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Areva EPR

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The dedicated corium spreading and cooling area is a core-catcher<br />

equipped with a solid metal structure and covered with “sacrificial”<br />

concrete. It aims to protect the nuclear island basemat from any<br />

damage, its lower section features cooling channels in which water<br />

circulates. The aim of its large spreading surface area (170 m 2 ) is to<br />

promote the cooling of the corium.<br />

The transfer of the corium from the reactor pit to the spreading area<br />

would be initiated by a passive device: a steel “plug” melting under<br />

the effect of the heat from the corium.<br />

After spreading, the flooding of the corium would also be initiated by<br />

a passive fusible plug-based device. It would then be cooled, still<br />

passively, by gravity injection of water from the tank located inside the<br />

containment and by evaporation.<br />

The effectiveness of the cooling would then provide stabilization of the<br />

corium in a few hours and its complete solidification in a few days.<br />

Containment heat removal system<br />

and long-term residual heat removal device<br />

In the eventuality of a severe accident, to prevent the containment<br />

from losing its long-term integrity, means would have to be provided<br />

to control the pressure inside the containment and to stop it from<br />

rising under the effect of residual heat. A dedicated dual-train spray<br />

system with heat-exchangers and dedicated heat sink is provided<br />

to fulfil this function. A long time period would be available for the<br />

deployment of this system by the operators: at least 12 hours owing<br />

to the large volume of the containment (80,000 m 3 ).<br />

A second mode of operation of the containment heat removal system<br />

enables to feed water directly into the core-catcher, instead of into<br />

the spray system.<br />

Collection of inter-containment leaks<br />

In the eventuality of a core melt leading to vessel failure, the<br />

containment remains the last of the three containment barriers; this<br />

means that provisions must be taken to make sure that it remains<br />

undamaged and leak-tight. For the <strong>EPR</strong>, the following measures have<br />

been adopted:<br />

•a 6 mm thick metal liner internally covers the pre-stressed concrete<br />

inner shell,<br />

• the internal containment penetrations are equipped with redundant<br />

isolation valves and leak recovery devices to avoid any containment<br />

bypass,<br />

• the architecture of the peripheral buildings and the sealing systems<br />

of the penetrations rule out any risk of direct leakage from the inner<br />

containment to the environment,<br />

• the space between the inner and outer shells of the containment is<br />

passively kept at slight negative pressure to enable the leaks to<br />

collect there,<br />

• these provisions are supplemented by a containment ventilation<br />

system and a filter system upstream of the stack.<br />

Containment heat removal system<br />

Spray nozzles<br />

x<br />

x<br />

Passive<br />

flooding<br />

device<br />

x<br />

CHRS<br />

(2x)<br />

Corium<br />

spreading area<br />

In-containment refueling<br />

water storage tank<br />

Melt flooding via cooling device<br />

and lateral gap<br />

x<br />

Water level in case of water<br />

injection into spreading area<br />

FL Flow limiter<br />

I 51

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