lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
cannot be satisfac<strong>to</strong>rily tackled in isolation from other parts of the law of murder.<br />
We agree. 6<br />
3.19 Different systems of criminal law have different ways of grading homicides, but<br />
our law with its broad definition of murder, manda<strong>to</strong>ry sentence and patchwork<br />
partial defences is a product of piecemeal development and reforms, rather than<br />
systematic thought. The expansion of provocation over the past half century can<br />
be seen as an attempt by courts and juries <strong>to</strong> avoid a conviction of murder with a<br />
manda<strong>to</strong>ry life sentence in cases where the court has had some degree of<br />
sympathy for the defendant. A reformulation of provocation, without regard <strong>to</strong> the<br />
surrounding law of murder, would not be satisfac<strong>to</strong>ry in the long term and would<br />
leave the law still subject <strong>to</strong> the same pressures as have led <strong>to</strong> the past<br />
expansion of provocation.<br />
THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH PROVOCATION<br />
3.20 There was widespread dissatisfaction among consultees both with the theoretical<br />
underpinning of the defence of provocation and with its various component parts.<br />
It is not underpinned by any clear rationale. There is widespread agreement that<br />
the concept of provocation has become far <strong>to</strong>o loose, so that a judge may be<br />
obliged <strong>to</strong> leave the issue <strong>to</strong> the jury when the conduct and/or the words in<br />
question are trivial. The concept of loss of self-control has proved <strong>to</strong> be very<br />
troublesome. The supposed requirement of a sudden and temporary loss of selfcontrol<br />
has given rise <strong>to</strong> serious problems, especially in the “slow burn” type of<br />
case. There is much controversy about the supposed objective test (that the<br />
provocation was enough <strong>to</strong> make a reasonable person do as the defendant did),<br />
which has been interpreted by the majority of the House of Lords in Smith<br />
(Morgan) 7 in a way that may enable a defendant <strong>to</strong> rely on personal<br />
idiosyncrasies which make him or her more short tempered than other people.<br />
Rationale of the defence<br />
3.21 The rationale underlying the defence of provocation is elusive. As we said in<br />
Consultation Paper No 173, 8 a study of the cases and textbooks (including<br />
particularly Provocation and Responsibility (1992) by Dr Jeremy Horder) 9<br />
suggests that the doctrine has never been truly coherent, logical or consistent. At<br />
the time of the Homicide Act 1957 there was theoretically an excusa<strong>to</strong>ry rationale<br />
of sorts, namely that the defendant had suddenly and temporarily lost his or her<br />
self-control as a result of provocation which might have caused a reasonable<br />
person <strong>to</strong> do the same. However, this rationale did not bear <strong>to</strong>o close scrutiny,<br />
particularly in relation <strong>to</strong> the requirement of loss of self-control (<strong>to</strong> which we will<br />
return).<br />
6 We discuss the need for a broader review in Part 2 and do not repeat the arguments here.<br />
7<br />
[2001] 1 AC 146.<br />
8 Para 1.23.<br />
9 Dr Horder is among those <strong>to</strong> whom we are particularly grateful for his help in the course of<br />
this project.<br />
33