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FEDERATION OF EURO-ASIAN STOCK EXCHANGES SEMI ANNUAL REPORT OCTOBER 2006<br />

TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE<br />

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS<br />

Economic and Political Environment<br />

With healthy oil revenue allowing increased<br />

spending, and his adoption of populist<br />

approaches to the nuclear as well as social<br />

issues, the president is less vulnerable to<br />

internal political pressure than had initially<br />

been thought. The only serious challenge to<br />

his authority comes from fellow hardline<br />

conservatives, who control the legislature and<br />

the judiciary. Although the radical policies<br />

espoused by Mr. Ahmadinejad genuinely<br />

alarm more traditional conservatives, Ayatollah<br />

Khamenei is likely to maintain his support for<br />

the president.<br />

Iran's international relations will be dominated<br />

by the question of whether international<br />

agreement is possible over the development<br />

of its nuclear power program. Efforts by<br />

Europe and Russia to reach some form of<br />

compromise with Iran are likely to continue.<br />

There are increasing signs of a desire on both<br />

sides to achieve a negotiated outcome that<br />

can prevent a build-up of tension and possible<br />

moves through successive UN Security<br />

Council resolutions towards economic<br />

sanctions and even military action.<br />

Mr. Ahmadinejad's electoral appeal rested on<br />

his advocacy of more equitable economic<br />

opportunity–above all, the fairer and more<br />

expansive distribution of Iran's oil wealth.<br />

This is likely to manifest itself in strong<br />

government spending, including steeper<br />

increases in public-sector wages and firmer<br />

support for conservative-leaning<br />

institutions–all policies pursued by the<br />

conservative-dominated Majlis. Exceptionally<br />

strong oil prices are likely to encourage and<br />

facilitate such policies over the forecast<br />

period, and with large fiscal and current<br />

account surpluses over the near term, these<br />

could prevent financing pressures after 2007.<br />

However, relatively high spending also carries<br />

strong inflationary risks, particularly given<br />

threats to the monetary policy framework<br />

stemming from efforts by elements within the<br />

Majlis to further reduce lending rates–a policy<br />

that Mr. Ahmadinejad seems to support.<br />

Economic Performance<br />

Real GDP growth in fiscal year 2005/06<br />

(ending March 20th 2006) was 6.3%.<br />

Growth is forecast to ease to 5.4% in 2006/07,<br />

as oil output declines and import expansion,<br />

though slowing, remains strong. However,<br />

with oil revenue still rising on the back of<br />

exceptionally high oil prices, fiscal expenditure<br />

growth will stay strong. This in turn will<br />

continue to contribute to high levels of private<br />

consumption and investment. Overall growth<br />

will ease more markedly in 2007/08, as both<br />

oil prices and output levels decline. However,<br />

oil revenue will remain comparatively strong,<br />

resulting in firm, albeit declining, growth in<br />

public spending. Investment and private<br />

consumption levels will continue to rise, albeit<br />

at a slower rate, resulting in a forecast real<br />

GDP growth figure of 4.5%.<br />

The average rate of inflation fell to 13.4% in<br />

2005/06, from 14.8% the previous year. This<br />

decline is surprising, given liquidity pressures,<br />

rapidly increasing demand and low interest<br />

rates. Despite recent agreements to freeze the<br />

price of some goods, inflation is expected to<br />

rise in 2006-07 as oil revenue continues to<br />

boost liquidity levels. Average inflation is<br />

therefore forecast to increase to around 15.4%<br />

over the forecast period. Limited monetary<br />

policy tools make the task of combating<br />

inflation difficult for Bank Markazi (the central<br />

bank), leaving it largely dependent on arguing<br />

the case for restricting government spending<br />

growth.<br />

The central bank will continue to allow the<br />

rial to weaken in nominal terms over the<br />

forecast period, in order to support the<br />

competitiveness of non-oil exports. However,<br />

in trade-weighted terms the "depreciation" will<br />

be much less marked, and in real terms the<br />

rial will continue to strengthen against the US<br />

dollar. The pace of nominal exchange-rate<br />

decline is expected to be little changed, at just<br />

over 3%, in 2006/07, leaving the rial at an<br />

average of IR9,279:US$1 as the US currency<br />

falls only marginally against the euro. The rate<br />

of depreciation is forecast to slow to 2% in<br />

2007/08 as the dollar strengthens, leaving the<br />

rial at an average of IR9,514:US$1. Given<br />

strong inflation, these projections imply<br />

considerable real appreciation against the<br />

dollar and a broader misalignment of the<br />

currency, a trend that will have to be<br />

addressed eventually.<br />

* Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd., July 2006.<br />

Key Information Contacts<br />

TSE Services Company www.tsesc.com<br />

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran www.cbi.ir<br />

Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines (ICCIM) www.iccim.com<br />

Organization for Investment, Economic & Technical Assistance (OIETAI) a division of the Ministry of Finance: www.investiniran.ir<br />

2003-ORIGINS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (%) (a)<br />

2004-COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (%) (a)<br />

Services<br />

Industry<br />

Oil<br />

Private consumption<br />

Gross fixed investment<br />

Public consumption<br />

Net external sector<br />

Agriculture<br />

32.9<br />

60<br />

50<br />

54.2<br />

48.9<br />

40<br />

35.2<br />

10.8<br />

7.4<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

10.9<br />

-10<br />

-7.1<br />

PAGE 130

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