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Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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What Drives Senior Management?<br />

In light of <strong>the</strong>se findings, and given <strong>the</strong> importance of senior management and board level<br />

commitment to improved OHS performance, an important question for Government and for<br />

<strong>the</strong> HSC/E is how best to motivate individual directors to assume responsibility for <strong>the</strong> safe<br />

and healthy operation of <strong>the</strong>ir companies. A review of <strong>the</strong> available research reveals<br />

consistent evidence that <strong>the</strong> single most effective means of securing <strong>the</strong> personal<br />

commitment of senior managers would be to impose direct personal liability on company<br />

directors and senior officers and to make available suitable sanctions in <strong>the</strong> event of noncompliance.<br />

In his report to <strong>the</strong> National Occupational Health and <strong>Safe</strong>ty Commission of<br />

Australia, Gunningham directly addresses <strong>the</strong> question of how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)<br />

and/ or business owners can be motivated to place a higher premium on, and commitment<br />

to, improved occupational health and safety outcomes. Following a comprehensive review of<br />

<strong>the</strong> international literature, Gunningham concludes that:<br />

“<strong>the</strong> key to motivating CEOs and senior management to improve safety is to make<br />

<strong>the</strong>m liable to personal prosecution and to actually enforce such provisions. Such<br />

prosecution is not only a powerful motivator to <strong>the</strong> CEO concerned, but also has<br />

a flow-on effect to senior management in o<strong>the</strong>r organisations.” 15<br />

This finding is supported by survey data from <strong>the</strong> UK, which reveals a widespread perception<br />

that <strong>the</strong> imposition of legal duties on individual directors and senior managers – and<br />

prosecution in <strong>the</strong> event of breaches of those duties – would provide a powerful antidote to<br />

management apathy. For instance, in 2000 Brazabon et al. report that:<br />

“The majority of interviewees perceive that if <strong>the</strong> number of prosecutions of<br />

Directors and Corporate Manslaughter charges increased <strong>the</strong>n this could result<br />

in large improvements in health and safety standards as this may enforce <strong>the</strong><br />

message that directors are responsible for <strong>the</strong> health and safety of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

workforce.” 16<br />

And in <strong>the</strong> same year Wright et al. report, following in-depth interviews with a representative<br />

sample of 120 UK employers, that two thirds of <strong>the</strong> employers interviewed suggested that:<br />

“an increase in <strong>the</strong> possibility of inspection and prosecution, especially of<br />

individuals, would provide <strong>the</strong> best prompt for employers to improve <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

approach to occupational health.” 17<br />

This evidence reflects <strong>the</strong> research on <strong>the</strong> importance of legal regulation set out in <strong>the</strong><br />

previous section.<br />

Reflections on current Government and HSC policy<br />

Initial Government and HSC thinking in May and June 2000 appeared to be consistent with<br />

<strong>the</strong> evidence and included proposals to introduce new legislation which would: (1) following<br />

<strong>the</strong> conviction of a company for <strong>the</strong> proposed offence of ‘corporate killing’, allow for ei<strong>the</strong>r<br />

(a) criminal proceedings to be brought against individual company officers if <strong>the</strong>y<br />

“contribute” to <strong>the</strong> company’s serious management failure that resulted in death; or (b) allow<br />

for <strong>the</strong> disqualification of directors; 18 and (2) impose statutory safety responsibilities on<br />

company directors. 19<br />

In addition <strong>the</strong> HSC undertook to develop guidance on directors’ responsibilities. 20 The<br />

Commission published its voluntary guidance, Directors responsibility for health and safety, 21<br />

in July 2001. The guidance is aimed principally at large companies and organisations and<br />

imposes no legal requirements, with no possibility of enforcement in <strong>the</strong> event of directors<br />

choosing not to assume any responsibilities for health and safety. The HSC also asked <strong>the</strong><br />

HSE to commission research to evaluate <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> guidance. Two surveys – a<br />

baseline survey in 2001 and a follow-up survey in 2003 – of 400 large private and public<br />

sector organisations were carried out by Greenstreet Berman and <strong>the</strong> resulting analysis<br />

published in July 2003.<br />

25

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