Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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Chapter Four Conclusion There is very strong evidence from the international and national empirical research that the introduction or threat of new legislation is a key driver of behavioural change, and that employers are unlikely to introduce measures that are not required of them by law. Therefore the recent reversals of government and HSC policies to develop and implement new legislation that would address current gaps or flaws in the regulatory framework contradict independently conducted international and national research. In addition, the HSC has decided to engage with the Corporate Social Responsibility movement as a substitute for legal regulation 1 at a time when serious questions are being raised by many stakeholders about the ability of CSR to deliver meaningful and sustained improvements, with these groups arguing that CSR should only be seen as a stop-gap on the road towards legal regulation. The U-turns in relation to both directors’ duties and worker participation and consultation are particularly worrying for two reasons. First, as stated, there is general evidence that voluntarism does not work. Second, there is strong and specific evidence to suggest that both of these factors – namely, board level commitment and workforce participation – are crucial to improving OHS performance, and that the imposition of legal duties and additional rights, for directors and workers respectively, and the enforcement of those duties and rights, would be effective means of reducing injuries and ill-health in the workplace. It is uncertain whether HSC’s stance on these two issues reflects the position of the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) which has produced a number of reports critical of any knee jerk response to the ‘automatic’ use of law as a regulatory tool. In a foreward of a recent report, called ‘Imaginative Regulation’, the BRTF states that: “arguably the most important of all the options discussed in their report is the option not to intervene at all.” The report also goes onto say: “Prescriptive state regulation, which we call ‘classic regulation’ in this report, is where a law is passed to tell people what to do or what not to do. This may be primary legislation – where there is an Act of Parliament – or secondary legislation, often (confusingly) known as ‘regulations’.…… Classic regulation is the traditional way for the State to seek to change behaviour. If there seems to be a need to intervene in a market; a new health risk needs to be addressed; there has been an accident or disaster and “something must be done”, the first thought is usually “we need to regulate” We want to stop this from being the first thought. Too often this first thought becomes the only option. We want Departments to choose the best way of solving their problem. Classic regulation may prove to be the best way; but equally it may not.” 2 However, the BRTF does take a nuanced view in that it does make clear that legal regulation has, in many cases, its advantages, and that the important thing is to consider whether there are any alternatives to legal regulation rather than simply ruling it out. 3 However, the HSE appears to be unaware of this and in its report to the Commission – which was accepted by them – the HSE stated: “In considering the way forward, the Commission may wish to take note of the Better Regulation Task Force’s guidance on policy development which indicates 33
that a voluntary approach should always be pursued rigorously in the first instance. It is only when this is shown to be inadequate that regulatory routes should be followed.” 4 Nowhere, in this of any of its other reports, does the BRTF indicate that “a voluntary approach should always be pursued rigorously in the first instance.” It only proposes that alternative approaches need first to be considered. There is nothing wrong, as such, with this approach as long as when making these decisions about “what is to be done” the following is considered: (1) the relative importance of obtaining the behavioural change and (2) whether the evidence suggests that a non-legislative approach will be successful and if so how this would compare to the success of a legislative approach. Clearly, if behavioural change will save a significant number of lives or stop people from being seriously injured and the evidence suggests that voluntary approaches are unlikely to be successful but legal ones will be, then ‘classic regulation’ will be required. This is exactly the situation that exists with respect to directors duties and workers participation – yet the HSC decided to pursue ‘voluntary’ approaches. One must assume that the BRTF thinks that, before making a decision on ‘what is to be done’, government bodies should take into account the available research, the potential benefits of legal regulation and the drawbacks of a voluntary approach. What the Select Committee said on Legislation “The Committee does not believe that the strategy of ‘downplaying… further regulatory solutions’ is the right approach. The relative Departmental inactivity in these areas of possible legislation is regrettable and demonstrates a worrying lack of commitment. The Committee recommends that commitments to legislate made in Revitalising Health and Safety in 2000 should be honoured by a Government Bill in the next session of Parliament.” 34 1 Health and Safety Commission (2003e: paragraph 5.2). 2 Better Regulation Task Force (2003: 12). 3 The Prime Minister in an introduction to a Cabinet Office document stated: “New regulations should only be introduced when other alternatives have first been considered and rejected, and where the benefits justify the costs.” Cabinet Office (2003). 4 Health and Safety Commission (2003b: p.3, para 10).
Page 1 and 2: Making companies safe: What works?
Page 3 and 4: Acknowledgments: Courtney Davis wou
Page 5 and 6: Contents INTRODUCTION 7 MAIN FINDIN
Page 7 and 8: So for example, the new Strategy do
Page 9 and 10: “In recent years, there had been
Page 11 and 12: Chapter eight is a short chapter lo
Page 13 and 14: • The only sector-specific data o
Page 16: PART ONE Legal Regulation v Volunta
Page 19 and 20: self-regulation through the adoptio
Page 21 and 22: • A number of studies evaluating
Page 23 and 24: Gap in the law Yet despite the impo
Page 25 and 26: By September 2002 the Government ha
Page 27 and 28: Conclusion In conclusion, the Green
Page 29 and 30: effectiveness of safety representat
Page 34: PARTS TWO & THREE Strategies to sec
Page 37 and 38: A recent HSE discussion paper illus
Page 40 and 41: Chapter Five The Health and Safety
Page 42 and 43: Support for these findings comes fr
Page 44 and 45: Gray and Scholz attempt to understa
Page 46 and 47: perceived low level of current fine
Page 48 and 49: Chapter Six The Implications for th
Page 50 and 51: five times greater than if one had
Page 52: Select Committee on Work and Pensio
Page 56: The evidence reviewed in part two s
Page 59 and 60: health risk management between “a
Page 61 and 62: The relationship between knowledge
Page 63 and 64: Conclusion Whatever factors prompt
Page 65 and 66: 16 This was at an aggregate level.
Page 67 and 68: - the year that the initiative was
Page 69 and 70: When safety does not pay (or does n
Page 71 and 72: Similarly, firms might make an econ
Page 73 and 74: However, even in the context of mul
Page 75 and 76: does, exert a negative influence on
Page 77 and 78: to cost “a little” or “nothin
Page 79 and 80: For instance, when BP Grangemouth r
Page 82 and 83:
Chapter Ten ‘Earned Autonomy’ T
Page 84 and 85:
A similar experiment in self-regula
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Whilst the original focus of TQM wa
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“the more firms incorporate ethic
Page 90 and 91:
“In Norway the mandated model is
Page 92 and 93:
odies, pressure groups and/or the m
Page 94 and 95:
Health and Safety Management System
Page 96 and 97:
Gunningham and Johnstone argue that
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Conclusion Proposals that some comp
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37 The Norwegian Internal Control R
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PART FOUR Conclusion 103
Page 104 and 105:
Chapter Eleven Conclusion The Healt
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Appendix Select Committee on Work a
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References Alder A., Tipping A. and
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Health and Well-Being’, in Frick
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Honey S., Hillage J. et al. (1997)
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Nichols T. and Armstrong P. (1973)
Page 116 and 117:
Wokutch R.E. and VanSandt C.V. (200
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