The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science - The Department ...

Lynn Hankinson Nelson
As the foregoing suggests, feminist philosophers of science have found valuable
resources in the broader discipline. They have contributed to and made use of
challenges to post-logical positivism in their analyses of science: including evidence
suggesting that observation is theory-laden (Harding, 1986); that individual
hypotheses do not, in Quine’s words, “face the tribunal of experience individually,”
but do so as part of broader bodies of theory (Longino and Doell, 1983;
Longino, 1990; Nelson, 1990); that theories are underdetermined by available
evidence (Alcoff, 1989; Longino, [1987] 1989, 1990; Nelson, 1990); that the
more specific epistemic virtues traditionally associated with the objectivity of
knowledge claims – empirical accuracy, generality of scope, simplicity, and so forth
– are often incapable of simultaneous satisfaction, with contingent and pragmatic
factors often determining the priority given to one or more over another (Longino,
1990, 1996; Wylie, 1995); and that clusters of disciplinary commitments (metaphysical,
methodological, and so forth) are instrumental in the arrival at agreedupon
understandings of given phenomena and research problems.
Moreover, in considering the implications of these challenges for feminist
philosophy of science, and vice versa, feminist philosophers have built on, even as
they have sought to further develop or refine, constructive approaches in the
philosophy of science that emerged in response to them. In addition to approaches
already cited, feminists have made appeal to and expanded on Bas van Fraassen’s
constructive empiricism – e.g., Longino (1990) – Mary Hesse’s Network Model
– e.g., Alcoff (1989) and Potter (1989); W. V. Quine’s naturalism (Antony, 1994;
Campbell, 1998; Duran, 1998; Nelson, 1990, 1996); and various aspects of
Thomas Kuhn’s work, including his arguments concerning the role of epistemic
values in scientific practice (Longino, 1995, 1996; Wylie, 1995). Finally, like naturalized
philosophers of science, feminists sympathetic to Quinean naturalism, and
some critical of it, have explored the implications of developments in the cognitive
sciences, and in other relevant disciplines, in their analyses of science; see, for
example Nelson and Nelson, 2001).
There is also work to incorporate, in philosophical explanatory principles, the
implications of recent investigations into the nature and role of epistemic and nonepistemic
values in scientific practices. Arguably, the most influential and provocative
analyses of these issues have been offered by Helen Longino. I earlier noted
that Longino proposes that one should approach the question of “What does it
mean to do science as a feminist?” in terms of the practices of feminist scientists
and, in particular, in terms of the values that guide that practice (i.e., guide their
assessments of specific hypotheses and theories, and reflect feminist political commitments
and goals). The most traditional of the values Longino attributes to
feminist scientists is empirical adequacy. But additional values “come into play” in
the assessment of theories, hypotheses, and models, Longino (1994, p. 477)
argues, because “empirical adequacy is not a sufficient criterion of theory and
hypothesis choice”. Those she identifies as guiding the practice of feminist scientists
are ontological heterogeneity, complexity of relationships, diffusion of power,
applicability to current human needs, and novelty (pp. 477–9). What is specifically
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