lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission

would have to be considered in the context of the relationship between the
defendant and the victim.
3.103 The question has been raised whether any statement of a reformed provocation
defence should make express reference to emotions other than fear. We
recognise that provocation may give rise to a range of emotions, e.g. anger, fear,
disgust and despair. It may be appropriate for a judge to refer to these matters in
his summing up, when inviting the jury to think about how provocation might
cause a person to respond with violence, but we do not think it necessary to
incorporate a list of all such emotions in a definition of provocation.
The trigger: combination of gross provocation and fear
3.104 HHJ Stewart QC has brought to our attention the case of Annette and Charlene
Maw 59 in which he appeared as junior counsel for the defendants. The case
aroused considerable public interest at the time. Annette was 21 and Charlene
was 18. They lived with their father, mother and younger brother in Bradford. The
father was a drunkard and a bully and habitually treated their mother with
violence. On the night of the offence he had a blood alcohol level equivalent to at
least ten pints of cider. He was in an ugly mood and assaulted both defendants
and their mother. There was a fight in a bedroom which ended only when the
mother smashed a mirror over the father’s head. The women came downstairs,
leaving him in the bedroom. The girls then decided that they could stand no more
of his treatment and would finish him off by stabbing him. Before they did
anything, the father came downstairs, made a grab at Annette and hit her. He
then hit the mother. Annette called for Charlene to fetch a knife. Charlene did so
and handed it to Annette, who stabbed the father below the neck, severing the
jugular vein. They called the police and initially told a false story that the father
had been trying to knife Annette.
3.105 The sisters were charged with murder but pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Their
plea was accepted with the approval of the trial judge. The basis of the plea was
not specified in open court. There was good reason for this. As a matter of law
they were guilty of murder. They were not acting under a sudden loss of selfcontrol
and there were other ways in which they could have protected themselves
against the immediate risk than by killing the father. As Lord Lane CJ said in the
Court of Appeal “unhappily, the case was not merely a simple one of self-defence
nor was it simply one of the agony of the moment.”
3.106 The trial judge sentenced both defendants to three years’ imprisonment. There
was a public outcry that the sentences were too severe. On appeal, Charlene’s
sentence was reduced to six months imprisonment and Annette’s sentence was
upheld.
3.107 It is unsatisfactory that the case could only be treated as manslaughter by
prosecutorial discretion which involved turning a blind eye to the law with the
connivance of the judge. Under our proposals, the conviction for manslaughter
would have been available on a principled and transparent basis.
59 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 3 December 1980, No. 4795/R/80.
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