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lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission

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We can see strong arguments for a rule of law precluding selfinduced<br />

provocation in the narrower sense from affording a partial<br />

defence <strong>to</strong> murder, and we can see no good argument <strong>to</strong> the<br />

contrary.<br />

To exclude from a defence of provocation all forms of conduct which<br />

might fall within the broader sense of self-induced provocation<br />

would in our view go <strong>to</strong>o far. While there is much <strong>to</strong> be said, for<br />

example, in denying the defence <strong>to</strong> criminals whose unlawful<br />

activities expose them <strong>to</strong> the risk of provocation by others, we see<br />

considerable problems in trying <strong>to</strong> devise a rule of law which would<br />

differentiate satisfac<strong>to</strong>rily between forms of self-induced provocation<br />

in the broader sense which should, and which should not, preclude<br />

a defence of provocation. The circumstances are <strong>to</strong>o potentially<br />

variable for a clear and simple rule.<br />

We are not putting any particular question <strong>to</strong> consultees on the <strong>to</strong>pic<br />

of self-induced provocation, but we would be interested in any<br />

observations by consultees who disagree with our comments<br />

on this subject.<br />

3.140 We had no comments on those observations and we adhere <strong>to</strong> them. Where an<br />

issue arises about self-induced provocation in the broader sense, it would be for<br />

the jury <strong>to</strong> take a common-sense view whether the defendant’s conduct met the<br />

requirements of the objective test.<br />

Role of judge and jury<br />

3.141 A judge should not be required <strong>to</strong> leave the defence of provocation <strong>to</strong> the<br />

jury unless there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly directed,<br />

could conclude that it might apply.<br />

3.142 If provocation is <strong>to</strong> be defined by general principles rather than specific<br />

categories, this proposal is important. The res<strong>to</strong>ration of this power <strong>to</strong> the trial<br />

judge (which was removed by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957), coupled with<br />

the supervision of the appellate courts, will enable the law <strong>to</strong> set boundaries in a<br />

reasoned, sensitive and nuanced way, whereas an inflexible statu<strong>to</strong>ry formula<br />

would have no room for development.<br />

3.143 Consider, for example, the decision of the High Court of Australia in the leading<br />

case of Stingel. 84 The defendant stalked a former girlfriend. She obtained a court<br />

order preventing him from approaching her, but he ignored it. After a party he<br />

found her (according <strong>to</strong> his account) in a car with another man having sex. He<br />

was sworn at and <strong>to</strong>ld where <strong>to</strong> go. He fetched a knife from his car and killed the<br />

man. The judge withdrew the defence of provocation from the jury and the High<br />

84 (1990) 171 CLR 312.<br />

64

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