Identity and Experience_Hamilton_1996

I 12
Identity and Experience
purpose of detached observation, as we shall discuss in chapter VIII. But we
read in the Cetokhilasutta that the purpose of knowing that one's states of
mind are unwholesome is so that one can direct one's attention towards
getting rid of such unwholesomeness and thus make progress in the
dhamma.161 Thus a passage in the Majhima Nikqa states: "A bhikkhu has
power over his state of mind; he is not the slave of his state of mind".16*
We also read in the Majjizima Nikiiya that it is in citta that one's
"wholesome moral habits" (kusalasilii) and "unwholesome moral habits"
(akusalas2'lZ) originate (citta~arnu?thiinZ).'~~ I stated earlier in this chapter that
the association in the Upani:ads and the Vedanta traditions of cit with
Brahman might be one reason why citta is sometimes understood in terms
of an entity. Passages such as this in the Majhima Nikea which state that it is
the source of volitions, also probably account both for substantialistic interpretations
of ~ittal~~ and for definitions of it solely in terms of thinking,165 in
both cases overlooking the central meaning I have suggested here of 'state
of mind'. But such passages do not refer to an entity nor to citta as that
which wills. If they did, one might ask why it is not included either in the
analysis of the human being into khandhas, or in the pa6casamuppZda
formula. What is meant here is that as it is the complex causal nexus of
volitions which one experiences (discussed in chapter rv) that continuously
conditions one's actions, thoughts and so on, and as one's state of mind at
any given moment as it were reflects that complex causal nexus, so the
causal origin of one's actions, thoughts and so on can become associated
with one's state of mind. But this is a manner of speaking. Though citta
from moment to moment as it were reflects one's causal nexus, this does
not mean that it actually is that causal nexus: it is perhaps better understood
as an abstract reflection. We see here an important similarity
between vifiiiiina and citta: they are both associated with the qualitative
condition of a human being. Viiifiap functions as the provider of awareness
and continuity by which one knows one's moral condition (in its broadest
sense), and citta is an abstract representation of that moral condition. This
reflects the fact that ethical concerns (also in their broadest sense) are
paramount in Buddhism. In attempting to understand the close association
of citta and volitions indicated by the manner of speaking referred to in this
paragraph, one can perhaps understand better the fact that citta comes
from the same verbal root as the active terms cetanZ, cetas and cinteti.
It is important to remember here that an indication of meditative
attainment also represents progress on the path to insight in a cognitive
sense. The removal of unwholesome states does not correspond to
becoming 'nicer' in some sentimental sense. Though the defilements which
represent ignorance are described in moral terms, and though the
development of morality (sila) is fundamental to the Buddhist teachings, the
removal of defilements implies the development of wisdom, which is part of
the cognitive process. In giving us an abstract picture of our state of mind,