Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

Afghanistan is not Iraq, anyone who has deployed
to either knows this and is frequently reminded.
However, whether addressing an urban insurgency
or a rural insurgency, “…the HUMINT collectors
must be able to maintain daily contact with the local
population.” 17 The closer a HUMINTer can get
to the population the better. In a bottom-up intelligence
structure, the place of the collector is at the
bottom, not mid-way.
There has been much resistance to the changes
that constitute this concept. The majority of this resistance
comes not from the collector himself, but
from those with great HUMINT experience in the
pre-9/11 Army. Team centricity is well established
in the HUMINT schoolhouse and amongst its subject
matter experts. But it has been my experience that
when this concept is tried, the hands-on experience
turns some doubters into believers. Just like my
Team Leader in Garmah, who fought against separating
the HCT and living with the companies, once
they go, most don’t look back. Still others remain
entirely obstinate, because it is not taught that way
and involves letting go of control. In the end, however,
this concept is really just another manifestation
of the HUMINT collector being able to, “operate
with minimal equipment and deploy in all operational
environments in support of offensive, defensive,
stability and reconstruction operations, or civil
support operations. Based on solid planning and
preparation, HUMINT collection can provide timely
information if deployed forward in support of maneuver
elements.” 18
“There are never enough HUMINT collectors to
meet all requirements.” 19 But this is a maxim true of
all intelligence, whether collection or analysis, and
doubly so in COIN. The increased intelligence burden
that COIN creates easily exposes the inadequacy
of the BCT intelligence modified table of equipment.
Low-Level Voice Intercept Teams in every CoIST
would allow Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection
and tactical intelligence fusion at the company, but
the MICO’s SIGINT manning simply doesn’t support
it. The UAS platoon is designed to only have one aircraft
flying an ISR mission at a time. But, with more
operators and maintainers, it would not be difficult
to sustain aircraft conducting persistent surveillance
on multiple objectives.
There aren’t enough collection assets in the BCT’s
MICO to satisfy the requirements of the maneuver
company. This problem is exacerbated even further
by the employment of field artillery and brigade special
troops battalions as maneuver formations, as is
common practice in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As
demonstrated earlier in the article, intelligence collection
in a COIN is not “plug and play,” you cannot
train effective intelligence collection systems
while divorced from maneuver. The modular design
of the BCT necessitates an intelligence collection system
that is integrated with maneuver during training
and in combat. All of these factors place the tactical
company grade MI officer in the pillory for the lack of
organic intelligence capability within the BCT. It becomes
his job to “create” more. Training non-MI MOS
soldiers in the crafts of some INTs involves plotting an
absurd course between the desires of maneuver and
the requirements of statutes, both military and nonmilitary.
But that, clearly, is another article.
Endnotes
1. Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency,
and Peacekeeping (St. Petersburg: Hailer Publishing, 1971), 98-9.
2. Kitson, 97.
3. FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September
2006, 3-2.
4. Kitson, 96.
5. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), 313.
6. FM 2-22.3, 2-12.
7. Scott, 317.
8. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 5-39.
9. Interview with Major Matthew Gregory, USA, FOB Salerno,
Afghanistan, 2 May 2009.
10. Ibid.
11. Interview. Major Stewart Lindsay, USA, FOB Salerno,
Afghanistan, 12 May 2009.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview, Gregory.
16. This is not intended as criticism of the out-going unit. Their
approach was not unreasonable and, in fact, might be considered
normal and customary. Instead, the intent is to document the gains
achieved over the traditional methods of HUMINT operations.
17. FM 2-22.3, 3-9.
18. FM 2-22.3, 1-31.
19. FM 2-22.3, 1-32.
Captain David Beall is currently serving as the MICO
Commander for the 4/25 th Airborne BCT in Operation Enduring
Freedom. He also served as the S2 for TF 3-509 th IN (ABN) and
an Armor Platoon Leader in TF 1-16 IN (MECH) during his two
deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is a graduate of
the University of Montana and an Anna Sobel Levy Fellow.
April - June 2009 37