Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

shinkyu lee
24 The Life & Peace Institute,
interview by author, March 7,
2011.
25 Yahya Mohamed Dahiye,
“NGOs in Jowhar to Pay Alshabab”,
Bar-Kulan, June 2,
2010, http://www.bar-kulan.
com/2010/06/02/ngos-in-jowharto-pay-al-shabab/
26 The NGOs banned on 2010
September are FEWSNET,
Horn Relief, and Mercy
Corps. See Wilfred Mulliro,
“US Condemns Alshabab’s
Interference with International
Aid Agencies in Somalia,”
Alshahid News, September 18,
2010, http://english.alshahid.
net/archives/12879. See also
the remarks by Ambassador
David Dunn, US Alternate
Representative to the UN at a
UN Security Council Debate on
Somalia: http://usun.state.gov/
briefing/statements/2011/158010.
htm
27 The Life & Peace Institute,
interview by author, March 7,
2011.
66
as food security, agriculture assistance, clean water, and sanitation, presumably
because the group alone cannot resolve these problems. 24
However, the challenge does not merely come from the restrained scope of
NGO activity. It also derives from taxes, registration fees, and other payment that
al-Shabaab has required. For example, on June 2, 2010, al-Shabaab ordered local
NGOs to pay money, which it claimed would be used to fund the prevention of
the river Shabelle floods. International NGOs were also asked to pay $ 1,000 as a
contribution to the project. 25 Due to such financial demands and threats, several
NGOs, including the World Food Program, have been forced to suspend their
programs in al-Shabaab-held territory. 26
Moreover, the outcome of the Holder vs. HLP case has worsened this situation.
Paying the protection money simply to remain in the controlled area of
al-Shabaab, or, not to mention, holding conflict resolution workshops/dialogue
meetings with the group, can merit the criminal penalty. This has significantly
impacted peacebuilding in Somalia, which, as in all other peacebuilding activities,
necessitates reconciliation through dialogue between the key actors. This
juridical challenge has also instigated al-Shabaab’s reaction. With the increasing
risk of persecution for NGOs in Somalia, they have become liable to a growing
suspicion from al-Shabaab questioning if their activities could serve US intelligence.
27 The work of NGOs and agencies building peace in Somalia have therefore
been considerably constrained, both by US anti-terrorism legislation and
al-Shabaab’s suspicion in relation to the law.
From this discussion, it is clear that the Supreme Court decision is one of the
major obstacles for peacebuilding in Somalia. With a limited and problematic understanding
of the nature of conflict and peacebuilding, the legal decision needs
revision to reflect the dynamic aspect of conflict. Immediate action is required to
clarify the material support statute for foreign terrorist organizations’ violent and
nonviolent activities. In the context of peacebuilding in Somalia, relevant policy
makers need to realize that al-Shabaab cannot be considered as a homogeneous
group of total spoilers, that the members of the group do not necessarily maintain
an invariably fixed terrorist agenda, that al-Shabaab has been affected by its
internal factions and structural changes of conflict, and finally that we cannot
reach a sustainable peace unless all powerful groups are included in the negotiations.
Based on this understanding is the recommendation for policymakers and
peacebuilding NGOs to find strategic avenues to work with peacebuilding at all
levels of society and help form public space where creative visions for a peaceful
Somalia can be better accommodated.
Recommendations
1. Increase the understanding that there cannot be sustainable peace without
including all powerful parties in negotiations to solve a conflict. The idea in the
US Supreme Court ruling therefore needs to be challenged, that all attempts to
engage these ‘terrorist organizations’ (even if they turn out to be non-violent),
or bring them to the mediation table constitute support for terrorist activities.