COI-Report-Somalia

EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview — 85
3.5.3 Outlook
Al‐Shabaab is likely to continue to fight the FGS and foreign troops ( 832 ). The slowing down of the tempo of ‘Operation
Eagle’ allows Al‐Shabaab to regroup and prepare to strike back ( 833 ). Al‐Shabaab will probably ‘continue to hold key
areas, slowly withdrawing as necessary’ ( 834 ).
Assassinations (see above), IED attacks as well as hit‐and‐run attacks on AMISOM, SNAF and SPF are likely to
continue ( 835 ). Mogadishu is particularly affected by a number of attacks because Al‐Shabaab will probably ‘continue
to harass and prevent the FGS from improving its position’ ( 836 ).
Al‐Shabaab is likely to maintain a significant influence on the population outside of Mogadishu and the other liberated
towns until rural areas are secured ( 837 ). It might exploit upcoming negative sentiments against AMISOM/SNAF ( 838 ).
Al‐Shabaab is likely to continue to exploit inter‐clan tensions in order to retain areas of control, local recruits and
resources. Additionally, Al‐Shabaab will lend its support to militias opposed to the FGS ( 839 ). Al‐Shabaab also pursues
its aggressive approach towards the population ( 840 ).
A recent statement by Al‐Shabaab Governor for Benadir, Sheikh Ali Jabal, mentions the rejection of secular education –
a possible reference to Nigeria’s Boko Haram and a threat against schools or educational organisations ( 841 ).
3.5.4 Manpower
Estimations of Al‐Shabaab’s fighting force differ. An international organisation provides figures ranging between
3 000 and 5 000, plus an additional ability to mobilise clans for given missions ( 842 ). The BBC refers to estimations
of 5 000 (including so‐called ‘pay‐as‐you‐go’ elements ‘who are paid to carry out specific acts such as throwing
grenades’) ( 843 ). A security analysis expert states that a current assessment is difficult but estimates the number to
be approximately 6 000 ( 844 ). Another source estimates the Al‐Ansar part of the Jaysh Al‐Usra (i.e. the indigenous
Somalis excluding Mujahirin) to be approximately 6 000 ( 845 ). Additionally, there are approximately 1 200 operatives
of the Amniyat (cf. infra) ( 846 ).
The number of Al‐Shabaab’s ‘Foreign Legion’ (Al‐Muhajirin) is currently 700, including up to 500 ethnic Somalis
from the diaspora and from neighbouring or nearby countries (especially Kenya, Tanzania but also Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Sudan); and up to 200 fighters from Islamic countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Saudi
Arabia) and from western countries (including ethnic Somalis; US, UK, northern Europe) ( 847 ).
( 832 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 23 May 2014.
( 833 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 16 May 2014.
( 834 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/
Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
( 835 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/
Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
( 836 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/
Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
( 837 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/
Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
( 838 ) ISS Africa, Peace and Security Council Report, issue 59, June 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/PSC59_%20June_14English.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 9.
( 839 ) Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al‐Shabaab. A Strategy of Choice or Necessity, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014 (http://csis.org/
publication/reinvention‐al‐shabaab) accessed 5 May 2014, p. 11-12.
( 840 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 30 May 2014.
( 841 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 23 May 2014.
( 842 ) An international organisation in: Lifos, Säkerhetssituationen i södra och centrala Somalia, Rapport från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i oktober 2013.
20 January 2014 (http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokumentdocumentAttachmentId=40524) accessed 22 June 2014, p. 18.
( 843 ) Menkhaus, K., ‘Al‐Shabab’s Capabilities Post‐Westgate’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue Vol. 7 Issue 2, CTC, February 2014 (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp‐content/
uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel‐Vol7Iss2.pdf) accessed 5 June 2014, p. 6; BBC (26.2.2014)
( 844 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: e‐mail response, 26 May 2014.
( 845 ) Source wants to remain anonymous.
( 846 ) Source wants to remain anonymous.
( 847 ) Source wants to remain anonymous.