Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

laura weis
42 Ledearach, p. 47.
43 Lederach, pp. 182-183, 79-80.
44 Lederach, p. 84.
45 See, for example, David
Smock, “How to Respond to
Somalia’s Current Crisis”,
USIP Peace Brief, August 2006.
Available online at: http://www.
usip.org/publications/howrespond-somalias-current-crisis.
46 Conversation with LPI.
47 See Besteman’s discussion of
clans in Section I.
48 Menkhaus et al (2010), p. 347.
49 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists”,
International Crisis Group Africa
Briefing No. 74 (May 18, 2010), p. 17.
48
relational spaces” and is “capable of generating adaptive change processes that
address both the episodic expression of the conflict and the epicenter of the
conflictive relational context” is fundamental to supporting constructive social
change over time. 42
Lederach defines horizontal capacity as “the ability to build and sustain relationship
spaces of constructive interaction across the lines of division in systems
and societies divided by historic patterns of identity conflicts”. Vertical capacity
refers to “relationship building across levels of leadership, authority, and responsibility
within a society or system, from grassroots to the highest, most visible
leaders”. Finally, integration “is the space where vertical and horizontal linkages
come together”. 43 Integration requires strategic connections, “a web process” that
intentionally links not-like-minded and not-like-situated people, that watches for
and builds spaces for where these relationships can intersect, and that creates
adaptive and flexible platforms that can respond to changing environments and
ongoing issues. 44
Key questions for Somali peacebuilding include who builds horizontal and
vertical capacity? Who integrates these capacities? How are the links, spaces,
and platforms necessary for change created? Some experts advocate a process of
grassroots based clan reconciliation organized by Somalis in Somalia, as part of
a comprehensive peace process, rather than viewing the conflict through the narrow
lens of terrorism, or as between Islamist extremists and moderate Islam. 45
Indeed, the lens of the war on terror has led the US to exclude some key actors
like al-Shabaab, from dialogue. Likewise, clans and sub clans play a critical role in
Somali society, and much of the violence during the past two decades has pitted
clans against one another. However, as one NGO suggested, pursuing a process
of clan reconciliation could exacerbate existing divisions rather than drawing on
linkages present between and across clans. 46 In addition, the current expression
of violence may be clan based, but the root causes of the conflict may lie in issues
that cut across clans. 47
In a recent case study, Menkhaus et al conclude that Somali civil society groups
have had “mixed success transcending clan, regional, and ideological divisions in
the country, with certain types of social movements, networks, and organizations
(such as business partnerships) better suited to bridging these divisions than others”.
They note that “civic peacebuilding has been most successful when pursued
as the result of hybrid partnerships among different civic actors, bringing together
professionals, women’s groups, clan elders, businesspeople, and clergy”. 48
Additionally, the International Crisis Group has called for efforts to reach out to
elements of al-Shabaab open to some form of political settlement, noting that a
limited engagement strategy that deliberately excludes al-Shabaab will not help to
pacify Somalia. 49
Recommendation: The US should utilize its resources and influence to support
international and Somali efforts to build vertical and horizontal capacity
and relationships.