Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

installations provides evidence of the importance of strong regulatory intervention and
enforcement action, the whole purpose of the earned autonomy proposals are that HSE will
withdraw from the routine regulatory intervention and inspection of those companies
selected for inclusion. In the next section, then, we will consider whether there is more
general evidence that some firms will successfully self-regulate in the absence of routine
regulatory inspection.
Is there evidence that some employers can be trusted
to self-regulate?
As discussed above, a number of assumptions underlie HSE’s discussion of ‘earned
autonomy’. In relation specifically to HSE’s proposals that certain duty holders be allowed to
self-regulate without regulatory intervention, we must assume that implementation of a SMS
by ‘good performers’ (further assuming that these can be reliably identified) will achieve the
following:
• That it will indeed bring about the integration of OHS management into all
management procedures and processes, 91 creating enterprises that are self-regulating,
self-critical, and that pursue continuous improvement in relation to their OHS
performance. 92
• That in the absence of regulatory inspection, or in the context of diminished regulatory
oversight and pressure, internal self-regulation and management commitment and
attention to health and safety will be maintained over the long term, in the face of
competing priorities and in the context of less favourable economic circumstances.
What empirical evidence is there to support these assumptions? We are aware of only one
formal experiment in the UK of the kind currently being considered by the HSE, which has
been discussed by Smith and Tombs (1995):
“In the mid-1980s the construction company Costain was exempted from active
inspection by the HSE, on the grounds of their having a safety management
structure and an accident record which was superior to that of most of the rest
of the construction industry. Factory inspectors were subsequently instructed not
to visit Costain’s sites.” 93
Smith and Tombs report that the Costain experiment was short-lived. The death of an
employee on site, and subsequent protests by trade unions and the media led to the
experiment being dropped. Whilst no definitive conclusions can be drawn from the episode,
it does raise concerns either that the HSE are not able to reliably identify the good
performers, or that good performers that systematically manage OHS are not immune from
serious safety failures.
Is it possible, however, to find more general evidence that some firms in the UK may be
capable of self-regulation? A review of the empirical literature suggest that individual
organisations in high profile, high risk and technologically-advanced sectors will be the most
likely candidates for self-regulation. First, according to Gunningham and Johnstone, these
firms will be more capable of implementing successful OHS management systems. 94 Second,
it has been argued that these enterprises will also have the highest levels of intrinsic motivation
to proactively manage OHS hazards. For instance, Wright (1998) concludes on the basis of his
review of the empirical research that it is possible to predict with reasonable certainty those
firms that are likely to be highly motivated and proactive with regard to managing OHS, and
those firms that are likely to have low levels of motivation.
92
‘Proactive’ firms will typically be high profile organisations operating in higher risk sectors,
especially where the health and safety of customers or members of the public is regarded to
be a significant risk and/ or where commercial fortunes are sensitive to adverse regulator,
public or customer opinion. They are more likely to be operating in a sector where demand
and supply is elastic, or where there is a potential for substantive regulatory intervention, and
where sub-standard performance is likely to be detected and acted upon by enforcing