lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
lc290 Partial Defences to Murder report - Law Commission
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eacted in the same way <strong>to</strong> the cumulative effect of the treatment<br />
which she endured. 64<br />
3.112 We think that the objective test should apply in the case of a person responding<br />
<strong>to</strong> fear of serious violence as in the case of a person responding <strong>to</strong> provocation. It<br />
might be argued that self-restraint is a relevant fac<strong>to</strong>r when considering<br />
provocation but not when considering the position of a person acting in fear, but<br />
we would disagree. Ordinarily it would not be even partially excusable for a<br />
person in fear, but not in imminent danger, <strong>to</strong> take the law in<strong>to</strong> his or her own<br />
hands. We would not, for example, want a partial defence <strong>to</strong> be available <strong>to</strong><br />
criminal gangs who choose <strong>to</strong> deal with threats of violence from rival gangs by<br />
striking first. Our proposals regarding the role of the judge and jury 65 would<br />
properly preclude such a defence from being left <strong>to</strong> the jury in those<br />
circumstances (on the basis that no properly directed jury could reasonably<br />
conclude that a gangster who chose <strong>to</strong> act in such a way could satisfy the<br />
objective test).<br />
3.113 Some concerns have been expressed about our formulation of the objective test<br />
on the basis that persons of ordinary temperament do not kill in face of<br />
provocation. The “reasonable person” test in the law of provocation has always<br />
involved this problem. In Campbell 66 Lord Bingham CJ observed that “it is not<br />
al<strong>to</strong>gether easy <strong>to</strong> imagine circumstances in which a reasonable man would<br />
strike a fatal blow with the necessary mental intention, whatever the<br />
provocation”. 67 Nevertheless juries have recognised that there may be<br />
circumstances in which an ordinary person may be driven <strong>to</strong> use fatal violence in<br />
response <strong>to</strong> provocation.<br />
3.114 It seems <strong>to</strong> us that there must be some objective assessment of the response<br />
and its causes. As Lord Hoffman said in Smith (Morgan): 68<br />
A person who flies in<strong>to</strong> a murderous rage when he is crossed,<br />
thwarted or disappointed in the vicissitudes of life should not be able<br />
<strong>to</strong> rely upon his anti-social propensity as even a partial excuse for<br />
killing. 69<br />
3.115 Moreover our proposals involve abandoning the loss of self-control test, which<br />
has proved very unsatisfac<strong>to</strong>ry, and this makes the need for an objective test still<br />
greater.<br />
3.116 It is clear from our consultation process that different judges and practitioners<br />
have had different experiences of how the Smith (Morgan) test has worked in<br />
64<br />
Ibid, at p 213.<br />
65 See paras 3.141 – 3.152.<br />
66 [1997] 1 Cr App R 199.<br />
67<br />
Ibid, at p 207.<br />
68 [2001] 1 AC 146.<br />
69<br />
Ibid, at p 169.<br />
56