The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science - The Department ...

Michael Silberstein
as the quantum system on the one hand, and the classical apparatus on the other.
On Bohm’s interpretation, it is not just quantum object and apparatus that are
holistically connected, but any collection of quantum objects by themselves constitute
an indivisible whole. A complete specification of the state of the “undivided
universe” requires not only a listing of all its constituent particles and their positions,
but also of a field associated with the wave-function that guides their trajectories.
If one assumes that the basic physical parts of the universe are just the
particles it contains, then this establishes ontological holism in the context of
Bohm’s interpretation.
For the purposes of this discussion, what is most important is not whether or
not quantum mechanics actually does provide cases of mereological emergence,
but that the belief that it does, in part, fuels emergentism. Though it must be said,
there are some philosophers who are still skeptical about the reality, coherence or
importance of quantum holism (Lewis, 1986; Dickson, 1998). Not everyone
acknowledges that nonseparability implies mereological emergence. For example,
Healey argues that whether or not nonseparability implies mereological emergence
is a matter of interpretation (1989, pp. 142–5). Healey’s own modal interpretation
(1989) does imply mereological emergence, however he stipulates that the
formalism of quantum mechanics is open to interpretations that do not. He argues
(Healey, 1991) that nonseparability in general and so-called non-locality are best
explained by positing mereological emergence.
Questions for Future Research
Recall that the best reason for believing in reductionism is an acceptance of mereological
and/or nomological supervenience based in large part on successful
intertheoretic reduction (or epistemological reduction). Do the preceding examples
of epistemological and ontological emergence indicate emergentism is true?
At this juncture, may we even say whether emergentism or reductionism is more
probable? What does the current state of disunity within any given science and
across the various sciences imply about emergence? Regarding the ultimate fate of
mereological and nomological emergence respectively, there are two general possibilities.
Either these respective forms of emergence are merely a function of our
ignorance or they are real facts about the world. If they are real facts about the
world then they may be either universally true or restricted to a particular domain
such as microphysics. Of course, the ultimate fate of mereological emergence
might be different from that of nomological emergence and vice-versa. For
example, the possibilities for nomological emergence are as follows:
There are four reductive outcomes:
1 Any claimed emergence is due to philosophical ignorance. A better, more
appropriate philosophical theory of intertheoretic reduction needs to be con-
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