Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

nationalism, state formation and peacebuilding in somalia
movement. Although al-Shabaab has been able to recruit members from across
clans, its willingness to use violence has caused widespread instability and human
suffering. A final problem related to Islamic identity is that many Islamists
reject both clan and Somali national identity in favor of a dominant religious
identity and a universal Muslim nation. For those who advance this goal, Somali
cohesion under an Islamic identity – i.e. an Islamic state – would entail the exclusion
of other traditional identities, which are perceived as unequal and divisive. A
better alternative to a single dominant identity is a collective identity that incorporates
both Islam and clan structures. Nationalism, while not strong enough at the
present time, could eventually fulfill this role.
Despite the challenges these strategies faces, power sharing and identity reconstruction
serve both the immediate needs of state building and the longer-term
goals of constructing a national Somali identity. In both cases, the mechanisms
needed are inclusive institutions that contribute to a viable Somali state and
intentionally foster national cohesion (Transactive Mechanisms Question 1). A
government that provides crucial public services such as security, law and order,
and judicial and educational systems will help regulate disputes between clans
and weaken the negative aspects of clan identity. Internal security mechanisms
such as police, courts, and prisons will diminish the retributive functions of
diya-paying groups while allowing them to maintain their positive contributions
to community collaboration. 31 The inclusion of local actors, traditional clan elders,
women and civil society in state structures and decision making will contribute
to vertical integration and national sentiment (Transactive Processes Question 3).
Contrary to past peace processes in which state formation has been heavily
influenced by outside actors, renewed efforts must allow Somalis full participation
and ownership of the economic and political decisions that accompany the
creation of a state. 32
Conclusions
Placing academic debates about nationalism in dialogue with the realities and
challenges facing peacebuilders illustrates that no single identity can offer a
sustainable solution to conflict and state formation in Somalia. Sustainable
peacebuilding efforts must rely on approaches that foster inclusion and participation
among multiple Somali identities. Clan affiliation and Islam represent
entrenched sources of identity among Somali society. Rather than attempting to
dilute or subsume these identities under a nationalist framework, local stakeholders
in Somalia’s peace process must work towards an integrative system of stable
governance. Crucial to this will be finding ways to incorporate traditional systems
and beliefs such as clan kinship and Islam in a way that also functions within
the political boundaries of a state. Peacebuilders must identify the strengths of
traditional Somali social structures while promoting government institutions that
compensate for their weaknesses.
Peacebuilders must approach conflict in Somalia with both short-term and
long-term strategies. In the short-term, priority must be given to the establish-
31 Lewis, I.M., A Modern History
of Somalia, p. 11; Elmi, A.A.,
Understanding the Somalia
Conflagration, p. 33.
32 Elmi argues that the 2004
Federal Government of the
Somali Republic failed in large
part because Somalis were
excluded from decisions regarding
the defining of regions, the
establishment of elections, and the
distribution of resources. Elmi,
A.A., Understanding the Somalia
Conflagration, pp. 16-27.
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