Community-based Sectors for the New England Groundfish Fishery

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oth states in 2004 relative to 2001. However, the reductions were quite uneven within the states. In Massachusetts, groundfish revenues fell by 45% between 2001 and 2004 for Cape and Islands ports, by 33% for the New Bedford coast, but by only 20% for Gloucester and only 11% for Boston (NEFMC 2006). During this period, Maine saw a shift of activity toward the Southern part of the state. Groundfish revenues for ports in upper Midcoast Maine dropped by 64% in this period. Groundfish revenues in lower Midcoast Maine were 28% lower in 2004 than 2001 while revenues in Southern Maine were 83% higher. Groundfish landings in Downeast Maine have been essentially nonexistent since 1997. Although overall groundfish revenues in Maine dropped by about the same amount as for Massachusetts between 2001 and 2004, concerns have been raised that permit holders are beginning to move their base of operations and landings away from Maine to Massachusetts ports because of proximity to the fishing grounds and because boats landing or registered in Maine are prohibited from landing lobsters which can provide a significant boost to revenues. Revenues from regulated groundfish landings in Maine did decline by about 2% in the 2005 fishing years relative to 2004 and increased by the same percentage in Massachusetts. Representatives of the Portland Fish Exchange, which handles the great majority of groundfish landings in Maine, have stated that the drop in landing of groundfish in Portland has made the exchange unprofitable and could lead to the close of the auction which would likely result in additional movement of vessels to other ports (Valleau 2007). 2.1 Sectors in the New England Groundfish Fishery The concept of self selecting sectors as a management tool for the New England groundfish fishery was first raised by Frank Marachi during the initial development of Amendment 13 (Thunberg 2007). The groundfish PDT was tasked with exploring the concept further. These self selecting sectors would allow groundfish permit holders to voluntarily join together to form a “sector” that would receive an allocation of the species they caught. They would be allowed to opt out of the input control system used to manage the fishery in return for keeping their catches within their allocation. Permit holders that did not wish to join a sector could continue to fish under a common set of regulations (i.e., the input control system as adapted by Amendment 13). The concept of sectors that emerged from Amendment 13 remained basically consistent with what was proposed by the PDT. A process was designed to allow groups of permit holders to form sectors and seek allocations of groundfish in return for developing a binding operations plan that would ensure the sector’s catch remained below its allocation. The allocation of catch to the sector would be based on the documented accumulated landings of sector members for the 5-year period prior to submission of a sector allocation proposal to the Council. An exception to that allocation formula was created for Georges Bank (GB) for which the allocation was based on fishing years 1996 through 2001 for any sectors that began operation by 2007. The sector regulations specified that no sector could be allocated more than 20 percent of a stock’s TAC unless otherwise authorized by the Council. The regulations spell out clearly the method for calculating the allocation of cod to the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector which was also implemented with Amendment 13. It states that the accumulated landings of GB cod by the sector participants from 1996–2001 will then be divided by the accumulated landings of GB cod by all vessels for 1996–2001. This ratio is the percentage of the GB cod TAC for the next fishing year that will be allocated to the sector. The sector would then receive that fixed percentage of the GB cod TAC in future years as well. The regulations are 10
somewhat vague on how the allocations for future sectors would be calculated, at least for allocations of stocks other than GB cod. The common presumption was that that allocations will be a percentage of the TAC calculated by dividing the sector vessels’ accumulated landings over the five years fishing years prior to submitting their proposal by the total documented (presumably commercial) landings for that stock over the same period. This would mean that, for a sector submitting its proposal in May of 2007 with plans to begin operation in May of 2008, its allocation would be based on catches in the fishing years beginning in 2002-2006. This allocation formula is likely to change anyway as a result of amendment 16. The regulations that implemented sectors require sectors to submit a proposal accompanied by an environmental assessment that satisfies National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other requirements for regulatory analysis of fishery management actions. The initial allocation of catch or DAS to the sector would require authorization by the Council through a framework or amendment. After the initial authorization, the sector would be required to submit an operations plan and a binding contract to the NMFS Regional Administrator (RA) along with an updated EA that evaluates the operations plan. The RA then reviews the operations plan and seeks public comment on it before giving the final approval (through a federal rule making) required for the sector to operate. Submission to and approval by the RA of an operations plan and contract with an updated EA is required each year the sector continues to operate, but further Council actions are not required for annual authorization of the sector unless there are substantial changes to the operations plan or membership. Sector management offers a number of potential advantages over the current management system. By accepting hard limits on total allowable catch (TAC) on all species, the regulations suggest that the sector members may be able to exempt themselves from trip limits and a number of existing management controls including trip limits, seasonal closures and overall limits on days at sea (DAS). This offers sector members an opportunity to: • increase efficiency by increasing flexibility of when and where they fish; • manage fishing operations to meet social as well economic objectives of the sector; • concentrate on increasing quality and value of fish caught without concern for lost fishing time; • make targeting and location decisions without concern for lost fishing time; • avoid having to return to port or discard fish because a trip limit is reached for one species (this “regulatory discarding” is currently a legal practice but leads to the discarding and mortality of large amounts of marketable fish); • transfer and potentially consolidate catch privileges between sector members to reduce capital costs. The potential benefits of sectors go beyond allowing more effective and efficient use of catch allocations. They empower fishery stakeholder to develop innovative ways to better manage the resources they have access to, and they can create strong incentives for these stakeholder to conserve fishery resources since their catch allocations in future years are directly related to the size and productivity of the fish stocks. Sectors may also offer an opportunity for communities that have historically participated in the groundfish fishery to maintain the viability of their local fishing fleets, preserve or regain access to the fishery, and become actively involved in managing local fishery resources through creation of community owned permit banks. By purchasing permits and associated catch history, a community entity could own a share of a sector’s catch allocation and make it available to sector members as an incentive to retain vessels in the community. Such a permit bank might also provide a means for communities to provide ongoing 11
Page 1 and 2: Community-based Sectors for the New
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents Executive Summary
Page 5 and 6: Community leaders in Portland and P
Page 7 and 8: of community-based permit banks. Th
Page 9 and 10: 1.0 Introduction The groundfish fis
Page 11: Although Amendment 13 effectively e
Page 15 and 16: 2.2 Experience with Existing Sector
Page 17 and 18: me to explore the idea further and
Page 19 and 20: period is that which was used to de
Page 21 and 22: shown above in Table 2. Revenue pro
Page 23 and 24: Table 3a: Port Clyde Sector Revenue
Page 25 and 26: ecruitment and could be either high
Page 27 and 28: increased. They also have caught a
Page 29 and 30: 3.2.1 Strawman Sector Structure and
Page 31 and 32: Table 8: Portland Sectors A and B V
Page 33 and 34: discussed earlier these price proje
Page 35 and 36: Table 9b: Portland Sector A Revenue
Page 37 and 38: Table 9d: Portland Sector B Revenue
Page 39 and 40: Table 10b: Portland Sector A Revenu
Page 41 and 42: Table 11b: Portland Sector B Specie
Page 43 and 44: vessels would be leased to sector v
Page 45 and 46: is ostensibly to reduce excess capa
Page 47 and 48: Table 15: Projected Total Revenue,
Page 49 and 50: later. However, rolling baselines c
Page 51 and 52: 4.4 Communities without Catch Histo
Page 53 and 54: opportunities for consolidation of
Page 55 and 56: References Alexander, Yvette 2006.M
Page 57 and 58: Appendix A: Landings and revenue pr
Page 59 and 60: Appendix B: Groundfish Price Model
Page 61 and 62: Appendix C: Sector Proposals Submit
Page 63 and 64:
Port Clyde Community Sector Glen Li
Page 65 and 66:
Full Retention All fish caught 1. e
Page 67 and 68:
Reasons for Existence: 1. end overf
Page 69 and 70:
Gloucester Fixed Gear Sector Peter
Page 71 and 72:
New Bedford Channel Trawl Sector Ri
Page 73 and 74:
Point Judith / Southern New England
Page 75:
Pier 6 Initiative Michael Walsh Req
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Community-based Sectors for the New England Groundfish Fishery

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