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Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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management of ‘core business’. They do not appear to believe that <strong>the</strong> one reflects on <strong>the</strong><br />

o<strong>the</strong>r, and are more concerned with senior managers’ ability to effectively manage <strong>the</strong> crisis.<br />

Therefore major disasters – even those involving loss of life – do not necessarily have<br />

long-term (or even medium-term) negative impacts on shareholder confidence, and in some<br />

cases actually offer senior managers an opportunity to enhance <strong>the</strong>ir reputations in <strong>the</strong> eyes<br />

of shareholders. Following Hopkins (see above), it is clear that we also need to ask in relation<br />

to reputational damage: ‘for whom does safety pay’? These cases show that senior decision<br />

makers do not necessarily suffer reputational damage following a major catastrophe and may<br />

even benefit from it. Interestingly, Knight and Pretty class <strong>Union</strong> Carbide as a ‘non-recoverer’<br />

six months after <strong>the</strong> Bhopal disaster. However, as we have seen, senior management<br />

benefited from <strong>the</strong> disaster in monetary terms, despite <strong>the</strong> loss of shareholder value (see<br />

above). So even when <strong>the</strong>re is a negative shareholder reaction, <strong>the</strong>re is no guarantee that<br />

management will be affected by this.<br />

Customer and Supply Chain Pressure (4): Here again, <strong>the</strong> evidence suggests that customers<br />

rarely exert a positive pressure on employers to improve <strong>the</strong>ir OHS performance. Only 1% of<br />

respondents cited customer pressure as a main prompt for improvements in a recent survey<br />

of 1,902 organisations in <strong>the</strong> UK. 38 Similarly, Brazabon et al. report that:<br />

“Pressure from stakeholders to improve health and safety is considered to be<br />

relatively low for most [construction] companies.” 39<br />

And Smallman and John report that:<br />

“Customer influence is not a direct source of pressure for improvements in health<br />

and safety management.” 40<br />

Whilst <strong>the</strong>re has been some consumer pressure exerted on brand name companies in relation<br />

to working practices and conditions within subsidiary companies or amongst <strong>the</strong>ir suppliers, 41<br />

<strong>the</strong>se consumer campaigns have not tended to address working conditions or health and<br />

safety practices within companies located in <strong>the</strong> UK. Consumer awareness and concern about<br />

corporate health and safety performance is really only likely to become an issue within a<br />

limited range of contexts – for example in sectors where services may pose a risk to public<br />

safety, such as <strong>the</strong> rail, road or air transport industries. And even here, <strong>the</strong> extent to which<br />

consumers or customers can directly impact on business activities will be fur<strong>the</strong>r limited in<br />

relation to public sector or monopoly operators. Wright points out that in <strong>the</strong>se contexts any<br />

negative impacts on business will be dependent upon regulator intervention. 42<br />

Wright also points out that <strong>the</strong> extent to which ‘stakeholders’ can exert customer or supply<br />

chain pressure by withdrawing <strong>the</strong>ir demand for a particular service will be circumscribed if<br />

supply of and demand for a service are ‘inelastic’. For example, supply of a service may<br />

be inelastic if <strong>the</strong> service depends on a large, costly infrastructure that takes long periods<br />

to construct, such as rail services, or services that are difficult to substitute such as law<br />

enforcement services. 43 Here again, stakeholders will depend upon regulator or direct<br />

government intervention to impact upon <strong>the</strong> business. In inelastic markets, services cannot be<br />

readily substituted, but regulator and government action can never<strong>the</strong>less impact on business<br />

through, for instance, <strong>the</strong> imposition of additional costs (by introducing new regulations or<br />

imposing additional safety requirements), or through restrictions on operational/commercial<br />

freedom. 44<br />

In relation specifically to supply chain pressure, <strong>the</strong>re is no evidence that it currently acts<br />

as a general driver for improved OHS performance amongst employers. 45 For instance, no<br />

respondents to <strong>the</strong> survey referred to above cited competitor pressure as a factor motivating<br />

improved OHS performance, 46 and a study of health and safety in <strong>the</strong> construction industry<br />

reported that interviewees considered that <strong>the</strong> health and safety practices of competitors<br />

had <strong>the</strong> least influence over health and safety out of a number of possible influences. 47<br />

This evidence suggests that, in general, employers do not believe that having a better health<br />

and safety record than <strong>the</strong>ir competitors will put <strong>the</strong>m at an advantage in winning work, and<br />

this is consistent with Smallman and John’s 48 finding that even amongst large firms, British<br />

directors do not believe that good OHS performance gives firms a competitive advantage.<br />

In fact, <strong>the</strong>re is some evidence that supply chain pressure can, and in certain sectors commonly 75

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