COI-Report-Somalia

EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview — 69
SNAF are not in a position to extend authority to all the areas which they captured from Al‐Shabaab. He adds that
it would be necessary for the Ministries of Interior and National Security to respectively establish administrations
for these areas and deploy security forces in these territories ( 542 ).
3.4.1.2 Possible further advances
Although all its troops are bound, AMISOM is mapping out another offensive for August 2014 ( 543 ). Further advances
might be possible on Diinsoor (from Qansax Dheere); Jalalaqsi (from Buulo Barde); Baardheere (from Buurdhubo or/
and Faafax Dhuun); Baraawe (from Qoryooley and/or Diinsoor) ( 544 ). Baraawe was named as a primary target for the
year 2014 by President Mohamud ( 545 ). However, it is unlikely that AMISOM will move forward before it can manage
to establish solid logistic bases in Merka and Qoryooley districts ( 546 ). In other regions, AMISOM/SNAF try to get the
support of local clan militias in order to secure further advances - for example, in Galgaduud ( 547 ).
Concerning further advances, ‘it will not be helpful to clear Al‐Shabaab from the territories it holds, unless the
Somali government replaces Al‐Shabaab’s administration in those areas with its own administration’ ( 548 ). Taking
into account traditional hostilities suppressed by Al‐Shabaab in areas under its control, it is believed that conflicts
will flame up in most of the districts of Lower Shabelle as soon as Al‐Shabaab is driven away ( 549 ). ‘Operation Eagle’
did not weaken Al‐Shabaab itself but rather anti‐Al‐Shabaab forces and AMISOM, thinning out and overstretching
them ( 550 ) - not only in terms of manpower - but also in regard to intelligence gathering and equipment support ( 551 ).
3.4.2 Lower Jubba (AMISOM Sector II - Kenya) ( 552 ) – Interim Jubba Administration
The Interim Jubba Administration (IJA; Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubba) was formed after an agreement with the FGS
in August 2013, officially allying itself to Mogadishu ( 553 ). The current IJA president, Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam
‘Madobe’, can count on the backing of most Darod clan militias (except some parts of the Marehan sub‐clan) ( 554 ).
Consequently, many have joined the armed forces of the IJA. Not only Madobe’s Raskamboni joined the IJA‐forces
but also the former Isiolo militia ( 555 ). The IJA‐forces are the only significant security forces left in Lower Jubba and in
the southwestern part of Gedo ( 556 ). This force is said to have a structure and to function quite well ( 557 ). Overall, the
IJA has some 3 000 ( 558 ) to 5 000 ( 559 ) soldiers at hand and is now registering clan militias into its ranks ( 560 ).
( 542 ) EU Somalia Mission, Press Review – Xog‐Doon, 18 May 2014.
( 543 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 544 ) OODA Loop, Security and Political Awareness Report Somalia for April 10 2014, 10 April 2014 (http://www.oodaloop.com/wp‐content/uploads/2014/03/
Somalia‐Report‐through-4.4.14.pdf) accessed 16 May 2014.
( 545 ) Sabahionline, Somalia faces major challenges in liberating al‐Shabaab controlled areas, 4 March 2014 (http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/
features/2014/03/04/feature-01) accessed 6 June 2014.
( 546 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 16 May 2014.
( 547 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 4 April 2014.
( 548 ) Fabricius, P., Somalia: why orthodox aid policy must give way to battlefield reality, ISS Africa, 17 April 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/iss‐today/
somalia‐why‐orthodox‐aid‐policy‐must‐give‐way‐to‐battlefield‐reality) accessed 3 June 2014.
( 549 ) CEWERU, From the bottom up: Southern Regions – Perspectives through conflict analysis and key political actors’ mapping of Gedo, Middle Juba, Lower
Juba, and Lower Shabelle, September 2013 (http://www.cewarn.org/attachments/article/214/Somalia%20CEWERU%20Report%20Final.pdf) accessed
15 May 2014, p. 53-54.
( 550 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 551 ) Atta‐Asamoah, A. & Ramis Segui, N., Situation Report Somalia: Somalia: Fighting the odds in the search for peace after the transition, ISS Africa, March 2014
(http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep5Mar14.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 5.
( 552 ) Sector divisions and commands as given in: Security Council Report, May 2014 Monthly Forecast – Somalia, 1 May 2014 (http://www.securitycouncilreport.
org/monthly‐forecast/2014-05/somalia_2014_05.php) accessed 2 June 2014.
( 553 ) Landinfo/Udlændingsstyrelsen, Update on security and protection issues in Mogadishu and South‐Central Somalia, March 2014 (http://landinfo.no/
asset/2837/1/2837_1.pdf) accessed 26 May 2014, p. 54.
( 554 ) Bryden, M., Somalia Redux Assessing the New Somali Federal Government, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2013 (http://csis.org/files/
publication/130819_Bryden_SomaliaRedux_WEB.pdf) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 21.
( 555 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 556 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 557 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 558 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014.
( 559 ) An international organisation in: Lifos, Säkerhetssituationen i södra och centrala Somalia, Rapport från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i oktober 2013.
20 January 2014 (http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokumentdocumentAttachmentId=40524) accessed 22 June 2014, p. 24.
( 560 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 30 May 2014.