Operational tools and adaptive management

Maximising the objective function in (24) with respect to Ej gives the optimal effort to exert
for the fishers given that they face two principals with incentive schemes:
F
F
F
a 2 pqx 1 Nqx 3 t1
1
E j
(25)
F
2a
2
Inserting the optimal effort into the objective functions of the principals and the agent, we get:
U
(
U
(
MS
F
NGO
F
( t
)(
0
MS
2
2a
)(
where
U
F
2a
( t
( t
, t,
MS
2
2a
0
MS
2
2a
0
F
(
F2
2
0
NGO
2
2a
, t,
F
2
, t,
F2
2
NGO
t
0
,
2
F
2
2
F
2
,
0
)
)
F
2
,
)
F
2
2a
)
F
2
t
F
2
F
t
t
0
)
)
NGO
2
F
2
t
C
0
C
MS
MS
3
2a
2a
NGO
pqx
0
j
E
MS
F
2
NGO
3
NGO
F
2
M
j
t
E
1
M
j
NGO
1
F
3
F
(
Nqx
M
j
and where C MS , C NGO and C F are given by
C
C
C
MS
NGO
F
MS
2
F
1
F
NGO
2
F
( x)
F
( x)
( x)
(
(
4a
F
F
(
)
)
0
F
2
F
2
E
MS
1
)
0
F
1
NGO
1
pqx
F
1
C
E
2
pqx
F
1
2
(
F
1
MS
2
4a
MS
2
(
(
NGO
2
4a
2
F
2
F
3
NGO
2
4a
NGO
3
MS
2
(
2
2a
F
2
(
t
Nqx
2
2
F
2
F
3
2
F2
1
NGO
2
2a
2
Nqx
F
2
F
1
4a
MS
3
F2
1
)
t
2
Nqx)
F
2
F
1
)
2
2a
)
2
4a
2
Nqx)
F
2
NGO
3
F
2
2a
2
MS
1
)
(
F
2
MS
2
F 2
2
(
2
4a
F
2
F
2
F
2
2a
NGO
1
2
MS
3
(
Nqx
(
NGO
2
F 2
2
F
2
F
2
NGO
3
t
F
3
t
Nqx
MS
1
2
Nqx)
NGO
1
F
3
Nqx)
68
(26)
t
(27)
(28)