Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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Chapter Ten ‘Earned Autonomy’ The previous discussion suggests that the majority of firms have neither the motivation nor the capability to effectively self-regulate. And that even when firms can be motivated by economic considerations, concerns for their reputation or supply chain pressures, these levers do not ensure that attention or resources are consistently or adequately directed toward the control of all the hazards that face workers or members of the public. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that whilst the majority of firms are not motivated to achieve high standards of occupational health and safety (OHS), there may be a minority of employers who have implemented effective systems of health and safety management and who are sufficiently motivated to self-regulate with minimal regulatory intervention. Consequently, it is argued that regulators should adopt different strategies to suit the different levels of motivation and competence exhibited by different organisations. For instance, Gunningham and Johnstone argue that to ‘reward’ good performers, to encourage companies to go beyond mere compliance with minimum standards, and in the context of limited regulatory resources, regulators should adopt a differentiated and targeted approach to intervention, and that one of the ways of doing this would be to introduce a ‘twin track’ approach to regulation. 1 Under the twin track approach regulators would continue to undertake routine preventative inspections of, and enforcement action in the event of serious non-compliance against ‘poor performers’ or firms that do not possess the resources or competence to adopt a systems approach to OHS management (track one). However, ‘good’ OHS performers who adopt a systems-based approach to OHS management 2 would enter into partnerships with the regulatory agency “in a manner that involves substantial self-regulation” 3 , and in which primary responsibility for finding solutions to OHS problems would rest with the organisation itself (track two). Whilst ‘track two’ companies would be subject to some regulatory oversight under the scheme proposed by Gunningham and Johnstone, this would largely be limited to an auditing of the company’s safety management system (SMS) and its initial implementation. 4 In other words, regulators (or private, third party auditors) would monitor ‘systems compliance’ rather than compliance with the range of specific OHS standards. Gunningham and Johnstone also argue that since not all employers are similarly motivated to, or capable of, adopting a management systems approach to OHS, imposing legislation that mandates the adoption of a systems approach would be inappropriate and possibly counter-productive, as well as resource intensive for the regulatory agency. Instead they suggest that incentives – which could include offering logos, abbreviating or reducing the likelihood of inspections and reducing penalties if prosecutions take place – should be offered to the ‘good performers’ to encourage them to adopt a safety management system and participate in ‘track two’. 5 It is important to note that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) already has a hazard rating system for prioritising and targeting inspections, 6 which is based both on the nature of the risks facing workers in particular workplaces and also on HSE’s judgment of the propensity of a particular employer to comply voluntarily with health and safety requirements. The HSE has also shifted towards greater monitoring of systems compliance in relation to specific sectors – most notably chemicals, major hazard installations and offshore oil. 7 What some commentators are now proposing is that HSE should withdraw from inspecting selected employers altogether. For instance, RoSPA and the CBI, have argued that HSE’s current informal approach to differentiated intervention should be formalised, with ‘higher performers put on trust’ to self-regulate without HSE intervention. 8 RoSPA has argued that such an approach would allow for more efficient allocation of scarce HSE resources, by enabling inspectors to concentrate their efforts on poorly performing firms. 83
Whilst appearing to offer advantages in terms of a more efficient use of inspection resources, such an approach would also be consistent with the current Government’s commitment to lighten the burdens on business through ‘targeted deregulation’. 9 It appears that HSC/E are now seriously considering this possibility, and have recently published an internal discussion document in which they suggest how certain employers might be exempted from routine inspection. The HSE describe such an approach as ‘earned autonomy’: “meaning that the performance and standards of a particular duty holder are good enough to earn them autonomy from routine intervention by the regulator.” The paper notes that: “An approach on similar lines has been operated by OSHA in the US for the last 20 years in their ‘Voluntary Protection Programme’”. 10 Only certain companies would be offered the chance to participate in this scheme, but how would these organisations be selected? HSE has suggested that such duty holders might be expected to possess some of the following: 1. An internal health and safety management system conforming to some standard and subject to regular internal or third-party auditing that would be paid for by the organisation. 2. ‘Good’ 11 performance in relation to a specified measure such as injury rates. 3. Effective systems for employee involvement. 4. Involvement of directors by making a named main board director (or equivalent) responsible for health and safety. 5. Effective systems for engaging with third parties. 12 A number of assumptions underlie these proposals. First, we must assume that there are indeed some organisations that have already achieved, or are capable of achieving, effective internal self-regulation through systematic management of OHS and that this will continue in the absence of routine regulatory inspection and intervention. Second, since it is acknowledged that there will be some enterprises that lack a genuine commitment to OHS but will attempt to gain the administrative or public relations benefits of earned autonomy by adopting ‘paper systems’, 13 we must assume either that the selection criteria HSE uses will ‘screen out’ such companies, or that third party oversight will provide a reliable mechanism for identifying ‘paper compliance’ once companies have been granted earned autonomy status. And third, we must assume that adoption of ‘earned autonomy’ will indeed allow for more effective use of the inspectorate’s resources. In the following sections we will consider to what extent the empirical evidence supports these assumptions. OSHA’s Voluntary Protection and Cooperative Compliance Programs Gunningham and Johnstone state that: “an example of how self-regulation can be made to work in practice is that of the Voluntary Protection Program” 14 (VPP). OHSA’s Voluntary Protection Program began in 1982 and was offered to companies considered to have exemplary health and safety records and which agreed to abide by certain conditions – including the adoption of a systems-based approach to OHS management. 15 The schemes rely on various incentives to encourage the participation of ‘good performers’, including the awarding of stars and logos to participating companies and exemption from routine OSHA inspections. 16 As of 1999, the VPP program included 516 companies, employing more than 300,000 workers. 17 84
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Making companies safe: What works?
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Acknowledgments: Courtney Davis wou
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Contents INTRODUCTION 7 MAIN FINDIN
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So for example, the new Strategy do
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“In recent years, there had been
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Chapter eight is a short chapter lo
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• The only sector-specific data o
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PART ONE Legal Regulation v Volunta
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self-regulation through the adoptio
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• A number of studies evaluating
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Gap in the law Yet despite the impo
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By September 2002 the Government ha
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Conclusion In conclusion, the Green
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effectiveness of safety representat
Page 32 and 33: Chapter Four Conclusion There is ve
Page 34: PARTS TWO & THREE Strategies to sec
Page 37 and 38: A recent HSE discussion paper illus
Page 40 and 41: Chapter Five The Health and Safety
Page 42 and 43: Support for these findings comes fr
Page 44 and 45: Gray and Scholz attempt to understa
Page 46 and 47: perceived low level of current fine
Page 48 and 49: Chapter Six The Implications for th
Page 50 and 51: five times greater than if one had
Page 52: Select Committee on Work and Pensio
Page 56: The evidence reviewed in part two s
Page 59 and 60: health risk management between “a
Page 61 and 62: The relationship between knowledge
Page 63 and 64: Conclusion Whatever factors prompt
Page 65 and 66: 16 This was at an aggregate level.
Page 67 and 68: - the year that the initiative was
Page 69 and 70: When safety does not pay (or does n
Page 71 and 72: Similarly, firms might make an econ
Page 73 and 74: However, even in the context of mul
Page 75 and 76: does, exert a negative influence on
Page 77 and 78: to cost “a little” or “nothin
Page 79 and 80: For instance, when BP Grangemouth r
Page 84 and 85: A similar experiment in self-regula
Page 86 and 87: Whilst the original focus of TQM wa
Page 88 and 89: “the more firms incorporate ethic
Page 90 and 91: “In Norway the mandated model is
Page 92 and 93: odies, pressure groups and/or the m
Page 94 and 95: Health and Safety Management System
Page 96 and 97: Gunningham and Johnstone argue that
Page 98 and 99: Conclusion Proposals that some comp
Page 100 and 101: 37 The Norwegian Internal Control R
Page 102 and 103: PART FOUR Conclusion 103
Page 104 and 105: Chapter Eleven Conclusion The Healt
Page 106 and 107: Appendix Select Committee on Work a
Page 108 and 109: References Alder A., Tipping A. and
Page 110 and 111: Health and Well-Being’, in Frick
Page 112 and 113: Honey S., Hillage J. et al. (1997)
Page 114 and 115: Nichols T. and Armstrong P. (1973)
Page 116 and 117: Wokutch R.E. and VanSandt C.V. (200
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