to the Horn
of Africa, including $380 million to Somalia, between 1954 and 1987. US bilateral
economic aid to Somalia during the same period totaled $677 million. 2 Professor
and former US diplomat David Rawson referred to military and economic assistance
packages during the late 1970s and 1980s as the “security/development mix”. 3
1 Peter Woodward, US Foreign
Policy and the Horn of Africa
(Aldershot, Hampshire, England;
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006),
pp. 17-22. See also Ken Menkhaus,
“US foreign assistance to Somalia:
phoenix from the ashes?” Middle
East Policy, (5:1) (January 1997),
p. 127.
2 Woodward, p. 127. The Soviet
Union was Somalia’s primary ally
during the 1970s, while the US
offered military and economic
support during the 1960s and
1980s. See also Menkhaus (1997),
p. 127.
3 David Rawson, in Ken Menkhaus,
“US foreign assistance to Somalia:
phoenix from the ashes?” Middle
East Policy (5:1) (January 1997),
p. 129.
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