COI-Report-Somalia

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94 — EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview Al‐Shabaab collects protection money not only in areas under its control but also in areas under control of anti‐Al‐Shabaab ( 972 ), as for example in the case of money paid by some businessmen in Mogadishu ( 973 ), partly due to the networks of the Amniyat ( 974 ). ‘The group is acting increasingly like a mafia in much of the country’. Therefore, the main source of Al‐Shabaab’s finances today is protection money ( 975 ). Another source of income is taxation of ground traffic ( 976 ). In Xudur, for example, trucks had to pay up to USD 300 and cars between USD 10 and 20 ( 977 ). Exports via Baraawe are also taxed, thereby turning into sources of income for Al‐Shabaab ( 978 ). One export product - said to be one of the major sources for Al‐Shabaab - is ivory smuggled from Kenya and worth USD 200 000 to 600 000 per month ( 979 ). Another source of income might be human smuggling, as this is one of the main activities in Eastleigh (Nairobi) and as this area is also known to be ‘a major link in Al‐Shabaab’s recruitment and financial network’ ( 980 ). 3.5.12 Intra‐Al‐Shabaab Conflicts The conflicts within Al‐Shabaab are fuelled by several factors: • poor functioning of the administration in the areas under its control • disagreement over the role of foreigners • (increased) killing of civilians • lack of financial resources • loyalty to Al‐Qaida • clan controversies • mistrust and lack of communication between the various factions within the organisation ( 981 ). Godane eliminated moderate elements within the group and replaced them with ‘younger, more jihadi‐minded cadre’ ( 982 ). This also happened to some elders who were replaced with younger men considered to be more suitable ( 983 ). ( 972 ) Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al‐Shabaab. A Strategy of Choice or Necessity, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014 (http://csis.org/ publication/reinvention‐al‐shabaab) accessed 5 May 2014, p. 12; Lifos, Säkerhetssituationen i södra och centrala Somalia, Rapport från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i oktober 2013, 20 January 2014 (http://lifos.migrationsverket.se/dokumentdocumentAttachmentId=40524) accessed 22 June 2014, p. 14. ( 973 ) BBC, Somalia’s al‐Shabab: Striking like mosquitoes, 26 February 2014 (http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐africa-26343248) accessed 2 June 2014. ( 974 ) Lifos, Säkerhetssituationen i södra och centrala Somalia, Rapport från utredningsresa till Nairobi, Kenya i oktober 2013, 20 January 2014 (http://lifos. migrationsverket.se/dokumentdocumentAttachmentId=40524) accessed 22 June 2014, p. 6. ( 975 ) Menkhaus, K., ‘Al‐Shabab’s Capabilities Post‐Westgate’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue Vol. 7 Issue 2, CTC, February 2014 (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp‐content/ uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel‐Vol7Iss2.pdf) accessed 5 June 2014, p. 7. ( 976 ) Hansen, S.J., ‘An In‐Depth Look at Al‐Shabab’s Internal Divisions’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue Vol. 7 Issue 2, Combating Terrorism Center, February 2014 (https:// www.ctc.usma.edu/wp‐content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel‐Vol7Iss2.pdf) accessed 5 June 2014, p. 9. ( 977 ) IRIN, No easy way forward for Al‐Shabab defectors, 12 June 2014 (http://www.irinnews.org/report/100197/no‐easy‐way‐forward‐for‐al‐shabab‐defectors) accessed 11 July 2014. ( 978 ) Hansen, S.J., ‘An In‐Depth Look at Al‐Shabab’s Internal Divisions’, CTC Sentinel, Special Issue Vol. 7 Issue 2, Combating Terrorism Center, February 2014 (https:// www.ctc.usma.edu/wp‐content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel‐Vol7Iss2.pdf) accessed 5 June 2014, p. 9. ( 979 ) Elephant Action League, Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al‐Shabaab and Conflict Ivory, 2012 (http://elephantleague.org/project/ africas‐white‐gold‐of‐jihad‐al‐shabaab‐and‐conflict‐ivory/) accessed 27 May 2014; see also: Foxwell, J., Severing Al Shabab’s Lifeline, 17 April 2014 (http:// www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital‐Library/Articles/Detail/id=176770) accessed 27 May 2014. ( 980 ) McGregor, A., ‘Bringing Jihad to Kenya. A Profile of al‐Shabaab’s Ikrima al‐Muhajir’, Militant Leadership Monitor Volume IV, Issue 11, Jamestown Foundation, November 2014, p. 8. ( 981 ) Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (The Netherlands), Algemeen ambtsbericht Somalië, 19 December 2013 (http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/ documenten‐en‐publicaties/ambtsberichten/2013/12/19/algemeen‐ambtsbericht‐somalie-2013-12-19/algemeen‐ambtsbericht‐somalie‐december-2013. pdf) accessed 27 May 2014, p. 15. ( 982 ) Atta‐Asamoah, A. & Ramis Segui, N., Situation Report Somalia: Somalia: Fighting the odds in the search for peace after the transition, ISS Africa, March 2014 (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep5Mar14.pdf) accessed 3 June 2014, p. 7; Marchal, R., ‘Introduction’, Somalia: Security, Minorities and Migration, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Austria, 2013 (http://www.refworld.org/docid/53564b8a4.html) accessed 15 May 2014, p. 11. ( 983 ) Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (The Netherlands), Algemeen ambtsbericht Somalië, 19 December 2013 (http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/ documenten‐en‐publicaties/ambtsberichten/2013/12/19/algemeen‐ambtsbericht‐somalie-2013-12-19/algemeen‐ambtsbericht‐somalie‐december-2013. pdf) accessed 27 May 2014, p. 20.
EASO Country of Origin Information report — South and Central Somalia — Country overview — 95 After some prominent opponents of Ahmed Godane were executed on 19 June 2013 in Baraawe, the numbers of foreign Muhajiriin within Al‐Shabaab dropped significantly ( 984 ). Some 300 to 400 were said to have left Al‐Shabaab ( 985 ). In contrast to the exodus of other Muhajiriin after Godane’s coup, al Hijra is still closely allied with Al‐Shabaab ( 986 ). After the execution of Al‐Shabaab leaders as mentioned above, another important senior Al‐Shabaab officer went into hiding: Mukthar Robow ‘Abu Mansur’, who is thought to be either in Bay or Bakool ( 987 ). Even if Amir Ahmed Godane is said to have ‘finally succeeded in purging the movement of his most vociferous critics, leaving him (…) as undisputed leader’ ( 988 ) internal clashes do occur, as happened in Saakow (Middle Jubba - 2014), where four Al‐Shabaab fighters died ( 989 ) , or in Bay region ( 990 ). 3.6 Piracy Circumstances in Somalia have proven to be favourable for the growth of piracy off its shores. In the previous decades, this phenomenon developed as a protective reaction against illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping by foreign vessels in the Somali waters. It evolved into a trans‐national business, interwoven with other (criminal) activities and run by Somali pirate networks with clan and political affiliations ( 991 ). The pirates need support from the local population for shelter and supplies during the long hostage and ransom‐negotiation processes. They use onshore support infrastructure to negotiate ransom and require access to local markets for selling stolen goods. They operate from the mainland, receiving support from villages and clans, and from so‐called ‘mothervessels’, ships used as a base ( 992 ). In terms of geography, pirates are dependent on infrastructure, such as roads, ports and villages. The proximity of this infrastructure renders piracy more lucrative. However, for the pirates, ports have to be weakly governed and surveyed. For this reason, major ports such as Kismayo and Mogadishu have not appeared in reports on ships hijacked for ransom. Research has shown that most pirate anchorages were in areas cut off from regional trading routes and harbours and hideouts were located in the most remote parts of Somalia ( 993 ). Socioeconomic factors (poverty, armed violence, lack of educational or employment opportunities, orphanage, displacement, and exposure to disease) make children vulnerable to taking part in piracy‐related activities. Most young people join on a ‘voluntary’ basis as a method of improving social and economic status ( 994 ). ( 984 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014; an international organisation in: Landinfo/Udlændingsstyrelsen, Update on security and protection issues in Mogadishu and South‐Central Somalia, March 2014 (http://landinfo.no/asset/2837/1/2837_1.pdf) accessed 26 May 2014, p. 15. ( 985 ) Security Analysis Expert, Austria: interview by the author, 13 May 2014. ( 986 ) Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al‐Shabaab. A Strategy of Choice or Necessity, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014 (http://csis.org/ publication/reinvention‐al‐shabaab) accessed 5 May 2014, p. 5. ( 987 ) Landinfo/Udlændingsstyrelsen, Update on security and protection issues in Mogadishu and South‐Central Somalia, March 2014 (http://landinfo.no/ asset/2837/1/2837_1.pdf) accessed 26 May 2014, p. 11. ( 988 ) Bryden, M., The Reinvention of Al‐Shabaab. A Strategy of Choice or Necessity, Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 2014 (http://csis.org/ publication/reinvention‐al‐shabaab) accessed 5 May 2014, p. 1. ( 989 ) Security Analysis Department, Weekly Security Report, 16 May 2014; other clashes with Robow took place at Xudur (22 June 2013) and again in southern Bakool (3 August 2013). See: Muhyadin Ahmed Roble/Jamestown Foundation (9.8.2013) P5 ( 990 ) UNDSS in: Landinfo/Udlændingsstyrelsen, Update on security and protection issues in Mogadishu and South‐Central Somalia, March 2014 (http://landinfo. no/asset/2837/1/2837_1.pdf) accessed 26 May 2014, p. 53. ( 991 ) UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013 (http:// www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.aspsymbol=S/2013/413) accessed 14 August 2014, p. 19; Bueger, C., ‘The Decline of Somali Piracy – Towards Long Term Solutions’, Piracy‐Studies.org [weblog], 1 September 2013 (http://piracy‐studies.org/2013/the‐decline‐of‐somali‐piracy‐towards‐long‐term‐solutions/) accessed 14 August 2014; Sterzi, F., ‘Offshore Somalia: Piracy, Naval Missions and Private Security’, International Commentary, vol. ix. no. 34, Somalia: Clan and State Politics, International Training Program for Conflict Management, December 2013 (http://www.itpcm.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2013/12/COMMENTARY_ SOMALIA_ISSUE_DEC_2013.pdf) accessed 14 August 2014. ( 992 ) IRIN, As Somali piracy falls, questions over what to do with captured pirates, 20 November 2013 (http://www.irinnews.org/report/99164/ as‐somali‐piracy‐falls‐questions‐over‐what‐to‐do‐with‐captured‐pirates) accessed 14 August 2014; UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia, 12 July 2013 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. aspsymbol=S/2013/413) accessed 14 August 2014, p. 19; Bueger, C., ‘The Decline of Somali Piracy – Towards Long Term Solutions’, Piracy‐Studies.org [weblog], 1 September 2013 (http://piracy‐studies.org/2013/the‐decline‐of‐somali‐piracy‐towards‐long‐term‐solutions/) accessed 14 August 2014; King’s College London, Combat piracy in Somalia through local investment, says study, 10 July 2014 (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/2014/July/Com bat‐piracy‐in‐Somalia‐through‐local‐investment,-says‐study-.aspx) accessed 14 August 2014; Sterzi, F., ‘Offshore Somalia: Piracy, Naval Missions and Private Security’, International Commentary, vol. ix. no. 34, Somalia: Clan and State Politics, International Training Program for Conflict Management, December 2013 (http://www.itpcm.dirpolis.sssup.it/files/2013/12/COMMENTARY_SOMALIA_ISSUE_DEC_2013.pdf) accessed 14 August 2014, p. 62. ( 993 ) Bueger, C., ‘The Decline of Somali Piracy – Towards Long Term Solutions’, Piracy‐Studies.org [weblog], 1 September 2013 (http://piracy‐studies.org/2013/ the‐decline‐of‐somali‐piracy‐towards‐long‐term‐solutions/) accessed 14 August 2014; King’s College London, Combat piracy in Somalia through local investment, says study, 10 July 2014 (http://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/2014/July/Combat‐piracy‐in‐Somalia‐through‐local‐investme nt,-says‐study-.aspx) accessed 14 August 2014. ( 994 ) Child Soldiers Initiative, Children and Youth in Marine Piracy: Causes, Consequences and the Way Forward, December 2012 (http://www.childsoldiers.org/ wp‐content/uploads/2014/02/Children‐and‐Youth‐in‐Marine‐Piracy‐RDCSI.pdf) accessed 19 August 2014, p. 3-7.
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3.2.2.1 Somali National Armed Force
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BZ-04-14-466-EN-C doi: 10.2847/3117
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COI-Report-Somalia

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