The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post ...

International Airport (RIIA), Springfield and the National Port in Monrovia. The Bureau
now has officials at the borders with Sierra Leone and Guinea.
Local ownership: There is a general consensus among Liberians - public officials and civil
society alike - that the international community (particularly UNMIL) has failed to
emphasise local ownership of the reconstruction process. Liberians feel excluded from
the planning and implementation of key programmes such as DDRR and Police Reform.
DDRR is one example. While UNMIL provides office space for National Commission
for DDRR (NCDDRR) and pays the salary of its Executive Director, there is real
concern that the blueprint for DDRR did not contain significant Liberian input and that
the NCDDRR was virtually sidelined in development of the DDRR programme. There is
also a feeling that UNMIL has a tendency to exaggerate the scale of the ‘brain-drain’
problem, as a consequence of which inadequate effort has been put into identifying
suitable Liberians to perform tasks that are farmed out instead to international personnel.
The assumption is that the entire country lacks skilled and educated personnel, with the
result that available human resources in the country feel marginalized and ignored.
Public perception of UNMIL: Although Liberians appreciate immensely the security and
stability provided by UN presence in Liberia, particularly Monrovia, there is a strong
public perception that the UNMIL senior leadership disregards their views on how the
country’s problems should be addressed. An issue of particular concern is the
relationship between the Chairman of the NTGL and the UN SRSG which has been
characterised as ‘too cordial’, in effect making a system of checks-and-balances
impossible. Overall, the team sensed that there is a general lack of confidence between
the SRSG/UNMIL and Liberians.
Related to this, and equally significant, is the perception by UNMIL and the NTGL that
many of the Ministers and their deputies presently serving in the Government are
‘warlords’ and ex-fighters solely concerned with getting good jobs. This attitude, while no
doubt having some basis in reality, does not encourage national re-conciliation and casts
a debilitating shadow over the entire transition process, when publicly expressed.
Legislative capacity and relevance: The CPA has resulted in many people being placed in the
National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) who have no real political
experience. Like other areas of Government, NTLA is plagued by poor infrastructure
with parliamentarians working without furniture and telephone lines in a building that is
in a poor state of repair.
As with the NTGL, the public perception of the NTLA is not encouraging.
Parliamentarians are seen as serving their own personal interests rather than the interests
of the public. Ordinary Liberians with whom we interacted were quick to draw attention
to the Cherokee Jeeps that Parliamentarians drive around Monrovia and the relatively
huge allowances that they voted for themselves in a country where the vast majority of
people live below the poverty line. In particular, the credibility of the TLA is also
hampered by allegedly poor human rights records of some of its members.
Parliamentarians expressed disquiet that Parliament in general, and the relevant select
committees in particular, are often by-passed in the governance process. Relations
between the TLA and other arms of Government are often coloured by factional politics
rather than national politics. Parliamentarians themselves seemed to lack the confidence,
and certainly the technical knowledge and skills necessary for the effective performance
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