Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

nationalism, state formation and peacebuilding in somalia
contribute heavily to Somalia’s social cleavages. 10 Kusow makes similar arguments
concerning Somali dialects, which he claims are judged in relation to the statesponsored
Somali language and literature. These hierarchical notions of Somaliness
affect all segments of society, “from the nation to the clan and sub-clan”. 11
A third group of scholars took a middle stance, arguing that although Somalis
share common characteristics and have experienced intermittent surges of nationalist
movements, they have not managed to unite under these characteristics
to the extent necessary for national coherence. Most scholars of Somali nationalism,
regardless of where and when they locate its origins, agree that anti-colonial
struggles and external conflicts such as World War II provided powerful impetuses
for nationalist movements. Within an anti-colonial context, nationalist
movements were able to compete for support from clans while working toward
common goals of independence and unification.
Yet even under colonial occupation, total unity proved elusive. 12 Nationalist
sentiments were quickly swallowed by the imperatives of day-to-day political life.
In the words of Cedric Barnes, “nationalist politics only unified local Somalis as
long as it served their political and economic interests to do so … local society and
economy was far more relevant than abstract concepts of national citizenship and
nationalism”. 13 Saadia Touval views nationhood as a positive goal but considers
traditional cleavages such as clan rivalries and the absence of state institutions
to be significant obstacles to successful national integration. Touval claims that
despite shared qualities and definitional debates, evaluations of the legitimacy
and prospects of Somali nationalism must rest primarily “upon the cohesion and
sense of purpose of the nation it claims to represent”. 14
The continuing controversy over Somali nationalism raises several concerns
relevant to future peacebuilding efforts. First, it indicates that clan divisions represent
serious obstacles to national integration. Most agree that Somali nationalism
is strongest when fomented by external conflict and weakest when confronting
deep-seated feuds between clans. Thus far, Somali heterogeneity, reinforced
by longstanding constructions of clan identity, is not subsumed by nationalism
and remains a practical barrier to peaceful social relations and stable governance.
Overcoming such obstacles will require inclusive strategies that integrate traditional
clan structures into conceptions of Somali national identity.
The second critical lesson to be learned from the historical debate is that no
single or dominant conception of nationalism exists in Somalia today. While
Somalis may unite against foreign oppression, or for a unified Greater Somalia,
such nationalist sentiment generates only temporary cooperation and does not
end the threat posed by internal divisions. Thus, at the current time nationalism
is not strong enough to mobilize the majority of Somalis around a single form
of government and a shared vision of the future. In the absence of a cohesive
Somali national identity, peacebuilders should concentrate on shaping inclusive
institutions that contribute to a stable and viable state. Once a permanent system
of government is in place, a positive form of nationalism may emerge that incorporates
multiple Somali identities and contributes to sustainable peace.
10 According to Kusow pastoral
nomadism, versus all other modes
of production, has been one of the
most important principles of social
differentiation in Somalia. Camel
herding is most dignified, while
fishing and agriculture are held in
less esteem. This system proscribes
groups such as the Midgaan, Yibir
and Tumaal, as stigmatized or
marginalized segments of society. A
“Segmentary Lineage Stratification
System” measures how “far
lineage-wise a clan is away from
the original ancestor, combined
with spatial distance from original
dispersal point”. Clans located
further south are further away from
the landing place of the original
ancestor and are therefore lower in
status. Regarding territory, clans
that are considered Mudnaan iyo
Asal (original owners of the land)
have stronger claims than those
considered to be Xuraysato (takers
of the land by force). Kusow argues
that territorial-based narratives
constitute a form of clan identity
that competes with lineage-based
narratives. Neither, in his opinion,
has been dominant enough to
create hegemony and the resulting
conflicts in interpretation have
contributed to Somalia’s social
cleavages. Ibid., pp. 6-10.
11 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
12 Examples of such nationalist
movements include the Somali
Youth League, the Greater Somalia
League, the Hizbia Dastur Mustaqil
Somali, and the Somali National
Union.
13 Barnes argues that during
the period of British Military
Administration following the defeat
of the Italian Empire in what is
today eastern Ethiopia, some clan
leaders (mainly Darood) preferred
occupation to unification under
British rule and withheld support
for the Somali Youth League. See
Barnes, C., ‘The Somali political
economy in eastern Ethiopia, circa
1941-1948’, ed. A.M. Kusow, Putting
the Cart Before the Horse: Contested
Nationalism and the Crisis of the
Nation-State in Somalia (Trenton:
The Red Sea Press, 2004.), p. 34.
14 Touval, S., Somali Nationalism:
International Politics and the Drive
for Unity in the Horn of Africa
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963), p. 23.
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