Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding

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laura weis 4 Menkhaus (1997), pp. 128-131. 5 Cathrine Besteman, “Representing Violence and ‘Othering’ Somalia”, Cultural Anthropology (11:1) (1996), p. 126. 6 Besteman, pp. 127-129. 7 Menkhaus (1997), p. 133. 8 Menkhaus, (1997), p. 128. 9 Besteman, pp. 128-129. 10 Woodward, pp. 11-12. 11 Menkhaus (1997), p. 125. 44 From 1978 to 1988, an influx of US and international development aid focused on agricultural and pastoral projects, refugee assistance and policy reforms linking assistance to economic and fiscal policy reform. 4 According to anthropologist Catherine Besteman, Somali President Siad Barre’s distribution of this aid, along with state resources like water and land, was increasingly perceived in clan terms, which encouraged “public awareness of and commentary on the clan basis of his rule”. Increasing competition for resources and the flood of development dollars fueled a “growing emphasis on new kinds of clan alliances in the national arena”. 5 Urban based, elite competition for access to and control of state resources channeled class struggles into clan terms, and clan identity became a more visible and prominent form of identity. Most rural Somalis did not participate in this competition, yet they were deeply affected by Barre’s policies, such as land tenure laws that made state-controlled title registration the only legal way to own land, alienating rural farmers and encouraging land concentration by urban elites. 6 Missed opportunities Some have posited that during this period, “success or failure measured in developmental terms was ultimately irrelevant, since the primary purpose of Cold War economic assistance was strategic”. 7 Yet, even within the Cold War framework, might the US government have worked, for example, to ensure that aid was distributed more evenly to avoid a regional imbalance in development? 8 In addition, the struggle for resources during the development influx in the 1980s and the introduction of clan identity at the national level deeply affected Somali society. During this time, and as Barre’s government began to collapse, many US and international actors adopted clan as a mode of analysis for this competition and as an explanation of subsequent violence. The significance of clan affiliations cannot be denied. However, Besteman contends that the “clan basis” of “recent warfare was the result, not the cause, of contemporary conflicts and competition”, and the discourse of clan “obscure[d] the far more complex historical tensions within Somali society”. 9 Further research could examine whether adopting the language of clan led to an emphasis on clan based solutions at the expense of opportunities to build unity across relational tensions. Frames in flux Late 1980s – 2001. At the end of the Cold War, President George H.W. Bush called for a “new world order”. US choices in foreign policy would promote liberal economic policies, focus on democratization and good governance and respect the rule of law and human rights. 10 Indeed, in the late 1980s, Congress and the media expressed concerns about human rights abuses in Somalia. At first, the US avoided direct criticism of Barre (perhaps out of concern for basing rights) but ultimately froze its foreign assistance to Somalia, “an ethical luxury that the logic of the Cold War had prevented in the past”. 11
u.s. engagement in somalia: frames, missed opportunities, and alternative options When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the US government received permission to establish military bases in the surrounding area, and Somali military facilities diminished in importance. Barre’s regime fell in January 1991, and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen (1989-1993), writes that “[a]ssuming that the clan system would somehow find a way to bring order out of chaos, with US forces well accommodated directly in the Gulf, and with our embassy closed, we more or less dropped Somalia from our radar screen”. 12 As many as 80,000 Somalis were killed during the ensuing violence, and a major famine followed, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 240,000. 13 Humanitarian crisis put Somalia back on the radar screen in 1992, but (absent, perhaps, a well-defined Cold War frame) Cohen cites bureaucratic wrangling over whether it was a “food problem” or a “security problem” as an obstacle to early action. 14 In August 1992, the Bush administration authorized “Operation Provide Relief”, a food airlift. International consensus began to emerge around armed intervention to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the UN Security Council authorized a US led, multinational operation, UNITAF, which lasted from December 1992 until April 1993. 15 In May 1993 (after President Clinton was in office), the mission was handed over to the UN, and UNOSOM II lasted from May 1993 until March 1995. The operation involved “an overreaching, nation-building phase” and “a scaled-back, accommodative phase” following the October 1993 violent clash in Mogadishu between UN forces, including US personnel, and Somali fighters. 16 The battle resulted in the deaths of 18 US military personnel, and Somali leaders put their losses at 312 killed and 814 wounded. 17 During the Clinton years, longer-term, comprehensive assistance to prevent state collapse, civil war, and protracted humanitarian crises, or “complex emergencies”, viewed as threats to US interests and global stability, emerged as a tool of post-Cold War foreign policy. 18 According to USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Somalia was classified as a complex emergency, though disaster assistance to the country dropped from over $49 million in FY1993 to around $6.3 million in FY1995. Disaster assistance continued throughout the rest of the 1990s at a comparable level. 19 Mohamed Sahnoun, UN Special Representative for Somalia in 1992, cites three missed opportunities for preventive diplomacy during this period. In May 1988, the US Government Accountability Office and the State Department documented Barre’s violent crushing of an uprising in the North, but no substantive international action on behalf of the victims occurred. 20 Secondly, in May 1990, the US and the international community could have supported calls for a national reconciliation conference in a manifesto signed by Somali business people, intellectuals, and tradesmen. 21 Finally, in 1991, Somalia lacked a functioning government after the fall of Barre. The US increased humanitarian aid, but it did not engage in finding a political solution, and there was no international, concerted mediation effort as clans and sub clans vied for power. 22 12 Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: MacMillan Press Ltd; New York: St. Martin’s Press, LLC, 2000), p. 203. 13 Ken Menkhaus with Hassan Sheikh, Shane Quinn, and Ibrahim Farah, “Somalia: Civil Society in a Collapsed State”, in Civil Society and Peacebuilding: a Critical Assessment, Thania Paffenholz, Ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), pp. 322-323. 14 Cohen pp. 206-207. 15 For Cohen’s account of the deliberations about and implementation of the intervention, see Cohen, pp. 204-217. A Los Angeles Times article later probed whether the US military mission in Somalia was strictly humanitarian, as US oil companies were well-positioned to move in once the country was at peace. In fact, Conoco, Inc. had maintained an office in Mogadishu, and it was utilized as a de facto American embassy in the days leading up to the intervention. See Mark Fineman, “The Oil Factor in Somalia”, Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1993. Available online at: http:// articles.latimes.com/1993-01-18/ news/mn-1337_1_oil-reserves. 16 Chester A. Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong”, Foreign Affairs (74:3) (May-June 1995), p. 4. 17 Rick Atkinson, “Night of a Thousand Casualties”, The Washington Post, January 31, 1994, A1. 18 Menkhaus (1997), p. 125. 19 “USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance to Somalia”, USAID, Historical Assistance table available online at: http://www.usaid. gov/our_work/humanitarian_ assistance/disaster_assistance/ countries/somalia/template/index. html. 20 Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), pp. 5-6. 21 Sahnoun, pp. 6-8. 22 Sahnoun, pp. 9-11. 45
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Page 34 and 35: douglas ansel 32 foreseeable future
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Page 38 and 39: ashley lyn greene 15 Kusow, A.M.,
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Page 42 and 43: ashley lyn greene 27 Ibid., p. 39.
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