Operational tools and adaptive management

fisheries activity (here limited to effort), but on the other hand have to take into account the
fishers‟ participation constraint, i.e. they must compensate for losses such that the fishers are
not driven out of the fishery. The latter is done in order avoid the typical corner solutions
where the regulators, especially the ENGOs, tax the fishers “to death”, i.e. such that it is not
possible to survive in the fishery (to decide whether a fishery should “survive” at all is
another discussion). The above analysis is a theoretical application of a common agency
model; a model where two principals can use tools to affect a single agent‟s behaviour. We
show that when a new stakeholder is given a say in the regulations of the fisheries and the
new stakeholder has strong environmental interests towards the fishery, the authorities will
moderate its regulations, i.e. set lower taxes (restrictions) or be more prone to support
(subsidise) the fishery activity. However, the aggregate of the regulations over the two
regulators is greater than the regulations by the authorities alone. In other words, the reduction
in the authorities‟ regulations is smaller than the regulations introduced by the new
stakeholder, such that the aggregate tax rate becomes higher, and the subsidy rate becomes
smaller.
We have applied results from the theoretical model in order to discuss three EU fisheries; the
sandeel fishery in the North Sea, the nephrops fishery in North Western Waters, and the purse
seine sardine fishery in South Western Waters. These three cases give different stakeholder
inputs into the model, and show how these new entrants on the management scene affect the
way the resources are managed.
The last part of the report is dedicated to studying how the environmental aspects of EBM
enter at many levels of fisheries management. This is done in lieu of the increasing number of
international treaties and EU directives, which affect fishery activity. Briefly stated, fisheries
policy is to an increasing degree the result of other regulations than those found within the
CFP. Especially, there is a vast number of environmental treaties and directives, which the
fisheries must take into account. This, in turn, will affect the regulations of the fisheries
through the CFP and/or national legislation. Translated into our model, this means that the
environmental interests get an increasing importance when the regulators choose their
regulations, at the expense of economic and social interests, which the regulators also hold
towards the fisheries. We coin this EBM approach as exogenous, due to the external nature of
with which these regulations enter into fisheries management, especially seen from a fisheries
standpoint. This in contrast to a more endogenous EBM approach, where the fishers
themselves seek solutions to the environmental challenges they face. One such example is
many fisheries‟ application for certification, where the certificate work as a (eco) label
securing the consumers in the market that the fishery is sustainable.
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