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Areva EPR

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Limitation functions and protection<br />

of the reactor (level 1)<br />

Four-channel limitation functions are implemented to rule out<br />

impermissible operational conditions that would otherwise cause<br />

reactor trip actions to be initiated. They also ensure that process<br />

variables are kept within the range on which the safety analysis is<br />

based, and they initiate actions to counteract disturbances that are<br />

not so serious as to require the protection system to trip the reactor.<br />

The protection system counteracts accident conditions, first by<br />

tripping the reactor, then by initiating event-specific measures. As<br />

far as reasonably possible, two diverse initiation criteria are available<br />

for every postulated accident condition.<br />

Reactor trip is actuated by cutting off the power to the electromagnetic<br />

gripping coils of the control rod drive mechanisms. All the<br />

control assemblies drop into the core under their own weight and<br />

instantaneously stop the chain reaction.<br />

† An enhanced and optimized degree<br />

of automated plant control, associated<br />

to an advanced Man-Machine interface<br />

for operator information and action.<br />

Man-Machine interface (level 2)<br />

At the design stage of the <strong>EPR</strong>, due consideration has been given<br />

to the human factor for enhancing the reliability of operators’ actions,<br />

during operation, testing and maintenance phases. This is achieved<br />

by applying appropriate ergonomic design principles and providing<br />

sufficiently long periods of time for the operators’ response to<br />

encountered situations or events.<br />

Sufficient and appropriate information is made available to the<br />

operators for their clear understanding of the actual plant status,<br />

including in the case of a severe accident, and for a relevant<br />

assessment of the effects of their actions.<br />

The plant process is supervised and controlled from the Main Control<br />

Room which is equipped, regarding information and control, with:<br />

• two screen-based workstations for the operators,<br />

•a plant overview panel which gives information on the status and<br />

main parameters of the plant,<br />

•a screen-based workstation for presenting information to the shift<br />

supervisor and the safety engineer,<br />

• an additional workstation for a third operator to monitor auxiliary<br />

systems.<br />

The Remote Shutdown Station is provided with the same information<br />

and data on the process as the Main Control Room.<br />

The plant also comprises a Technical Support Centre. It is a room<br />

with access to all the data concerning the process and its control,<br />

to be used, in case of accident, by the technical team in charge of<br />

analysing the plant conditions and supporting the post accident<br />

management.<br />

A computerized screen-based control room designed to maximize operator efficiency. Chooz B1, France (N4, 1,500 MWe).<br />

I 43

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