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TIBET AT A TURNING POINT: THE SPRING UPRISING AND CHINA’S NEW CRACKDOWN
(see below), who worked under Hu at the CYLC headquarters in Beijing; the Party Secretary
of Sichuan province, Liu Qibao, who used to head the Anhui provincial CYLC;
as well as the Party Secretary of Qinghai province, Qiang Wei, and Qin Guangrong, the
Governor of Yunnan province, both of whom have also headed provincial CYLC
offices, and who largely owe their careers to President Hu’s patronage.
Historian Tsering Shakya indicated recently that within the Party, the successes of
some of these key figures are under question due to the unrest in Tibetan areas since
March: “Within the Party discussions are taking place as to whether Hu will save himself
by dismissing some of those he promoted, or whether his entire entourage will
come under attack. […] But everything now hinges on the Olympics. Until then the government
is paralysed — if they take any action before the Games it will bring doubts
and uncertainty, and I think they will wait until they are over before making any
major changes.” 2
The imposition of martial law in Lhasa on March 9, 1989 presaged martial law in Beijing
three months later, and the killings in and around Tiananmen Square after the student
and workers’ protests. Although known to be closely associated with the
relatively moderate Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, whose death in April 1989
was the catalyst for the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, Hu Jintao was
quick to consolidate his conservative credentials. When Deng delivered a televised
speech soon after the Tiananmen Massacre praising the army for “putting down the
counter-revolutionary rebellion”, Hu Jintao convened the TAR Party Committee to
study the speech, making him one of the first provincial leaders in the PRC to display
allegiance to Deng. Despite still being TAR Party Secretary, Hu spent most of the years
1990 to 1992 in Beijing, building networks and alliances which frequently brought
him into to contact with Deng, who publicly praised Hu on several occasions. 3
This open expression of support for Deng was critical to Hu’s rapid ascent — it was
Deng who picked Hu as a potential successor to Jiang Zemin in 1992. And it was Hu’s
tough handling of the Tibetan protests in the late 1980s that brought him to Deng’s
attention. Tensions had been simmering in Tibet since the mid-1980s, with unrest
and some demonstrations against Chinese rule from 1987. In language that is almost
identical to the statements of the Party now about the Tibet protests (although
arguably less specific about the Dalai Lama’s supposed involvement), in 1989 Hu was
quoted as saying that the unrest was a result of conspiracies “by separatists both within
and outside the country, who have been aided by hostile forces abroad” (‘Hu Jintao
on the situation in Tibet,’ Xinhua, December 23, 1989.)
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