SEXUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS A legal and ... - The ICHRP
SEXUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS A legal and ... - The ICHRP
SEXUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS A legal and ... - The ICHRP
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Constitutional Court in <strong>The</strong> National Coalition for Gay <strong>and</strong> Lesbian Equality v. <strong>The</strong> Minister<br />
of Justice 64 :<br />
“When everything associated with homosexuality is treated as bent, queer,<br />
repugnant, the whole gay <strong>and</strong> lesbian community is marked with deviance <strong>and</strong><br />
perversity. <strong>The</strong>y are subject to extensive prejudice because what they are or what<br />
they are perceived to be, not because of what they do. <strong>The</strong> result is that a<br />
significant group of the population is, because of its sexual non-conformity,<br />
persecuted, marginalised <strong>and</strong> turned in on itself.”<br />
<strong>The</strong> court also held that Section 377 falls foul of the equality guaranteed in Article 15,<br />
particularly as regards ‘sex’. It found that “sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex<br />
<strong>and</strong> that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not permitted by Article 15.” It<br />
rooted its decision on a Canadian judgment, Corbiere v Canada 65, which held that such<br />
grounds serve to permit decisions based on stereotypes, which compromise merit <strong>and</strong> call<br />
attention to personal characteristics that are “immutable or changeable only at unacceptable<br />
cost to personal identity.” Importantly, the court held that the discrimination prohibited by<br />
Article 15 extends not just to State action but also to action which is perpetrated by one<br />
citizen against another. It held that, “In our view, discrimination based on the ground of<br />
sexual orientation is impermissible even on the horizontal application of the right enshrined<br />
under Article 15.”<br />
<strong>The</strong> court also found that Section 377 violated the right to life contained in Article 21 of the<br />
Indian Constitution. Discussing the content of the right to life, the court held that it<br />
encompasses the right to privacy as well as to human dignity. In discussing the growing<br />
jurisprudence around the right to dignity, the court referred to the Yogyakarta Principles <strong>and</strong><br />
their definitions of sexual orientation <strong>and</strong> gender identity. <strong>The</strong> court also surveyed<br />
developments in international jurisprudence on the subject quoting with approval from<br />
judgments from across the world including Toonen v. Australia (Human Rights Committee),<br />
Lawrence v. Texas (US Supreme Court) <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> National Coalition for Gay <strong>and</strong> Lesbian<br />
Equality v. <strong>The</strong> Minister of Justice (South African Constitutional Court). <strong>The</strong> judges also<br />
referred to the right to equality enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil <strong>and</strong> Political<br />
Rights, the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the right to health in General Comment 14 on Article 12 of the<br />
International Covenant on Economic, Social <strong>and</strong> Cultural Rights, the 2001 United Nations<br />
General Assembly Special Session Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS <strong>and</strong> the<br />
statement endorsed by 66 states presented to the UN Human Rights Council in 2008 calling<br />
for an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation <strong>and</strong> gender identity.<br />
One of the most interesting sections of the judgment tackles the question of morality as a<br />
ground for restricting fundamental rights. <strong>The</strong> court framed the issue stating that where a<br />
state law infringes the right to privacy there must be a compelling state interest <strong>and</strong> asked<br />
whether the enforcement of public morality amounts to a “compelling state interest.” In<br />
dealing with this issue, the judges distinguished popular morality from “constitutional<br />
morality” holding:<br />
“Thus popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid<br />
justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. Popular<br />
64 1999 (1) SA 6<br />
65 (1999) 2 SCR 203<br />
25