Cremation, Caste, and Cosmogony in Karmic Traditions.

The use of the spiritual capacity represents also other
paradoxes. When the ascetic makes use of the magical
qualities he has attained through meditation, the
possibilities for acquiring new forces vanish. Thus, “he
who renounces secular life finally finds himself rich in
magical forces, but he who succumbs to the desire to use
them ultimately remains a mere “magician,” without
power to surpass himself. Only a new renunciation and a
victorious struggle against the temptation of magic bring
the ascetic a new spiritual temptation” (Eliade 1958:89).
Finally, the power of sadhus or holy men is also a
paradox for the commoners. Particularly, “the blessing
of an Aghori is as beneficent as his curse is awesome”
(Parry 1994:259).
The construction of elitism and other statuses
Regarding the creation, maintenance, and loss of elite
status in relation to elitist behaviour of holy men, it is
possible to emphasise some structural principles of the
dynamics of social identities and statuses. Material
institutions are not a criterion for elites. Materialisation
of power and status may hide the principles of how
statuses are created and maintained through social
interaction. Being accepted as an elite is fundamental
regardless of relations of domination and the way elites
have acquired their power. Analytically one may
distinguish between authority and prestige. Authority
can work in two ways. An authoritative person of
superior significance has a character of objectivity
giving his opinions or faith a confidence and
overwhelming weight. In decisions he will have a
prerogative and an axiomatic trustworthiness, which
transcend the personality that is always relative and
subject to criticism. But the authority of super-individual
powers such as the church, state and military may take
the opposite direction. Individuals may deduce their
power and authority from these institutions, which
would never have flowed from their own individuality.
Prestige, on the other hand, lacks the element of supersubjective
significance because the identity of the
personality is not a part of an objective power or norm.
Superiority by prestige has the possibility to “push” the
masses and to make unconditional followers of them.
Authority does not have the same ability because the
normative and institutionalised character leaves more
room for criticism (Simmel 1971:98-100).
“From name man attains fame” (Pandey 1969:78). Fame
is a mobile and circulating dimension of the person; it
transcends and extends the material and physical body
but refers back to it. By being renowned the person’s
name travels apart from his physical presence through
the minds and speech of others (Munn 1986:105). Fame
is a factor that may affect a person’s influence in a given
situation, but as a phenomenon it is different from
influence and belongs to a different order of subjective
conversion. The third party observer outside the
immediate transacting parties is important. This third
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category or person is an actor that hears about and
witnesses the transaction in addition to the main
transactor and recipient necessary for a simple model of
persuasion. This third person is anyone or everyone in
the culture, and it implies that transactions occur in the
presence of others. The importance is the third person’s
representation and mere being, not his actions
(ibid:115). Thus, “fame” can be defined as “a positive
subjective conversion effected by a particular
transaction, which derives from the outside cognition of
a distant other external to the transaction” (ibid:116). It
is a virtual form of influence by which the circulation of
names are free and detached from the particularities and
making them the topic of discourse available in other
times and places (ibid:117). The emphasis on fame
rather than honour, pride, etc., focuses on the nonintentional
aspects of the actor’s practice. Whereas
honour is a more personal quality by which one sees a
person as he would like to be perceived, fame is more an
ascription free from the actor’s own intentions and selfascriptions.
An individual may see his own action as
honourable, but other members of the society may not.
Fame is therefore a communal acceptance of actions, and
as such, it may define what become honourable acts later
because it sets the agenda and structures people’s minds
of what is apprehended as a code of conduct. Being
renowned is thus a consequence of the third party’s
ascription and acceptance of a person’s actions. Fame as
an attribution to oneself and one’s individuality may be
unwanted and not foreseen. This is often the
consequence of miracles done by holy men, monks, and
lamas, and their fame may often be seen more as a
burden than a prestige in their strive towards liberation
from this world (figs. 3.2-3.3).
The difference between fame and honour as analytical
tools in ascribing status and understanding social
stratification and the creation, maintenance, and loss of
elitism in Hindu religious contexts, is perhaps one
approach in order to conceptualise some of the variables
in the hierarchisation of cultures. The acceptance of
certain people being holy in the “true” sense is a matter
of conducting miracles. Those holy people who are able
to perform miracles are truly seen as religious
superiorities, and the names of these men are rapidly
spread. Their own honour and way of living are directed
towards the otherworldly existence, whereas fame
functions in this world. The emphasis in this world is
therefore on fame and religious supremacy, and this
implies that the social creation of statuses is directed
towards the others and the third part that reckons and
acknowledges certain people as holy and divine. Holy
men will not, in theory at least, partake in this society
and world but renounce from it.
Nevertheless, they are in some way or another and to
various extents included in the society. If they really are
holy and can perform miracles and cure deceases, then
society does not accept a total withdrawal.