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lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission

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3.108 HHJ Stewart QC has commented on our provisional conclusions:<br />

I agree that the trigger should be gross provocation by words or<br />

conduct or fear of serious violence <strong>to</strong> self or another which caused<br />

the defendant <strong>to</strong> have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged<br />

in the situation in which he found himself. This would cover the Maw<br />

situation <strong>to</strong> which I have referred in earlier correspondence.<br />

The objective test<br />

3.109 Even if there was gross provocation, it by no means follows that an ordinary<br />

person would have reacted in the way that the defendant did. Most people from<br />

time <strong>to</strong> time suffer gross provocation without resorting <strong>to</strong> lethal violence. The<br />

defence should only be available if a person of ordinary temperament, i.e.<br />

ordinary <strong>to</strong>lerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant<br />

might have reacted in the same or a similar way.<br />

3.110 In deciding whether a person of ordinary temperament in the circumstances of<br />

the defendant might have reacted in the same or similar way, the court should<br />

take in<strong>to</strong> account all the circumstances of the defendant other than matters<br />

whose only relevance <strong>to</strong> the defendant’s conduct is that they “bear simply on [his<br />

or her] … general capacity for self-control” (<strong>to</strong> adopt a succinct expression used<br />

by Professor Glanville Williams 60 in his analysis of the decision in Camplin). 61 The<br />

only qualification which we would make is that the court should have regard <strong>to</strong><br />

the defendant’s age, because capacity for self-control is an aspect of maturity,<br />

and it would be unjust <strong>to</strong> expect the same level of a twelve-year-old and an adult<br />

(as was recognised in Camplin). In other words, we prefer the minority position in<br />

Smith (Morgan), 62 which also accords broadly with the law in Australia, Canada<br />

and New Zealand, and with the recent provisional recommendations of the Irish<br />

<strong>Law</strong> Reform <strong>Commission</strong>.<br />

3.111 This is not <strong>to</strong> deny a defence <strong>to</strong> an abused person whose temperament may<br />

have been changed as a result of the provocation, for that would be a matter<br />

which bore not simply on the defendant’s general temperament independent of<br />

the provocation but on the effect of the provocation itself. As Lord Millett said in<br />

Smith (Morgan) 63 about such a case:<br />

The question for the jury is whether a woman with normal powers of<br />

self-control, subjected <strong>to</strong> the treatment which the accused received,<br />

would or might finally react as she did… . It does not involve an<br />

inquiry whether the accused was capable of displaying the powers<br />

of self-control of an ordinary person, but whether a person with the<br />

power of self-control of an ordinary person would or might have<br />

60 Textbook of Criminal <strong>Law</strong> (2nd ed 1983) p 540.<br />

61 [1978] AC 705.<br />

62 [2001] 1 AC 146.<br />

63 Ibid.<br />

55

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