Identity and Experience_Hamilton_1996

92 Identity and Experience
In chapter 111, I referred to a passage in the Samyutta NiklZya which
appeared to suggest that there is a discriminative function to vifiiitipz, and
that this can be applied to each of its six types. The passage was translated
there as follows: "And what bh.ikkhus, do you call vin"n"tiy? It is called vin"n"tiy
because it discriminate^".^' Vin"n"tina appears to discriminate whether
something is sour or bitter, acid or sweet, alkaline or non-alkaline, saline or
non-saline. The tentative suggestion was made in chapter 111 that the
difference between the discriminatory functions of saii7ii and vin"n"tipz might
be one of degree: vin"n"iv discerns that a taste is sweet or sour, but it is san"n"ti
that discriminates or identifies it more precisely as, for example, sugar or
lemon. But we also noted that the author(s) both of this passage and the
similar passage in the Mh-r)edallmtta seem to have difficulty describing the
difference between san"Cti and vifiiitina, using standard formulas about
colours and tastes. The verbs used in both these passages to define vin"n"tipz
and sarZti are z+'tintiti and saEj'a'ntiti respecti~ely.~~ These verbs are associated
with cognition, but neither of them has a precise meaning and their use
further indicates that the author(s) had difficulty in attempting to define
vin"n"tina and san"n"a'. The description of the cognitive process can assist us
here, in that it contains no suggestion that vin"n"tiya acts in a discriminatory
capacity. If one bears this in mind, together with the understanding of
viKEtina as consciousness of, one can make more sense of the apparent
confusion created by the author(s) of the Samyutta Nika'ya passage and the
Mahiivedalhsutta. Kalupahana makes the helpful suggestion that the phrase
vij6niti ... tmti vin"n"iyn ti vuccati might be interpreted "vin"ii6;?a stands for the
function of 'being conscious"'.49 This accords with vin"n"@za as consciousness
of, and as such it functions in providing awareness when something is
discriminated, regardless of whether the discrimination is general or
precise. Perhaps this is the point that the author of these passages has failed
to understand. I have stated that we have to know that we hear something.
We also have to know when we discriminate something. ViECa'na does not
specifically do the discriminating, but, rather, is the awareness by which we
experience every stage of the cognitive process, including the process of
discriminating.
In this sense, vin"n"tiyz is comparable to p7ajn"ti as described in the KaMtaki
Upani~ad (which is almost certainly later than the time when the Buddha
was teaching). There we read:
Verily, without pr.jn"a, speech does not make known any name at all. One
thinks 'My mind was elsewhere; I was not aware of this name'. Without
prajr?, breath does not make known any smell at all. One thinks 'My mind
was elsewhere; I was not aware of any smell' (and so on through all the
The passage concludes: