lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
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his mental functioning was so aberrant and affected his criminal<br />
behaviour <strong>to</strong> such a substantial degree that the offence ought <strong>to</strong> be<br />
reduced <strong>to</strong> one of manslaughter;” 52<br />
(6) an amended version which would provide:<br />
“Where a person kills or is a party <strong>to</strong> the killing of another, he<br />
shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from an<br />
abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of<br />
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent<br />
causes or induced by disease or injury) and that abnormality of<br />
mind was a significant cause of his acts or omissions in doing<br />
or being a party <strong>to</strong> the killing”;<br />
(7) some other version?<br />
5.53 Our analysis of responses revealed that none of the versions which we put<br />
forward for consideration attracted widespread support. Fifty-five consultees<br />
chose one or more of the versions. 53 Versions (4) and (5) (the New South Wales<br />
<strong>Law</strong> Reform <strong>Commission</strong> version (NSW) and Professor Mackay’s version)<br />
attracted very little support. 54 Versions (2) and (3) (the Butler Committee version<br />
and the Criminal <strong>Law</strong> Revision Committee version) attracted a higher level of<br />
support. 55 Version (1) (the current formulation) was generally favoured by<br />
women’s organisations 56 on the basis that it is the least narrowly defined medical<br />
version. 57 Version (6) (our own formulation) attracted some support amongst the<br />
judiciary. 58<br />
The pervasive “ought <strong>to</strong> be reduced <strong>to</strong> manslaughter” test<br />
5.54 One common feature of versions (2), (3), (4) and (5) is that the ultimate question<br />
the jury has <strong>to</strong> decide is whether the offence “ought” <strong>to</strong> be reduced <strong>to</strong><br />
manslaughter. This element in these versions appealed <strong>to</strong> some whose view was<br />
that the essence of the defence involves the jury making a moral choice. Version<br />
(3) was particularly favoured by two consultees because it introduces a societal<br />
test and is akin <strong>to</strong> the test set by Lord Hoffmann in Smith (Morgan). 59<br />
52 Ibid, at p 83.<br />
53 Mr Justice Curtis, Mr Justice Penry-Davey and Sally Cunningham chose both versions (2)<br />
and (3).<br />
54 Each of these versions attracted the support of four consultees. The two versions are very<br />
different from each other. The former stresses the accused’s mental capacity and it<br />
restricts the defence <strong>to</strong> “a notion of a pre-existing impairment requiring proof by way of<br />
expert evidence, which impairment is of a more permanent nature than a simply temporary<br />
state of heightened emotions”. Professor Mackay’s version incorporates neither of those<br />
features.<br />
55 7 and 13 consultees respectively.<br />
56 Middlesborough Domestic Violence Forum; Justice for Women; Southall Black Sisters.<br />
57 11 consultees favoured retention of the current formulation.<br />
58 In <strong>to</strong>tal 11 consultees supported this version.<br />
59 [2001] 1 AC 146.<br />
96