The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post ...

4. Enabling Environment for Democratic Governance
of the Security Sector
Much of the focus of post-conflict reconstruction of the security sector in Liberia has so
far focused almost exclusively on the efficiency (restructuring) aspect of reform. The
governance dimension of reform, as encapsulated in mechanisms for democratic control
of armed and security forces, has hardly been addressed. 85 The efficiency of armed and
security forces is emphasised in the reform process because improved performance of
security functions can have a substantial impact on a country’s stability. However,
improved performance per se is not sufficient for peacebuilding, as the security forces
may merely become more efficient at brutalising and repressing the population. 86 Hence
the need for democratic civilian oversight which ensures that the armed and security
forces function according to the priorities, and under the control of the population which
they should serve and protect. In this section, our discussion focuses on factors which
affect the prospects for the infusion of the democratic oversight principles of
accountability, transparency and participation into the process of reforming the security
sector in post-war Liberia:
4.1. Constitutional Framework
As indicated earlier, the constitution is a vital instrument of security governance, as it
provides the overall legal framework for security policy. The Liberian Constitution has
created an all-powerful presidency which represents a difficult challenge to effective
democratic control of the armed and security forces. Article 56(a) grants the President
absolute power over all appointees, including those in charge of the security system. The
President is practically in singular and absolute control over the armed and security
forces. Apart from the AFL, which is headed by a Chief of Staff and responsible to the
Minister of Defence, all agencies report to the Minister of Justice and are headed by
Directors who are appointed by the President. Thus, even though Article 34(c)
empowers the legislature ‘to make rules for the governance of the Armed forces of the
Republic’, the wide-ranging powers of the president casts a shadow over the entire
security governance framework, further enhanced by the President’s control of public
finances. As Amos Sawyer has pointed out:
A president who has the sole authority to appoint prison wardens, sheriffs, district
commissioners, county attorneys, superintendents, the minister of justice, and
judges of the courts, including the Supreme Court, is legally entrusted with allinclusive
prerogatives to shape the rule of law and the course of justice in society.
This is too much power for any person, no matter how humble, compassionate and
knowledgeable that person may be. A president who has the sole authority to
determine disbursements of public funds through a warrant prepared by his
assistant and passed unchecked by any other independent authority is empowered
to exercise exclusive control over the public purse. 87
85
See Report of CSDG-DCAF, op. cit.
86
Clingendael, International Alert, and Saferworld, ‘Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector
Reform: Broadening the Debate’, Occasional Paper No. 1, August, 2002, p. 6.
87
Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London,
2005, p. 106.
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