Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin - Federation of American ...

Perception management, influencing operations,
product dissemination, measures of effectiveness,
propaganda, persuasion
Introduction
These are buzzwords heard every day in the
9 th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Battalion
(Airborne) headquarters as commanders and staff
plan and prepare to support tactical PSYOP missions
worldwide. I served in this unit for nearly nine
months as the Battalion S2 after graduating from
the Military Intelligence (MI) Basic Course. It was
not, however, until my move from Battalion S2 to
Company Intelligence Officer that the above phrases
came to mean anything to me.
Tactical PSYOP companies are attached to other
units; therefore, intelligence requirements are
typically met by the supported unit, similar to the
way administrative needs are met. Unfortunately
for an eager lieutenant fresh out of the basic
course, being a Battalion S2 in PSYOP meant
passports, clearances, and security management.
I served under leaders who recognized this issue
and within a few months the unit was willing
to forfeit a battalion staff officer to be the first
ever Tactical PSYOP Company Intelligence Officer.
During my time in this position, I served in the
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-
Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), among the military’s
finest. Serving among men and women of
this caliber in the Special Operations Forces (SOF)
community was not only intimidating, it was inspiring.
With this new found respect and title I
earnestly set out on a quest to crack the code on
intelligence support to PSYOP.
The Threat
The first step for any intelligence professional is
to gain atmospherics on the current threat and in
my case PSYOP preparation of the operational environment
(OE). This included understanding the
idealism that drove militias and high value individuals
(HVIs), but more specifically it meant seeing
the conflict from the Iraqi people’s perspective. To
understand their perspective the OE must be put
in context of culture, education, religious affilia-
by First Lieutenant Katie Winwood
tion, economic stature, history and every other anthropological
consideration. Ultimately I was trying
to understand how Coalition Forces could change
perceptions, and eventually behaviors. Since I was
mostly alone in my quest among my analyst peers, I
found a way to simultaneously support Psychological
Operations and bring a PSYOP perspective to SOF
intelligence.
The Challenge
The concept of perception management or influencing
with words is not always embraced in the
Armed Forces and certainly was not in an organization
as kinetic-based as CJSOTF-AP. However, after
five years of lethal operations military planners
at every level were forced to re-evaluate the need
for such force and ultimately place more emphasis
on non-kinetic effects. This transition was due in
part to the success of the surge, the Sunni awakening,
and the ceasefire agreement with Muqtada
Al-Sadr (leader of a major Shia militia). But mostly it
was the realization that changing perceptions may
just be the key to getting out of Iraq. Through these
turns of events PSYOP, and consequently intelligence
support to PSYOP, received a level of interest
at CJSOTF-AP that was unlikely given to PSYOP
planners during the earlier phases of the war.
PSYOP leaders took advantage of this momentum
by making perception management a consideration
on every mission and intimately integrating themselves
within the J3. Conspiracy theories run rampant
among a populace as ill informed as Iraq’s and
experience has taught us if we don’t tell the story
someone else will.
Often times a three man Tactical PSYOP Team
(TPT) is the only voice of an entire Army. Intelligence
support to these operations is critical and leaves little
room for error. There is a common saying in the
4 th PSYOP Group (A) that “no PSYOP is better than
bad PSYOP,” and the same is true for intelligence.
The majority of my work came before operations began
and after they completed. This included finding
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