The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science - The Department ...

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A Brief Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science 1960 W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object 1961 Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science 1962 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science Israel Scheffler, The Anatomy of Scientific Inquiry Robert G. Colodny, Frontiers of Science and Philosophy (first volume of the Pittsburgh series) 1965 Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation Paul Feyerabend, “Problems of Empiricism” in R. G. Colodny (ed.), Beyond the Edge of Certainty Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses 1968 Imre Lakatos, “Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized” lecture delivered (published 1969) 1969 Foucault, L’Archeolgie du Savoir Further reading Contemporary presentations of the basic issues in philosophy of science Merrilee Salmon, et al., Philosophy of Science, (by the Department of History & Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh), Prentice-Hall, 1991 A collection of readings which cover the field of philosophy of science Baruch Brody and Richard Grandy (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edn, Prentice Hall, 1989 Historical overviews of the history of positivism J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Cambridge: CUP, 1991 Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge CUP, 1999 Frederick Suppe, Critical Introduction, to The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd edn, Urbane, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1977 A systematic treatment of the main parts of the logical positivist/empiricist program: Quite difficult in parts Israel Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry, New York: Borzoi Books, 1964 A review of the critics of positivist/empricist program. Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, Indianapolis. Bobbs Merrill, 1967 17
Chapter 2 Philosophy of Science: Classic Debates, Standard Problems, Future Prospects John Worrall The Background Immanuel Kant’s celebrated investigation of human knowledge started from the assumption that we have achieved rock-solid, indubitable knowledge – in geometry through Euclid and in physics through Newton – and from the question of how this was possible (especially in view of Hume’s demonstration of the invalidity of inductive inference). Contemporary philosophy of science is a rich and multi-faceted enterprise and so any one way of viewing it will inevitably leave out much of importance and interest. Nonetheless, many of the classic debates and areas of current concern can be introduced by investigating how Kant’s questions require modification in the light of the development of science since his time and by investigating the attempts made to answer those modified questions. Two radical – apparently “revolutionary” – changes of fundamental theory occurred in the early twentieth century, those associated with the theory of relativity and with quantum theory. The former had the more direct effect on Kant’s presuppositions and questions. If, at any rate, we think of geometry as a synthetic description of the fundamental structure of space, then Einstein’s revolution involved the rejection of Euclidean geometry in favor of the Riemannian version of non-Euclidean geometry. Instead, for example, of two straight lines that are parallel being extendable indefinitely without intersecting, the new geometry states that any two straight lines (geodesics) eventually intersect. Far from being certainly true, Euclidean geometry (at least as a “physical geometry”) is – it seems – not even true. Similarly, although Newton’s theory (of mechanics plus universal gravitation) continues to be empirically adequate over a wide range of phenomena (basically motions involving velocities small compared to that of light), its fundamental claims about the structure of the universe – that space is infinite, that gravitation acts at-a-distance, that time is absolute so that two events simultaneous in one reference frame are simultaneous in all – are entirely rejected by 18
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Page 5 and 6: Contents Notes on Contributors vii
Page 7 and 8: Notes on Contributors Daniela M. Ba
Page 9 and 10: Notes on Contributors Peter Machame
Page 11 and 12: Preface of science and again about
Page 13 and 14: Peter Machamer until the present da
Page 15 and 16: So, formally, what was needed was a
Page 17 and 18: Peter Machamer work out and change
Page 19 and 20: Peter Machamer general, trans-parad
Page 21 and 22: Peter Machamer or general relativit
Page 23 and 24: Peter Machamer actually know some o
Page 25 and 26: Peter Machamer General strike and r
Page 27: Peter Machamer 1940 Journal of Unif
Page 31 and 32: John Worrall the view): the “revo
Page 33 and 34: John Worrall Confirmation - the att
Page 35 and 36: John Worrall Confirmation - the Bay
Page 37 and 38: John Worrall Virtues like these, co
Page 39 and 40: John Worrall Creationism (C) - say
Page 41 and 42: John Worrall Then, of course, as pa
Page 43 and 44: John Worrall and about the vibratio
Page 45 and 46: John Worrall A different view - a v
Page 47 and 48: John Worrall Lakatos, I. (1970):
Page 49 and 50: Jim Woodward account are complex, b
Page 51 and 52: Jim Woodward a DN explanation answe
Page 53 and 54: Jim Woodward plete: the occurrence
Page 55 and 56: Jim Woodward The Causal Mechanical
Page 57 and 58: Jim Woodward appeals to the general
Page 59 and 60: Jim Woodward use of a single origin
Page 61 and 62: Jim Woodward of the limitations of
Page 63 and 64: Jim Woodward a relatively sharp dis
Page 65 and 66: Jim Woodward Hitchcock, C. (2001):
Page 67 and 68: Logical and extralogical vocabulary
Page 69 and 70: Carl F. Craver world - a picture in
Page 71 and 72: Hairpin turn Na+ 3. Hairpins bend i
Page 73 and 74: Carl F. Craver Theories and laws A
Page 75 and 76: Carl F. Craver that the required ph
Page 77 and 78: Carl F. Craver to take on the allow
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Carl F. Craver provides important r
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Carl F. Craver tion that the lower-
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Carl F. Craver attention to salient
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Carl F. Craver 3 Classic statements
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Carl F. Craver Bechtel, W. and Rich
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Carl F. Craver Nagel, E. (1961): Th
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Chapter 5 Reduction, Emergence and
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Michael Silberstein The Varieties o
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Michael Silberstein Nomological sup
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Michael Silberstein statistical mec
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Michael Silberstein Semantic/model-
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Ontological relations are objective
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Michael Silberstein epistemological
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Michael Silberstein Focus on actual
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statistical mechanics. As of yet, f
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Michael Silberstein as the quantum
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Michael Silberstein limited to the
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Michael Silberstein Humphreys sugge
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Michael Silberstein property with a
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Michael Silberstein Healey, R. A. (
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Chapter 6 Models, Metaphors and Ana
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones Bailer-Jone
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones this “[a]
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones importance
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones excited sta
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones the science
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones Coping with
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones and elsewhe
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones The relatio
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Daniela M. Bailer-Jones Bradie, M.
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Chapter 7 Experiment and Observatio
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James Bogen nected causally or only
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James Bogen Whewell (1991) and Duhe
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James Bogen with air pressure oscil
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James Bogen chosen for them, I’ll
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James Bogen 1987, pp. 180-97). Gali
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James Bogen cal significance of Mil
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on the treatment of a low-level pro
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James Bogen tory system. fMRI calcu
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James Bogen Dear, P. (1995): Discip
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James Bogen Stuewer, R. H. (1985):
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall The streng
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall Billy.) Ra
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall abilistic
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with colored balls; let the languag
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PX ( Y) PXY ( )= PY ( ) provided P(
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall the only t
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The Subjectivist Interpretation: Or
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Unorthodox Bayesianism Each of B1-B
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall Non-Kolmog
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall for a trea
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall Statistics
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Alan Hájek and Ned Hall Schervish,
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer His
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Outside the Hole: h* = Identity, no
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer If
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer Of
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer the
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer In
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer its
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer i.e
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer is
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Figure 9.3 Our past light cone Figu
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer gen
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer But
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Craig Callender and Carl Hoefer Tel
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Laura Ruetsche ing to it. In quantu
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Laura Ruetsche Measuring sˆ x on s
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For the purposes of probing localit
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By the Spectrum rule [Î] = 1 and [
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1989). What’s more, the assumptio
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The revisions that require the leas
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Laura Ruetsche 1 i x ,..., x N x˙
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the apparatus system after measurem
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Laura Ruetsche But the terms of rec
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observables in {A(O)}. If it were a
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Laura Ruetsche particle notions. Ev
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Laura Ruetsche intrinsic angular mo
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Laura Ruetsche Bohr, N. (1935): “
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Laura Ruetsche Rovelli, C. (1997):
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Roberta L. Millstein the lenses of
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Roberta L. Millstein Second, if ran
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Roberta L. Millstein conception of
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Roberta L. Millstein tionary psycho
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Roberta L. Millstein viduals. This
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Roberta L. Millstein Recently, the
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Roberta L. Millstein described the
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Roberta L. Millstein However, this
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Roberta L. Millstein heart, and yet
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Roberta L. Millstein Pittsburgh-Kon
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Roberta L. Millstein Harding, S. (1
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Roberta L. Millstein of Fitness,”
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Chapter 12 Molecular and Developmen
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Paul Griffiths complex plus other r
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Figure 12.1 Canalization of develop
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Paul Griffiths Peter Godfrey-Smith
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Paul Griffiths development in a rad
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Paul Griffiths study of development
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Paul Griffiths of DNA “which segr
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Paul Griffiths empirically integrat
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Paul Griffiths D. Mundici and J. va
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Paul Griffiths Mitchison, J. G. (19
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Chapter 13 Cognitive Science Rick G
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Rick Grush The cognitive revolution
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Rick Grush This trend in cognitive
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Rick Grush ‘girls’. In one of t
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Rick Grush number of incompatible y
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Rick Grush materialism is directed
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Rick Grush will move to as a functi
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Rick Grush foreseeable future, the
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Rick Grush Dretske, F. (1981): Know
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Chapter 14 Social Sciences Harold K
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Harold Kincaid 1 Social systems are
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Harold Kincaid In the 1950s, philos
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Harold Kincaid if social science cl
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Harold Kincaid ideas, and it is hel
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Harold Kincaid There are further on
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Harold Kincaid made simply by sorti
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Harold Kincaid commitment is whethe
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Harold Kincaid Problems to Come Imp
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Harold Kincaid Notes 1 Philosophy o
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Harold Kincaid Kincaid, H. (2001):
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Chapter 15 Feminist Philosophy of S
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson aids, financi
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson By the mid 19
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson work for work
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson feminist and
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson ceptual as we
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson As the forego
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson tinctive phil
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson philosophy of
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Lynn Hankinson Nelson Keller, E. F.
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absolute vs. relative (notions of)
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causation cont’d Humean 40 superl
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emergence 80, 90-3, 99, 102-3 epist
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geometry Euclidean 1, 178, 180 non-
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locality 202-3 Jarrett 204 logical
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Pearl, J. 51 Penrose, Roger 186, 19
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elativity cont’d conventionality
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supervenience cont’d see also ont
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