Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics

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152 <strong>Handbook</strong> on contemporary Austrian economics If this is so, the question: "Where are the wealthy spontaneously ordered societies" is the wrong one to be asking and not at all useful for evaluating the desirability of actual spontaneous order vs. actual government. Instead, the relevant question is: "In this particular case of x-best government and y-best spontaneous order, which will produce the superior outcome" Since most of the world's governments are far from first-best, here, the prospects for spontaneous order's superiority are quite strong indeed. Notes I. Though, there is reason to possibly reject this dichotomy. See Wagner (2007). Carl Menger, for example, suggested that the state itself was a spontaneous order ([1883) 1963). 2. Of course, if the reason individuals rely on spontaneously ordered mechanisms of contract enforcement is the prohibitive cost of state contract enforcement, even the "shadow of the state" cannot ensure contractual compliance. However, for those contracts where a spontaneously ordered institution of contract enforcement is used because it is cheaper than state enforcement (when the former is effective), though state enforcement remains cost-etfectivc if it has to be relied upon, the "shadow of the state" can secure contractual compliance even if spontaneous order breaks down. 3. On medieval Iceland's spontaneous order, see David Friedman's (1979) superb study. 4. See http://www.fundforpeace.orglwehlindex.phpoption=com30ntent&task=view&id =104&ltemid=324; accessed 27 January 2010. 5. Though, as Tim Harford and Tatiana Nenova's (2004) important paper discusses, private sector actors have been remarkably innovative in anarchic Somalia. 6. I emphasize wealthier here to highli~ht the fact that, as I try to make clear above, I'm not claiming that Somalia is wealthy. Hopefully this is clear from my entire discussion in the section - that the benchmark is not one of wealthy or poor from some idealized, unattainable (i.e., modern North American or Western European) and thus irrelevant benchmark, but rather, in the case of Somalia, what preceded spontaneous order, which was a brutal and predatory government - Somalia's institutional alternative. If history is any indicator, only a small percentage of readers will "get this." The much larger part will wrongly infer that I'm saying Somalia is grand or that Somalia is evidence that spontaneous order is always better than any government. References Anderson, Terry L. and Peter 1. Hill. 2004. The Not So Wi/d, Wild Wesl. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Benson, Bruce L. 19!19. "The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law," SOUlhern E('ollomi(' Juurnal 55(3): 644-61. Craig. W.L., William Park, and Ian Paulsson. 2000. International Chamber of Commerce Arhitratioll. New York: Oceana Publications. Dykstra, Robert R. 1996. "Overdosing on Dodge City," Western Historical Quarterly 26(winter): 505- 14. Ferguson, Adam. (1767) 1966. An Essay on the History of Cil'il Science, edited by Duncan Forbes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Friedman, David. 1979. "PrivatI! Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case," Juurnal o/Legal SllIdie.l' 8(M arch): 399-415. Harford, Tim and Tatiana Nenova. 2004. "Anarchy and Invention," Public Policy for the Private Sector. World Bank, note no. 280. Hayek , F.A. 1948. IndividualislIl and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
How much order can spontaneous order create 153 Hayek, F.A. (ed.) 1963. Capiw/ism and the Historial/s. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, F.A. 1973-79. La 11", Legislation, and Liberty. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leeson, Peter T. 2007. "Better Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse," Journal of Comparative Economics 35(4): 689- 710. Leeson, Peter T. 2008. "How Important is State Enforcement for Trade," American Law and Economics Reviell' 10(1): 61 - 89. Menger, Carl. [1871]1950. Principles of Economics. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Menger, Carl [1883] 1963. Problems of Economics and Sociology. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford, and Alex Nowrasteh. Forthcoming. "Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Smith, Adam. [1776] 1976. An Inquiry il/fO the Nature alld Causes of the Wealth of Natiolls. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stringham, Edward P. 2006. "Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law," Journal of Illstitutiol/al and Theoretical Economics 162(3): 516-34. Volckart, Oliver and Antje Mangels. 1999. "Are the Roots of the Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval," Southern Economic Journal 65(3): 427-50. Wagner, Richard E. 2007. Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Williamson, Oliver E. 2005. "The Economics of Governance," Americal/ Economic RevielV 95(2): 1- 18.
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Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics

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