The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post ...

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Executive Summary Liberia presents one of the most challenging contexts for post conflict reconstruction since the end of the Cold War, featuring a protracted civil war and the concomitant destruction of the state, society and economy. This Occasional Paper examines post conflict reconstruction in Liberia, with particular focus on the security sector. The paper argues that opportunities for security sector reform (SSR) are conditioned by the mutually reinforcing relationship between the state of security on the one hand, and the security of the state on the other. The prospects for stability and peacebuilding are enhanced by the extent to which SSR is predicated on the state of security broadly defined, as opposed to the narrower focus on the security of the state. The core of SSR lies in the twin imperatives of operational efficiency and democratic governance. From a governance perspective, therefore, the objective of improving the ability of security institutions to deliver security services to the majority of the population in a cost effective and operationally efficient manner is necessary but not sufficient. Operational efficiency, without effective democratic governance of the security sector is a recipe for brutalisation and oppression of the population by the armed and security forces, particularly of the poor and vulnerable. SSR therefore seeks to achieve, not only the efficacy of security institutions, but also to ensure that they are consistent with democratic norms of transparency, accountability and responsiveness. This is particularly relevant in the case of Liberia where there has been repeated personalization of the security sector an all-powerful presidency. In this regard, it must be noted that the Liberian reconstruction process has, thus far, paid little attention to the governance aspects of reform, and would need to be addressed by a newly-elected government. In addition, Liberia’s transition period (2003-2005) has not featured a discernible national security policy and, relatedly, there has been the lack of a coherent and comprehensive framework for the reconstruction of the security sector. Rather, there has been a compartmentalisation of reform and of the reform process. For example, despite the emphasis on reforming the police, there has been no corresponding effort on the reforming the judiciary and correctional services, resulting in an over-burdened judiciary and congested prisons. The Liberian peace process follows the pattern of the UN’s modus operandi which has been emerging since the end of the Cold War, characterized by a sequence of activities in the order of a peace agreement, followed by deployment of peacekeepers, a DDR programme, SSR, and ending with elections. In the case of Liberia a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in Accra in August 2003, provided for the formation of a transitional government (National Transitional Government of Liberia), including a transitional parliament (National Transitional Legislative Assembly). However, the challenge and opportunity of starting reconstruction from scratch have been hampered by various factors including governance deficits and corruption in the transitional government, the inconclusive nature of the DDR process and a gap between Disarmament and Demobilization on the one hand and Reintegration and Rehabilitation on the other (DD-RR gap), Charles Taylor’s continued meddling in the affairs of the country and the yet unresolved issue of transitional justice, failure to address the youth question and other root causes of conflict. ii
The following factors impede the prospects for democratic governance of the security sector in Liberia: • Lack of adequate constitutional framework; • Conceptual and implementation gaps between SSR and the broader governance framework; • Lack of mechanisms for making the reform process accountable to the Liberians; • Inadequate parliamentary oversight; • Lack of genuine and effective civilian leadership and management capacity in the Ministry of Defence (MoD); • Inadequate civil society involvement in the reform process; • In the recent past, a gap between the Liberian population and the leadership of UNMIL. Overall, a coherent and accountable framework for SSR in Liberia needs to be articulated, based a comprehensive and inclusive national security policy. The paper makes the following specific recommendations: • A broad-based national security policy review; • Review of the Liberian constitution • Integration of regional peacebuilding capabilities into the new Liberian armed forces; • Devise an oversight mechanism over the activities of DynCorp which would include the UN Peacebuilding Commission, ECOWAS, ICRC, the United States Government, and Veritas, proprietor of DynCorp; • A comprehensive programme for the enhancement of parliamentary oversight capacity; • Identifying and using new funding sources such as the Democracy Fund the UN Peacebuilding Commission to support mechanisms for strengthening democratic control of the armed and security forces; • Extension of disarmament beyond the October/November 2005 elections. Civilian disarmament through the UNDP Small Arms Control and Community Micro- Disarmament project provides a useful framework achieving this objective. • Explore avenues for enhancing local ownership of the reconstruction process, particularly in the security sector. iii
Page 1: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Co
Page 4 and 5: About the Author Adedeji Ebo is a S
Page 7: Preface This Occasional Paper partl
Page 11: SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons S
Page 14 and 15: epressive. 3 The more significant p
Page 16 and 17: 1822, despite its declaration of in
Page 18 and 19: In the case of Liberia, the nationa
Page 20 and 21: 2.2.1. Corruption and governance de
Page 22 and 23: ush to disarm in order to show dono
Page 24 and 25: population.’ 40 For example, seve
Page 26 and 27: 2.2.4. The Youth Question The role
Page 28 and 29: • Special Security Services (SSS)
Page 30 and 31: the DAC plan, would be composed of
Page 32 and 33: agriculture, and health, to mention
Page 34 and 35: efore the law is a necessary condit
Page 36 and 37: The democratic credentials of the L
Page 38 and 39: constituency, and no interests, but
Page 40 and 41: expressed disquiet, ranging from th
Page 42 and 43: • In addition to the oversight re
Page 44 and 45: Determined to foster mutual trust a
Page 46 and 47: "UNHCR" means the United Nations Of
Page 48 and 49: 36 h. Along with ECOWAS and the Int
Page 50 and 51: 38 2. The following Principles shal
Page 52 and 53: 40 ARTICLE XIII TRUTH AND RECONCILI
Page 54 and 55: 42 ARTICLE XVII CONTRACT AND MONOPO
Page 56 and 57: 44 except those restrictions impose
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2. In addition to the Commissions e
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program for the rehabilitation of s
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FOR LIBERIAN ACTION PARTY FOR PEOPL
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Meetings The team met with a broad
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UNMIL authorities have acknowledged
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of their oversight duties. Combined
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Skilled Liberians: Notwithstanding
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The specific objectives of the Nati
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Proliferation of Small Arms: It was
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west Africa, within which Liberia i
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66 security sector reform, with emp
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Heiner Hänggi, ‘Making sense of
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Fred Schreier and Marina Caparini,
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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Co
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