lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
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We can see strong arguments for a rule of law precluding selfinduced<br />
provocation in the narrower sense from affording a partial<br />
defence <strong>to</strong> murder, and we can see no good argument <strong>to</strong> the<br />
contrary.<br />
To exclude from a defence of provocation all forms of conduct which<br />
might fall within the broader sense of self-induced provocation<br />
would in our view go <strong>to</strong>o far. While there is much <strong>to</strong> be said, for<br />
example, in denying the defence <strong>to</strong> criminals whose unlawful<br />
activities expose them <strong>to</strong> the risk of provocation by others, we see<br />
considerable problems in trying <strong>to</strong> devise a rule of law which would<br />
differentiate satisfac<strong>to</strong>rily between forms of self-induced provocation<br />
in the broader sense which should, and which should not, preclude<br />
a defence of provocation. The circumstances are <strong>to</strong>o potentially<br />
variable for a clear and simple rule.<br />
We are not putting any particular question <strong>to</strong> consultees on the <strong>to</strong>pic<br />
of self-induced provocation, but we would be interested in any<br />
observations by consultees who disagree with our comments<br />
on this subject.<br />
3.140 We had no comments on those observations and we adhere <strong>to</strong> them. Where an<br />
issue arises about self-induced provocation in the broader sense, it would be for<br />
the jury <strong>to</strong> take a common-sense view whether the defendant’s conduct met the<br />
requirements of the objective test.<br />
Role of judge and jury<br />
3.141 A judge should not be required <strong>to</strong> leave the defence of provocation <strong>to</strong> the<br />
jury unless there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly directed,<br />
could conclude that it might apply.<br />
3.142 If provocation is <strong>to</strong> be defined by general principles rather than specific<br />
categories, this proposal is important. The res<strong>to</strong>ration of this power <strong>to</strong> the trial<br />
judge (which was removed by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957), coupled with<br />
the supervision of the appellate courts, will enable the law <strong>to</strong> set boundaries in a<br />
reasoned, sensitive and nuanced way, whereas an inflexible statu<strong>to</strong>ry formula<br />
would have no room for development.<br />
3.143 Consider, for example, the decision of the High Court of Australia in the leading<br />
case of Stingel. 84 The defendant stalked a former girlfriend. She obtained a court<br />
order preventing him from approaching her, but he ignored it. After a party he<br />
found her (according <strong>to</strong> his account) in a car with another man having sex. He<br />
was sworn at and <strong>to</strong>ld where <strong>to</strong> go. He fetched a knife from his car and killed the<br />
man. The judge withdrew the defence of provocation from the jury and the High<br />
84 (1990) 171 CLR 312.<br />
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