Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

civilian support and the foundations of al-shabaab expansion
ing rebellion an individually rational activity. 3 While offering selective benefits to
individuals is an effective way of recruiting and maintaining support, this is often
difficult to do on the scale necessary to secure adequate control over a region’s
non-combatant population. 4 Thus, rebel organizations often turn to other sources
of benefits by providing governance services that benefit large swaths of the targeted
population. The form governance takes varies between organizations and
conflicts, but it can include taxation, redistribution of wealth, provision of public
health care, education, infrastructure, and welfare payments. Providing security
and stability is another crucial function rebel organizations perform in areas under
their control. This is one of the most-cited reasons for why both the ICU and
al-Shabaab gained popularity quickly among the Somali population. 5
Because civilians are not merely pawns in the interaction between governments
and rebel groups in civil conflicts, they have some autonomy in expressing
demands for services provided by either side. Civilian loyalty goes to the group
that can provide a “better deal” to the affected populations. 6 Hence, governance by
rebel organizations is rooted in the demand for services expressed by the population,
though this demand varies in nature and magnitude from context to context.
A substantial factor in determining what types of governance civilians demand
is their prior history with the state apparatus. Populations become socialized to
the state apparatus they are exposed to and expect similar benefits and protection
from a competing rebel organization. When a state has established deep administrative
and extractive roots in society through extensive taxation and service provision,
citizen demands for governance services will be high. Conversely, when a
state is historically weak, predatory, and has no established record of providing
welfare benefits, health care, and even security, citizens will demand relatively little
from a rebel organization in control of their territory. 7 When states have been
historically weak, it will be easier for alternative groups to gain loyalty of civilians
by establishing their own government structures.
However, it is costly to extend benefits, especially governance, to civilians within
even a small area. 8 When desired levels of civilian support are not achieved
through incentives, groups resort to using force to coerce support. Violence is a
function of the level of control over a group of people. When control and support
are high, there is little need to coerce further support. However, when territory
is contested, violence is high as fighting groups compete for support. 9 Civilians
respond to violence by supporting the actor who poses the most credible threat,
which can easily vary as a conflict progresses.
All violence is not equal, though. When actors hold good information, they are
able to selectively employ violence against suspected spies and informants. However,
when information about whom within the local population supports specific
actors is low, as it can be in areas contested by multiple actors, careful application
of violence against selected individuals is no longer possible. In these circumstances,
actors are restricted to employing indiscriminate violence in hopes of
creating fear in the population. Predictably, this can often backfire by substantially
increasing civilian resentment for the perpetrator of violence. 10
3 See Fearon, James D. and
David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity,
Insurgency, and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review
97(1): 75-90; Collier, Paul and
Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and
Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford
Economic Papers 56(4): 563-595.
This has also been confirmed
by a survey of ex-combatants in
Sierra Leone that identified lack of
economic opportunities as a key
factor motivating participation in
the conflict; Humphreys, Macartan
and Jeremy Weinstein. 2008.
“Who Fights? The Determinants
of Participation in Civil War.”
American Journal of Political Science
52(2): 436-455.
4 Kalyvas, Logic of Violence
5 Shay, Shaul. 2008. Somalia
between Jihad and Restoration. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers.
6 Wood, Reed Morrison. 2010.
Competing for Control: Conflict
Power Dynamics, Civilian loyalties
and Violence in Civil War. Ph.D.
dissertation for the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
7 Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian.
2007. Stationary Bandits:
Understanding Rebel Governance.
Ph.D. dissertation for the
University of California at Los
Angeles.
8 See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence,
and Mampilly, Stationary Bandits.
9 Ibid. See also Kalyvas, Stathis
N. 1999. “Wanton and Senseless?
The Logic of Massacres in Algeria.”
Rationality and Society 11(3):
243-285.
10 See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence
and “Wanton and Senseless? The
Logic of Massacres in Algeria”
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