Operational tools and adaptive management

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1) what characterises an “optimal” incentive scheme in the present situation, i.e. a situation with agency drift and only national authorities setting the regulations 2) how will this optimal incentive scheme change if a new stakeholder, e.g. a ENGO, is given a say in the fisheries regulations We start out with the present situation within the CFP, which can be termed delegated (or double) agency, indicating that one principal (the EU-authorities) indeed set relatively detailed regulations for the fisheries, but delegates to the national authorities to enforce the regulations vis-a-vis the fishers. In this model both EU and national authorities are principals, but on separate levels, and the fishers are the agent. Then, not exerting mere power, it is up to either the EU or the national authorities to formulate incentive schemes, in order to meet the main aims of the CFP. This model, delegated agency, is depicted within the oval in figure 3.1. Then we proceed by taking into account that an additional principal, symmetric to either EU or national authorities, is given a say in the regulations of the fisheries. By the use of a common agency model, given in the dotted hexagon in figure 1, we discuss how this affects the optimal incentive scheme given above, and characterise the aggregate of the incentive schemes. Figure 3.1 Principal-agent situations inherent in the CFP NGOs CEU+CEC MS 1 Fishers MS 2 Fishers 24
3.2.1 Agency drift As shown by both Hegland and Raakjær (2008) and Gezelius (2008) for Denmark and Norway, and by van Hoof et al (2005) for Netherlands, France, Spain and Shetland, fishing policy (such as the CFP) is implemented as a corporatist system. This implies that the member state authorities and the fishery sector work closely to implement regulations of the activity. There are many reasons for this, and one is that the sector, though not large, represents an important voter group. According to Fort and Rosenmann (1993) the reason why we often observe inefficient regulations of e.g. natural resources, is that the regulator, i.e. national authorities, have other interests than economic (efficiency) when regulating the exploitation of natural resources, as fish, forest and oil and gas. If it is a goal to be re-elected they have an incentive to align their interests with those of large or popular voter groups. Though not large voter groups by number, primary production sectors often has wide popular support and are considered important for the nation. Thus, for a government aiming at staying in power it is rational to take into consideration the interests of actors in these sectors. In Annex 4 we have derived the optimal effort levels, as seen from the perspective of the different interest groups. Table 3.2 gives examples of the optimal effort level for the different groups under varying assumptions about how they weight their environmental, economic and social interests. Table 3.2 Optimal effort level measured as man-hours per year for the interest groups under varying assumptions about the weights of their interests Optimal effort level in 1000 man-hours per year EU-authorities National authorities Fishers NGO High alignment across all groups 246 248 243 250 Corporatist system 246 249 243 250 Large polarisation across the groups 241 246 230 250 The calculations above are based on the following assumptions: N=10 (the number of member states participating in the fishery), q=0,01 (catchability, i.e. how easily accessible is the fish, the higher the more easy to catch), p=1000 EUR per tonnes (first hand price), a=2 (cost factor, the higher a, the more the harvest costs increase when effort increases). The weights of the interests, the λs, vary between the three scenarios; “high alignment”, “corporatist system”, and “large polarisation”. The scenario “high alignment across all groups” implies that we assume relatively small differences in the weights of the three interests across the groups. The weight of the environmental interests (λ1) varies between 0,6 for the NGO to 0,3 for the fishers, the economic interests (λ2) between 0,4 for the fishers and the national authorities to 0,2 for the NGO, and the social interests (λ3) between 0,2 and 0,3. The results show limited variation in the optimal effort, measured in 1000 man-hours per year, between 243 for the NGO and 250 for the fishers. In the scenario “large polarisation” the weight of the environmental interests vary between 0,8 for the NGO and 0,1 for the fishers, the economic interests vary between 0,8 for the fishers and 0,1 for the NGO. The social interests are low across all groups, about 0,1- 0,2. This results in considerably higher variations in the optimal effort level, from 230 for the NGO to 250 for the fishers. In the scenario “corporatist system” we have set the weights of the different interests equal for fishers and national authorities. Still, the optimal effort level differs between the two and the reason is that we have assumed that the fishers are myopic in 25
Page 1 and 2: Work package 3 Operational tools an
Page 3 and 4: 0 Summary In the Green Paper on the
Page 5 and 6: 1 Introduction and background 1.1 B
Page 7 and 8: This is true not at least due to th
Page 9 and 10: management tools above the national
Page 11 and 12: 2 Operational tools, their effectiv
Page 13 and 14: this behaviour are taken into accou
Page 15 and 16: d) dynamical effectiveness Politica
Page 17 and 18: Gear type: Here the political accep
Page 19 and 20: Table 2.4 Results of experts’ opi
Page 21 and 22: European Union (Council) usually ac
Page 23: not obeying the regulations. Mechan
Page 27 and 28: w0 implies compensation to the fish
Page 29 and 30: When we formulate the common incent
Page 31 and 32: interests, whereas the economic int
Page 33 and 34: 3.3 Comparing the optimal tax/subsi
Page 35 and 36: 3.4.1 The sandeel fishery in the No
Page 37 and 38: the fishery benefits from a general
Page 39 and 40: should not be controversial, the ne
Page 41 and 42: Then we have a situation with two s
Page 43 and 44: the tax/subsidy rate. When the new
Page 45 and 46: A part of the analysis will focus o
Page 47 and 48: ecological and economic concerns ov
Page 49 and 50: 4.3 The market, ecolabelling and fi
Page 51 and 52: In general, MLG concerns the sharin
Page 53 and 54: and thus deters effort, or a subsid
Page 55 and 56: Annex 1: Questionnaire for expert o
Page 57 and 58: that a series of tools are applied
Page 59 and 60: Adaptive management and stakeholder
Page 61 and 62: G j j ( x, E j) qxE q 0 (1) 2 C( E
Page 63 and 64: and economic interests are higher t
Page 65 and 66: L w L S 0 0 L w 0 and ( L S 0 if wh
Page 67 and 68: The less the interests of the new p
Page 69 and 70: Applying the same optimisation proc
Page 71 and 72: U NGO ( t 0 , t, NGO 2 F 2a 1 0 , N
Page 73 and 74: R FC 2 1 pqx * Whereas the equilibr
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As in the two other cases, the tran
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Commission of European Communities
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van Hoof, L. and van Tatenhove, J.
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