Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

douglas ansel
11 Wood, Competing for Control.
12 For example, Kalyvas asserts
that the majority of noncombatants
are less preoccupied
with the ideological goals of
groups and primarily wish to
remain uninvolved in a conflict.
Only when the threat of violence
or amounts of benefits available
are sufficiently large do noncombatants
cease “fence-sitting”.
13 In Sierra Leone, for example,
members of the Mende ethnic
group were substantially more
likely to support and join the
Revolutionary United Front than
other individuals. See Humphrey
and Weinstein “Who Rebels?”
14 Barnes, Cedric and Harun
Hassan. 2007. “The Rise and Fall
of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.”
Journal of Eastern African Studies
1(2): 151-160.
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In sum, civilian support for rebel organizations originates in both the services
that they provide as well as the threat of violence. When choosing the “packages”
of coercion and benefits, each side can be expected to provide, civilians weigh
both short- and long-term concerns. If perception of a group’s relative strength
falls, defection will occur rapidly. 11 Ideological affinity with an organization is the
final factor that enters into civilian calculations of support. While some scholars
downplay the importance of this aspect 12 , religious and ethnic ties as well as nationalism
can provide strong affinities to a fighting organization. 13
Applied to Somalia
Applying the framework generated above to the case of al-Shabaab’s growth in
Somalia from 2006 to the present sheds insight on the sources of apparent support
for the movement as well as what can be expected to happen in the future.
Several factors combined to allow the rapid expansion of al-Shabaab from 2006
to the present.
First, the decline of the ICU in 2006 was not matched by an extension of state
authority into South-Central Somalia. Without a serious competing group, it was
easy for al-Shabaab to establish civilian support at a low cost. The movement was
able to subsume local clans and build support with a minimum level of violence.
Had the government been able to extend the rule of law outside of sections of
Mogadishu after it defeated the ICU with the help of Ethiopia, al-Shabaab’s rise to
prominence would have been much less rapid.
Second, the historically weak and predatory state in Somalia established a low
threshold of expectations citizens have for groups contending for control of territory
or the state. Unlike countries like Sri Lanka, where the legacy of a stronger
state forced the rebels to provide many social services, al-Shabaab has been able
to provide a minimum level of stability and little else. The history of the Somali
state both created the setting in which such expansion could happen for the ICU
and al-Shabaab and also lowered the bar for a successful governance structure.
This is not a reaction to merely the period after the fall of Siad Barre in the early
1990s. Instead, the entire development of the Somali state has contributed to this
situation. 14 For the foreseeable future, it will remain easy for groups to rapidly
expand their influence by providing nominal governance structures and public
benefits. The traditional system of clan-provided services makes it even easier
for al-Shabaab to do this because it can merely support local elites. So long as
al-Shabaab can provide security and order, which it has been able to do thus far, it
will continue to be associated with the re-emergence of governance in the regions
it controls.
Third, al-Shabaab has been able to expand from the southernmost to the central
regions of Somalia, mainly due to locally negotiated security agreements with
local clan structures, rather than relying solely on the use of force. The ability to
negotiate security agreements with local clans has made it easier for al-Shabaab
to provide security and order. The decentralized nature of al-Shabaab has made
such a strategy possible. The more rigid structure of the TFG has prevented it