Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

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time consuming task but it must be done to
offset the rapid personnel turnover and trainup
time, and continuous OPTEMPO. Simple 3x5
cards that outline, step by step, the required
tasks to run the morning C2 preparatory session,
CG roundtable briefings, develop daily
BUA themes, etc., will get the team into a predictable
battle rhythm, increase time efficiency,
and reduce the stress associated with discovery
learning.
“No one wakes up in the morning wanting to
fail.” Leaders at all levels must always positively
coach, teach, and mentor their respective teams
or sections. They must always believe, and make
their troops believe, that regardless of the incredible
tasks and impossible deadlines, they can
and will accomplish the mission to standard.
OPTEMPO required a formal C2 chief of staff to
assist the C2 in orchestrating the various moving
parts and missions in the Perfume Palace and
downtown. I noted that the other MNF-I staffs
had authorized chiefs of staff. To this end, I informally
initiated weekly (Sunday) deconfliction
meetings with the other O-6 staff heads to help
synchronize efforts, share information, and focus
intelligence support across the MNF-I staff.
Next to the C2, the most important position in
the C2 is the Deputy C2 (DC2). The DC2 needs
to be operationally experienced, proficient in directing
a staff, a leader, and a team builder and
synchronizer. Anything less and the C2 risks
fracture within his organization and mission
failure.
The MNF-I OPTEMPO often required coordination
with the stateside IC during off duty hours
or weekends. This often created a synchronization
challenge for our more senior analysts
charged with the daily C2 0600 BUA updates
and CG Sunday morning roundtable briefings.
CENTCOM C2 noted this challenge and refocused
his Tampa based IZ cell main effort and
“local time” to Baghdad time. Although this understandably
created a certain level of discomfort
in CONUS, the CIOC analysts greatly appreciated
the support to the main effort in Iraq.
As stated earlier, not only does the CIOC provide
timely, relevant and predictive strategic
level intelligence to the CG, MNF-I and warfighters,
but the intelligence helps shape the strate-
gic battlespace for the MNF-I staff to prosecute
the four LOOs (political, diplomatic, economic
and security) in support of the JCP. Thus, intelligence
must support the strategic information
operations efforts (STRATEFF), operations
(STRATOPS), engagements and reconciliation
efforts with maligned individuals and groups
(FSEC), and overall strategy, plans and policies
as we evolve as an organization supporting the
post Provincial Iraq Control (PIC) environment
(Strategy Plans and Analysis).
The physical separation from the MNF-I staff
often created challenges involving priority of
support/work, information sharing, and coordinating
efforts. However, we mitigated this shortfall
by embedding intelligence officers across the
MNF-I staff. The intent was to inject operationally
savvy, and intelligence attuned officers who
could leverage the CIOC’s capabilities, understand
the staffing requirements and prioritize
intelligence support, and ultimately help the operational
staffers shape the battlefield conditions
in order to successfully prosecute the JCP.
The C2 was often tasked with supporting the
detainee review board by providing compelling
intelligence on various detainees, high value individuals,
and maligned actors in order to justify
their conviction in an Iraqi Court of Law. This
proved to be difficult as intelligence analysis
was not always translated into hard, evidentiary
proof. As we continue along the post-PIC timeline
we can expect an increasing support role
of this nature as MNF-I transitions more functions
to the Government of Iraq. Continued collaborative
efforts and formal education/sharing
between the IC and the legal system will help
mitigate some of these challenges.
April - June 2009 9
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Colonel Reyes is currently serving in HQ, INSCOM as the
G3, Director for Operations and Training, and will assume
command of the 116 th MI Group (NSA Gordon) this summer.
Prior to the CIOC deployment he commanded the Joint
Analysis Center , Molesworth, UK. He has commanded and
served in principal staff positions in MI, Infantry and Special
Forces units, and also served in the J3, Joint Staff. Colonel
Reyes previously deployed to OIF 1 as the G2, 101 st Airborne
Division (AASLT).