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FEDERATION OF EURO-ASIAN STOCK EXCHANGES SEMI ANNUAL REPORT OCTOBER 2006<br />
TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE<br />
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS<br />
Economic and Political Environment<br />
With healthy oil revenue allowing increased<br />
spending, and his adoption of populist<br />
approaches to the nuclear as well as social<br />
issues, the president is less vulnerable to<br />
internal political pressure than had initially<br />
been thought. The only serious challenge to<br />
his authority comes from fellow hardline<br />
conservatives, who control the legislature and<br />
the judiciary. Although the radical policies<br />
espoused by Mr. Ahmadinejad genuinely<br />
alarm more traditional conservatives, Ayatollah<br />
Khamenei is likely to maintain his support for<br />
the president.<br />
Iran's international relations will be dominated<br />
by the question of whether international<br />
agreement is possible over the development<br />
of its nuclear power program. Efforts by<br />
Europe and Russia to reach some form of<br />
compromise with Iran are likely to continue.<br />
There are increasing signs of a desire on both<br />
sides to achieve a negotiated outcome that<br />
can prevent a build-up of tension and possible<br />
moves through successive UN Security<br />
Council resolutions towards economic<br />
sanctions and even military action.<br />
Mr. Ahmadinejad's electoral appeal rested on<br />
his advocacy of more equitable economic<br />
opportunity–above all, the fairer and more<br />
expansive distribution of Iran's oil wealth.<br />
This is likely to manifest itself in strong<br />
government spending, including steeper<br />
increases in public-sector wages and firmer<br />
support for conservative-leaning<br />
institutions–all policies pursued by the<br />
conservative-dominated Majlis. Exceptionally<br />
strong oil prices are likely to encourage and<br />
facilitate such policies over the forecast<br />
period, and with large fiscal and current<br />
account surpluses over the near term, these<br />
could prevent financing pressures after 2007.<br />
However, relatively high spending also carries<br />
strong inflationary risks, particularly given<br />
threats to the monetary policy framework<br />
stemming from efforts by elements within the<br />
Majlis to further reduce lending rates–a policy<br />
that Mr. Ahmadinejad seems to support.<br />
Economic Performance<br />
Real GDP growth in fiscal year 2005/06<br />
(ending March 20th 2006) was 6.3%.<br />
Growth is forecast to ease to 5.4% in 2006/07,<br />
as oil output declines and import expansion,<br />
though slowing, remains strong. However,<br />
with oil revenue still rising on the back of<br />
exceptionally high oil prices, fiscal expenditure<br />
growth will stay strong. This in turn will<br />
continue to contribute to high levels of private<br />
consumption and investment. Overall growth<br />
will ease more markedly in 2007/08, as both<br />
oil prices and output levels decline. However,<br />
oil revenue will remain comparatively strong,<br />
resulting in firm, albeit declining, growth in<br />
public spending. Investment and private<br />
consumption levels will continue to rise, albeit<br />
at a slower rate, resulting in a forecast real<br />
GDP growth figure of 4.5%.<br />
The average rate of inflation fell to 13.4% in<br />
2005/06, from 14.8% the previous year. This<br />
decline is surprising, given liquidity pressures,<br />
rapidly increasing demand and low interest<br />
rates. Despite recent agreements to freeze the<br />
price of some goods, inflation is expected to<br />
rise in 2006-07 as oil revenue continues to<br />
boost liquidity levels. Average inflation is<br />
therefore forecast to increase to around 15.4%<br />
over the forecast period. Limited monetary<br />
policy tools make the task of combating<br />
inflation difficult for Bank Markazi (the central<br />
bank), leaving it largely dependent on arguing<br />
the case for restricting government spending<br />
growth.<br />
The central bank will continue to allow the<br />
rial to weaken in nominal terms over the<br />
forecast period, in order to support the<br />
competitiveness of non-oil exports. However,<br />
in trade-weighted terms the "depreciation" will<br />
be much less marked, and in real terms the<br />
rial will continue to strengthen against the US<br />
dollar. The pace of nominal exchange-rate<br />
decline is expected to be little changed, at just<br />
over 3%, in 2006/07, leaving the rial at an<br />
average of IR9,279:US$1 as the US currency<br />
falls only marginally against the euro. The rate<br />
of depreciation is forecast to slow to 2% in<br />
2007/08 as the dollar strengthens, leaving the<br />
rial at an average of IR9,514:US$1. Given<br />
strong inflation, these projections imply<br />
considerable real appreciation against the<br />
dollar and a broader misalignment of the<br />
currency, a trend that will have to be<br />
addressed eventually.<br />
* Economic Intelligence Unit Ltd., July 2006.<br />
Key Information Contacts<br />
TSE Services Company www.tsesc.com<br />
Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran www.cbi.ir<br />
Iranian Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines (ICCIM) www.iccim.com<br />
Organization for Investment, Economic & Technical Assistance (OIETAI) a division of the Ministry of Finance: www.investiniran.ir<br />
2003-ORIGINS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (%) (a)<br />
2004-COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (%) (a)<br />
Services<br />
Industry<br />
Oil<br />
Private consumption<br />
Gross fixed investment<br />
Public consumption<br />
Net external sector<br />
Agriculture<br />
32.9<br />
60<br />
50<br />
54.2<br />
48.9<br />
40<br />
35.2<br />
10.8<br />
7.4<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
10.9<br />
-10<br />
-7.1<br />
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