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SEXUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS A legal and ... - The ICHRP

SEXUAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS A legal and ... - The ICHRP

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Constitutional Court in <strong>The</strong> National Coalition for Gay <strong>and</strong> Lesbian Equality v. <strong>The</strong> Minister<br />

of Justice 64 :<br />

“When everything associated with homosexuality is treated as bent, queer,<br />

repugnant, the whole gay <strong>and</strong> lesbian community is marked with deviance <strong>and</strong><br />

perversity. <strong>The</strong>y are subject to extensive prejudice because what they are or what<br />

they are perceived to be, not because of what they do. <strong>The</strong> result is that a<br />

significant group of the population is, because of its sexual non-conformity,<br />

persecuted, marginalised <strong>and</strong> turned in on itself.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> court also held that Section 377 falls foul of the equality guaranteed in Article 15,<br />

particularly as regards ‘sex’. It found that “sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex<br />

<strong>and</strong> that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not permitted by Article 15.” It<br />

rooted its decision on a Canadian judgment, Corbiere v Canada 65, which held that such<br />

grounds serve to permit decisions based on stereotypes, which compromise merit <strong>and</strong> call<br />

attention to personal characteristics that are “immutable or changeable only at unacceptable<br />

cost to personal identity.” Importantly, the court held that the discrimination prohibited by<br />

Article 15 extends not just to State action but also to action which is perpetrated by one<br />

citizen against another. It held that, “In our view, discrimination based on the ground of<br />

sexual orientation is impermissible even on the horizontal application of the right enshrined<br />

under Article 15.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> court also found that Section 377 violated the right to life contained in Article 21 of the<br />

Indian Constitution. Discussing the content of the right to life, the court held that it<br />

encompasses the right to privacy as well as to human dignity. In discussing the growing<br />

jurisprudence around the right to dignity, the court referred to the Yogyakarta Principles <strong>and</strong><br />

their definitions of sexual orientation <strong>and</strong> gender identity. <strong>The</strong> court also surveyed<br />

developments in international jurisprudence on the subject quoting with approval from<br />

judgments from across the world including Toonen v. Australia (Human Rights Committee),<br />

Lawrence v. Texas (US Supreme Court) <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> National Coalition for Gay <strong>and</strong> Lesbian<br />

Equality v. <strong>The</strong> Minister of Justice (South African Constitutional Court). <strong>The</strong> judges also<br />

referred to the right to equality enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil <strong>and</strong> Political<br />

Rights, the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the right to health in General Comment 14 on Article 12 of the<br />

International Covenant on Economic, Social <strong>and</strong> Cultural Rights, the 2001 United Nations<br />

General Assembly Special Session Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS <strong>and</strong> the<br />

statement endorsed by 66 states presented to the UN Human Rights Council in 2008 calling<br />

for an end to discrimination based on sexual orientation <strong>and</strong> gender identity.<br />

One of the most interesting sections of the judgment tackles the question of morality as a<br />

ground for restricting fundamental rights. <strong>The</strong> court framed the issue stating that where a<br />

state law infringes the right to privacy there must be a compelling state interest <strong>and</strong> asked<br />

whether the enforcement of public morality amounts to a “compelling state interest.” In<br />

dealing with this issue, the judges distinguished popular morality from “constitutional<br />

morality” holding:<br />

“Thus popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid<br />

justification for restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. Popular<br />

64 1999 (1) SA 6<br />

65 (1999) 2 SCR 203<br />

25

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