COI-Report-Somalia

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60 — EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview According to Matt Bryden: ‘Regardless of the true extent of Damul Jadiid influence on government policy and conduct, its proximity to the levers of power has contributed to the perception that FGS decision‐making is determined, at least in part, by an unelected and largely unaccountable interest group.’ ( 427 ) Meanwhile, ‘Al‐Islah and organisations in its network have retained a capacity to operate in (…) areas under the control of Al‐Shabaab’ ( 428 ). 3.1.2 Federalism The second political risk - Federalism - could be linked to the first one: ‘Some critics attribute the [FGS]’s assertively centrist approach to governance to Damul Jadiid ideologues.’ ( 429 ) The FGS still ‘represents a country that remains as fragmented as ever: a patchwork of authorities and factions, some of them aligned with the federal government, others either suspicious or hostile’ ( 430 ). In theory, Federalism is ‘an intelligent response to the country’s need’ ( 431 ) but the question as to which form of federalism will be implemented is generating tensions ( 432 ). There are indications that the question of clan‐composition of those newly formed entities is or will be a source of further conflicts ( 433 ). In its report (2014) on key political actors’ views and strategies, the Life and Peace Institute (LPI) underlines that ‘clan divisions pervade the government and its security forces and that clanism remains a central issue’ ( 434 ). The question of Federalism is not really clarified in the constitution that ‘is only provisional and was considered to include a number of unclear and sometimes contradictory formulations’ ( 435 ). The alternatives in implementation are ‘centralised decentralisation’ (FGS) and ‘decentralised decentralisation’ ( 436 ). In the issue of Somali federalism lies an ‘enormous escalation potential’, depending on whether it is settled ‘through “lawfare” or warfare’ ( 437 ). This is particularly the case in regard to the South‐Western State and whether it should encompass three (Bay, Bakool, Lower Shabelle = SW3) or six (+Gedo, Middle and Lower Jubba = SW6) regions ( 438 ). Both creations were made by Digil‐Mirifle clan leaders and it seemed to be a somewhat internal clan debate ( 439 ). However, the Dir are supporting SW6 to avoid being trapped in a state with Hawiye dominance ( 440 ). On the other hand, the Darod/Ogaden sub‐clan that dominates Jubbaland is not willing to become incorporated, while parts of the Darod/Marehan in Gedo are attempting to distance themselves from Jubbaland ( 441 ). ( 427 ) Bryden, M., Somalia Redux Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2013 (http://csis.org/files/ publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 8. ( 428 ) LPI, Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia. A snapshot and analysis of key political actors’ views and strategies, 2014 (http://www.life‐peace. org/wp‐content/uploads/The‐ACTS‐Report.pdf) accessed 27 May 2014, p. 36. ( 429 ) Bryden, M., Somalia Redux Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2013 (http://csis.org/files/ publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 8. ( 430 ) Bryden, M., Somalia Redux Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2013 (http://csis.org/files/ publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 5. ( 431 ) Atta‐Asamoah, A. & Ramis Segui, N., Situation Report Somalia: Somalia: Fighting the odds in the search for peace after the transition, ISS Africa, March 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep5Mar14.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 4. ( 432 ) Atta‐Asamoah, A. & Ramis Segui, N., Situation Report Somalia: Somalia: Fighting the odds in the search for peace after the transition, ISS Africa, March 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep5Mar14.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 4. ( 433 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014; OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www. oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 434 ) LPI, Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia. A snapshot and analysis of key political actors’ views and strategies, 2014 (http://www.life‐peace. org/wp‐content/uploads/The‐ACTS‐Report.pdf) accessed 27 May 2014, p. 32. ( 435 ) LPI, Alternatives for Conflict Transformation in Somalia. A snapshot and analysis of key political actors’ views and strategies, 2014 (http://www.life‐peace. org/wp‐content/uploads/The‐ACTS‐Report.pdf) accessed 27 May 2014, p. 15-16. ( 436 ) Atta‐Asamoah, A. & Ramis Segui, N., Situation Report Somalia: Somalia: Fighting the odds in the search for peace after the transition, ISS Africa, March 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep5Mar14.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 4. ( 437 ) Bryden, M., Somalia Redux Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2013 (http://csis.org/files/ publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 21; ISS Africa, Peace and Security Council Report, issue 59, June 2014 (http:// www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC59_%20June_14English.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 8. ( 438 ) ISS Africa, Peace and Security Council Report, issue 59, June 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC59_%20June_14English.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 9; the UN seems to be favoring SW3. See: RBC Radio/Raxanreeb Online, UN supports three‐region state for Baydhaba, its envoy says, 25 March 2014 (http:// www.raxanreeb.com/2014/03/somalia‐un‐supports‐three‐region‐state‐for‐baydhaba‐its‐envoy‐says/) accessed 21 May 2014. ( 439 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 440 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 441 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview — 61 In addition to these creations, some Digil‐Mirifle in Lower Shabelle are opposed to both SW‐States and have allied themselves with Hawiye/Abgal in Middle Shabelle to form the Shabelle State. This is strongly opposed by the Dir/ Biyomaal in Lower Shabelle ( 442 ). Violence has already sparked, for example when two persons were killed in SW3/SW6 demonstrations in Baidoa or when six pro‐SW6 Biyomaal elders were executed in March 2014 ( 443 ). ‘The tensions between South‐West 3; South‐ West 6; the Shabelle State and the Independent Jubba Administration are only set to grow. Potentially we could see a major outbreak of fighting in Lower Shabelle and Bay regions.’ ( 444 ) 3.2 Security Forces 3.2.1 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and UN Guard Unit (UNGU) For a general introduction to AMISOM and UNGU, see section 1.4.6. AMISOM has three components: Military, Police and Civilian. The bulk of its troops come from six countries: Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone ( 445 ). In November 2013 the mandated troop size of AMISOM was raised from 17 731 to a maximum of 22 126 uniformed personnel ( 446 ). The AMISOM police component currently has 515 police officers ( 447 ), whereas the military component of AMISOM encompasses 21 564 soldiers ( 448 ). AMISOM contributing countries use helicopters in the fight against Al‐Shabaab. However, those helicopters are not directly assigned to AMISOM but rather used by Ethiopia and Kenya when needed. Consequently, costs for those operations are not covered by AMISOM and therefore the two countries are not keen to expand their use of air forces ( 449 ). In addition to AMISOM, a 410 strong UN Guard Unit (UNGU) started its duties on 15 May 2014. These troops, bases on Mogadishu airport, will guard UN offices and staff ( 450 ). Due to better cooperation between the UN and AMISOM, the discipline of the latter has drastically improved ( 451 ). There are only few reports concerning human rights violations by AMISOM personnel ( 452 ). Wherever there is a permanent presence of AMISOM, the human rights situation is substantially better than in other areas in South/ Central Somalia ( 453 ). ( 442 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 443 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 444 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for March 29 2014, 29 March 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/ Somalia‐Report-32914.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014. ( 445 ) AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions, s.d. (http://amisom‐au.org/frequently‐asked‐questions/) accessed 15 May 2014. ( 446 ) UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2124 (2013) [on the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 31 Oct. 2014], 12 November 2013 (http://www.refworld.org/docid/52908e9e4.html) accessed 30 May 2014, p. 2. ( 447 ) AMISOM, AMISOM Police, s.d. (http://amisom‐au.org/mission‐profile/amisom‐police/) accessed 15 May 2014. ( 448 ) AMISOM, Frequently Asked Questions, s.d. (http://amisom‐au.org/frequently‐asked‐questions/) accessed 15 May 2014; AMISOM gives the numbers as follows: 6 223 Uganda; 5 432 Burundi; 4 395 Ethiopia; 3 664 Kenya; 1 000 Djibouti; 850 Sierra Leone. ( 449 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014. ( 450 ) UN News Service, UN deploys new special force to protect staff in Mogadishu, 18 May 2014 (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.aspNewsID=47820) accessed 26 May 2014; see also: EU Somalia Mission, Press Review – Mogadishu Times, 19 May 2014. ( 451 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014; the security analysis expert stated that there is strict discipline e.g. with the Ethiopian contingent. He added that the best parts of the Ethiopian as well as of the Kenyan Armed Forces were deployed to Somalia. ( 452 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014. ( 453 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014; see also: Lifos, Säkerhetssituationen i södra och centrala Somalia, Rapport från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i oktober 2013. 20 January 2014 (http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokumentdocumentAttachmentId=40524) accessed 22 June 2014, p. 6, 11.
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3.2.2.1 Somali National Armed Force
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BZ-04-14-466-EN-C doi: 10.2847/3117
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