lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
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Our recommendation<br />
5.86 Our view is that for the time being, and pending any full consideration of murder,<br />
section 2 should remain unreformed. There appears <strong>to</strong> be no great dissatisfaction<br />
with the operation of the defence and this is consistent with our consideration of<br />
the results of Professor Mackay’s investigation of the defence in practice. To the<br />
extent that there is concern that certain defendants are forced <strong>to</strong> adopt the partial<br />
defence of diminished responsibility when their true defence is that they acted out<br />
of fear of future violence, our recommendations in respect of provocation would<br />
meet that concern more directly than tinkering with diminished responsibility. To<br />
the extent that there is some concern that the defence operates overly<br />
sympathetically <strong>to</strong> men who kill their partners, the evidence does not support that<br />
concern.<br />
5.87 There is no substantial support for any of the alternative formulations which we<br />
canvassed. It would be wrong for us <strong>to</strong> make a recommendation which might<br />
simply give rise <strong>to</strong> a round of appellate hearings and which would not significantly<br />
improve this area of the law.<br />
The burden of proof 95<br />
5.88 A small majority of consultees who addressed this issue was in favour of the<br />
defence only bearing an evidential burden. 96 The judiciary was evenly split 97 but<br />
the professions were in favour of retaining the current arrangement. 98<br />
5.89 The arguments in favour of placing only an evidential burden on the defence<br />
arose primarily from a perceived need for consistency between the two partial<br />
defences of provocation and diminished responsibility (particularly where, post<br />
Smith (Morgan), there may be considerable overlap in the relevant evidence <strong>to</strong><br />
which the jury may be directed <strong>to</strong> apply different burdens of proof), rather than<br />
from instances of perceived injustice. 99<br />
5.90 The arguments on the other side focused on the fact that the defence was one<br />
where the matters relied on were peculiarly in the hands of the defence. In<br />
contrast <strong>to</strong> provocation, the defence depends not on external facts which might<br />
be investigated and challenged independently of the defendant but on the<br />
defendant’s state of mind, a matter which can only be investigated with his cooperation.<br />
Furthermore, even where the medical evidence <strong>to</strong> support the defence<br />
is weak, it might be very difficult for the jury <strong>to</strong> conclude that the defence had<br />
been disproved <strong>to</strong> the criminal standard because of the limitations of the<br />
95 In Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] QB 1112 the Court of Appeal held that the imposition of<br />
the burden of proof on the defendant was compatible with the presumption of innocence<br />
contained in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.<br />
96 33 for, 24 against.<br />
97 12 for, 12 against.<br />
98 7 for, 4 against.<br />
99 One judicial consultee suggested that the resolution of this dilemma would be <strong>to</strong> require<br />
the defence <strong>to</strong> bear the legal burden of establishing each of the partial defences.<br />
105