Operational tools and adaptive management

should not be controversial, the net incentive scheme induces a tax upon effort in the
nephrops fisheries. The tax increases in the economic interests of the cod fisheries, and
decreases in the environmental interests of the nephrops fisheries.
As explained in the previous section, it is not possible to determine the lump sum transfers,
0, 0 unambiguously. The nephrops fishers will always be kept on their outside option payoff,
i.e., when regulated by economic means any eventual resource rent will be taxed away.
However, which of the regulators, the authorities or the cod fishers‟ representative, that shall
be allowed to acquire how much, is to be decided in negotiations between the two. Probably,
in a situation where the authorities are the main regulator and the cod fishers‟ representative is
given a “consultative” role, the authorities are the principal who is allowed to acquire the
resource rent, whereas the cod fishers‟ representative will not be given any economic gain (or
loss) from the participation of the regulations.
The nephrops fisheries are regulated both on the input and on the output side. On the input
side are mesh size, limited licensing and days at sea, whereas the output regulations
encompass TAC, individual quotas, bycatch regulations and minimum landing size (see table
in appendix 4).
Various efforts have been taken to reduce the bycatch of other commercial species in the
nephrops fisheries. These have led to reductions in the bycatch especially of cod. Whereas for
whiting and haddock the bycatch still amounts for 40-60% of the total harvest (measured in
tonnes) the bycatch of cod is reduced to below 10%. The reduction of the cod bycatch is due
to much emphasis on this species, as it is the most valuable of the bycatch species. Among
these efforts are closures of FUs where the bycatch of juvenile cod is especially large, larger
mesh size, and a demand to use selective bycatch devices, all of which increase the costs for
the nephrops fishers, and thus limit effort. This is also just what the results from the model
above shows. If the cod fisheries get a say in the management of the nephrops fisheries the
costs of effort, and thus harvest, will increase.
There are two types of nephrops fisheries; the trawl fisheries and the creel fisheries. Only the
trawl fisheries have externalities such as bycatch of commercially exploited species. On the
other hand the share of the nephrops harvest caught with creels is only about 10% of total
catches (measured in tonnes). An interesting question is then how costly the effort in the trawl
fisheries for nephrops have to be in order for larger shares of the nephrops to be caught by
creels. The model results indicate that the more stakes other commercial fisheries get in the
management of the nephrops fisheries the more expensive will the trawling for nephrops be,
and this will relatively favour the creel fisheries. However, there are of course also other
reasons than purely economic for the creel fishery, and which contribute to explain the
existence and size of this fishery. It is not a part of this work to go in detail into this.
3.4.3 The purse seine sardine fishery in the South Western Waters
After having experienced very low stocks and very high catches during the 1990s the EU
authorities suggested to take over the regulation of the sardine fishery in the waters off the
Iberian peninsula (Atlantic coast and Bay of Biscay). As an alternative to this solution,
Portuguese and Spanish authorities took over the management of the fishery, and though
catches have decreased during the last decade, the stock has stabilised. This is shown in table
3.14.
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