lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
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The provoking conduct<br />
3.25 In Consultation Paper No 173 we explained that because the word “provoked” in<br />
section 3 of the 1957 Act has come <strong>to</strong> be interpreted as meaning no more than<br />
“caused”, conduct can qualify as provocation although it is of a minor character or<br />
even entirely lawful. 13 We did not put a specific question <strong>to</strong> consultees about this,<br />
but one highly experienced judge expressed the views held by many respondents<br />
when she wrote:<br />
The scope of provocation has been so enlarged that a judge is<br />
obliged <strong>to</strong> leave it when … the conduct and/the words in question<br />
are trivial. The issue should only arise where circumstances are<br />
sufficiently grave <strong>to</strong> justify it. Such tightening up would not remove<br />
the last straw in the slow burn of domestic violence, although<br />
provocation must always be distinguished from revenge.<br />
Sudden and temporary loss of self-control<br />
3.26 In Consultation Paper No 173 we discussed this ingredient of the defence and<br />
the problems <strong>to</strong> which it has given rise. 14 There is no satisfac<strong>to</strong>ry definition of loss<br />
of self-control. In Oneby 15 it was said that <strong>to</strong> reduce a crime from murder <strong>to</strong><br />
manslaughter the provocation had <strong>to</strong> arouse in the defendant “such a passion as<br />
for the time deprives him of his reasoning faculties”. Similarly in Duffy 16 Devlin J<br />
spoke of provocation “rendering the accused so subject <strong>to</strong> passion as <strong>to</strong> make<br />
him or her for the moment not master of his mind”. 17<br />
3.27 However, the equation of loss of self-control with deprivation of reasoning<br />
faculties has been only partial. The courts have rejected the argument that a<br />
reasonable person who has lost self-control cannot be fully responsible for their<br />
conduct. In Phillips v The Queen 18 Lord Diplock said:<br />
Before their Lordships, counsel for the appellant contended, not as<br />
a matter of construction but as one of logic, that once a reasonable<br />
man had lost his self-control his actions ceased <strong>to</strong> be those of a<br />
reasonable man and that accordingly he was no longer fully<br />
responsible in law for them whatever he did. This argument is based<br />
on the premise that loss of self-control is not a matter of degree but<br />
is absolute; there is no intermediate stage between icy detachment<br />
and going berserk. This premise, unless the argument is purely<br />
semantic, must be based upon human experience and is, in their<br />
Lordships’ view, false. The average man reacts <strong>to</strong> provocation<br />
according <strong>to</strong> its degree with angry words, with a blow of the hand,<br />
13 Paras 4.8 – 4.11.<br />
14 Paras 4.15 – 4.28.<br />
15 (1727) 2 Ld Raym 1485; 92 ER 465.<br />
16 [1949] 1 All ER 932.<br />
17 Ibid.<br />
18 [1969] 2 AC 130.<br />
35