The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post ...

Security Sector Reform (SSR): While there is a general recognition that the peace cannot be
sustained without more effective and accountable, state security provision, a
comprehensive strategy for SSR has thus far not been developed. This worrying gap is
due to a number of factors: a deliberate policy of some within both Government and the
donor community of marginalising security actors who are largely held responsible for
the conflict and killing which has engulfed Liberia over the past 16 years; competing
demands on the attention and resources of both donors and Government for
reconstruction; and the lack of a holistic response to Liberia’s security problems. This
oversight is perhaps most glaring in the context of the UN Secretary General’s own
quarterly assessments of Liberia’s reconstruction needs which gloss over the challenges
of SSR, presenting them largely in terms of ‘police reform’.
This is short-sighted. Transformation - as opposed to ‘reform’ - of the entire state
security apparatus should be at the heart of the peace and reconstruction process. Unless
the limitations of past security models are addressed, there is a danger of recreating the
conditions that gave rise to Liberia’s war in the first place. The challenge is not simply to
demilitarise, but to create a new framework for state security action that can help to
avoid the conflicts of the past between the security interests of Liberia’s political regimes
and the security interests of its population. Achieving this will be a long and complicated
process, but it will involve fundamentally reviewing the very objectives and means of
state security provision, including institutional cultures, systems and processes.
To date, UNMIL has focused exclusively on one component of this broader challenge
which is police reform and the rule of law. While there has been some tangible progress
in terms of training police and increasing their presence on the streets of Monrovia, and
some evidence of coordination between several UNMIL components (CIVPOL, Human
Rights, Corrections and Judiciary), this work has been undertaken in isolation from
restructuring of the armed forces or wider governance reforms within the security sector
which are yet to be launched. The US has expressed a keen interest in supporting the
restructuring of the AFL which was originally based on the US model and has previously
received US assistance. US support is conditional on the NTGL first demonstrating
visible interest in reform by undertaking to re-document the AFL, though resources to
carry this out have still not been found. Of greater concern, however, is that the
restructuring plan being produced by the Liberian Ministry of Defence with Pentagon
assistance does not devote adequate attention to the question of civil management of the
army. Furthermore, other security agencies, including, the National Security Agency,
National Bureau of Investigation and Bureau for Immigration and Naturalisation are
completely left out of the plan.
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR): The success of the
Liberian reconstruction programme also hinges upon an effective DDRR programme.
The fast pace of disarmament, after some early hitches in the process in December 2003,
is one of the early indicators of the commitment of the armed factions to peace and
disarmament. However, there are real concerns about the way in which the programme is
being implemented. These concerns centre around four main issues:
First, the UN grossly underestimated the number of combatants and people associated
with the warring factions that would need to be demobilised. As at 1 August 2004, more
than 60,000 combatants had gone through the disarmament process, with several
counties yet to be covered – compared to the UN’s initial estimate of 38,000 troops. This
has had cost implications for disarmament and overall reintegration, in particular. While
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