The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post ...

ush to disarm in order to show donors that UNMIL was making progress’. 31 Also, the
UN’s initial estimate of a total of 38,000 ex-combatants proved to be grossly off the
mark. By November 2004, when the process was officially declared ended, according to
the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and
Reintegration (NCDDRR) 103, 018 persons had been disarmed. 11% of these were
children. 27,000 weapons, 6,153,631 rounds of ammunition and 29,274 heavy munitions
had been collected. 32 Despite the official declaration of the end of disarmament and
demobilisation, however, there have been reports that the exercise was far from
comprehensive:
10
Ex-combatants in some provinces in Liberia, it is widely reported, were not
disarmed before the process was declared complete in November 2004… The
disarmament exercise with all its attractions for fighters did not cover a large part of
Lofa, Grand Kru and other areas, thus cutting off a large chunk of potential
beneficiaries from the goods of disarmament and therefore prospects for lasting
peace and development. 33
Lack of accurate records render an assessment of the level of success of the disarmament
programme rather problematic, in the absence of a baseline figure of actual number of
weapons in circulation. However, an attempt to relate the number of weapons collected
to the six known arms shipments transported from the former Yugoslavia in 2002 offer
some encouraging results:
…by 3 October, 2004, ex-combatants had turned in a total of 3,175, or 64%, of the
original 5,000 rifles. UNMIL undertook a similar count of 200 missile launchers (RB
M57)… Of these, it appeared from the serial numbers that ex-combatants had
turned in 184, or 92%. Further analysis also showed that of an estimated 791 RPG-
7 rockets, a total of 459, or 58% were collected. Combined, these figures show that
64% of the weapons…were collected. 34
The programme has also suffered from inadequate implementation of the demobilisation
of ex-combatants. The three-week period initially planned for demobilisation (including
separation of ex-combatants from their commanders, healthcare, psychological
counselling and career guidance) was subsequently reduced to five days. This has been
palpably inadequate for many of the ex-fighters who had witnessed years of combat.
With the psychology of war deeply embedded in their consciousness, and with the failure
of the demobilisation process to effectively sever links between the fighters and their
commanders, many ex-combatants are reported to still be in the employ of their
commanders, for domestic and personal errands and as general hangers-on.
The DDR programme has gone some way in improving the state of security in Liberia. It
has enhanced the security of the state as well, by reducing the multiplicity of sources of
31 The decision to commence disarmament despite the palpable lack of adequate preparation resulted in the death
of nine persons, several other wounded, and damage to property. See International Crisis Group Report,
‘Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils’, ICG Africa Report No. 75, Freetown/Brussels, 30 January, 2004, p. 15.
32
National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, DDRR Consolidated
Report Phase (Status of Disarmament and Demobilisation Activities as at 1/16/2005). 1,2 & 3. Available at
http://humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/sectoral/DDR/index.asp
33
The Analyst, ‘NEC’s False Start’, 20 May, 2005. Available at www.analystnewspaper.com/nec_false_start.htm
34
Ryan Nichols, ‘Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls’ in Nicholas Florquin and Eric Berman (eds.), Armed and
Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns and Human security in the ECOWAS Region, Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005,
p.124.